Opinion
C. A. 7:21-cv-1982-TMC-KFM
08-11-2021
Tiarra Tate, Plaintiff, v. Suminoe Textile of America and Staffing Associates, Inc., Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's motion to remand this action to state court (doc. 14). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
On March 23, 2021, the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, filed a complaint alleging two causes of action against the defendants: (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and (2) breach of contract (doc. 1-1 at 13). On July 2, 2021, defendant Suminoe Textile of America (“Suminoe”), with the consent of defendant Staffing Associates, Inc. (“Staffing”), removed the action to this court based upon federal question jurisdiction (doc. 1 at 3). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Within 21 days of the filing of the defendants' answers (docs. 7, 12), the plaintiff filed an amended complaint as a matter of course on July 27, 2021 (doc. 13). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). That same day, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand this action to state court (doc. 14). On August 10, 2021, defendant Suminoe filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim (doc. 16) and a response to the plaintiff's motion to remand (doc. 17), and defendant Staffing filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim (doc. 18). Defendant Staffing did not file a response to the plaintiff's motion to remand.
The plaintiff's amended complaint cites the South Carolina Human Affairs Law (“SCHAL”), South Carolina Code § 1-13-80, as the basis for the race discrimination cause of action, rather than Title VII as alleged in the original complaint (doc. 13 at 3). In the motion to remand, the plaintiff's counsel states that the amended complaint was filed “to remove the allegations alleged to create the federal question jurisdiction” and argues that federal question jurisdiction no longer exists (doc. 14 at 3). In response, defendant Suminoe notes that the amended complaint still alleges conduct that would be prohibited by Title VII (which conduct it denies) and still seeks compensatory and punitive damages, which are not available under the SCHAL (doc. 17 at 3) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-90(d)(9)). However, defendant Suminoe “credits counsel's representation . . . that Plaintiff is 'removing her claims under federal law 42 U.S.C. § 2000e'” and further states that “[predicated upon that understanding, Suminoe will respond no further and await the Court's decision as to its jurisdiction upon consideration” of the motion to remand and amended complaint. (doc. 17 at 3) (quoting doc. 14 at 1)). As noted, defendant Staffing did not file any opposition to the motion to remand.
Here, the defendants properly removed the plaintiff's original complaint based on federal question jurisdiction in light of the race discrimination claim arising under federal law and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. In Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007) the Supreme Court of the United States noted in dicta that “when a defendant removes a case to federal court based on the presence of a federal claim, an amendment eliminating the original basis for federal jurisdiction generally does not defeat jurisdiction.” 549 U.S. 457, 474 n.6 (2007). However, courts within the Fourth Circuit have relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as well as the enumerated factors in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), to elaborate on when an amendment eliminating the original basis for federal jurisdiction warrants remand. See, e.g., Wood v. Crane Co., 764 F.3d 316, 318, 320-22 (4th Cir. 2014); Niemitalo, Inc. v. Greenville Cty., C. A. No. 6:20-1432-HMH, 2020 WL 2745696, at *2 (D.S.C. May 27, 2020); Flowers v. South Carolina, C. A. No. 8:15-706-TMC, 2015 WL 6903581, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 9, 2015); Williams v. Montgomery Cty., Md., C. A. No. GJH-15-25, 2015 WL 4506806, at *4 (D. Md. July 23, 2015). Under § 1367, “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if - . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). District courts have discretion in making this determination and “should consider and weigh [several factors, including] . . . judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. . . .” Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 (citation omitted). Additionally, district courts should consider “manipulative tactics” as another non-dispositive factor. Id. at 357. “When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction. . . . ” Id.
Here, the balance of the applicable factors supports remanding this matter to state court. As in Niemitalo, where the plaintiff amended his complaint and omitted all of the federal claims less than one month after he filed the original complaint and before the defendant filed an answer, judicial economy supports remand here. See 2020 WL 2745696, at *2 (remanding when “Plaintiff eliminated all of its federal claims at an early stage of the litigation . . . “). Moreover, the court has not expended substantial resources in this case, other than deciding this motion, and has not addressed the merits. Further, regarding the interests of convenience and comity, the Fourth Circuit “evince[s] a strong preference that state law issues be left to state courts . . ., ” Arrington v. City of Raleigh, No. 09-1207, 2010 WL 750085, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2010), and “South Carolina has a strong interest in deciding the state law issues that remain.” Niemitalo, 2020 WL 2745696, at *2. Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has iterated that “[n]eedless decisions of state law [by federal courts] should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Moreover, under these circumstances, fairness does not require a federal court to retain an action that was only recently removed. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and grant the plaintiff's motion to remand this matter to state court.
Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's motion to remand (doc. 14) be granted. Should the district court adopt this recommendation, the defendants' motions to dismiss (docs. 16, 18) will be rendered moot.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 300 East Washington Street Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).