Opinion
October 1, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Saratoga County (Brown, J.).
Plaintiffs commenced this action claiming that defendant had breached its duty to provide them with certain benefits under their health benefits package. After the parties had engaged in extensive discovery, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add a fifth cause of action for punitive damages. Supreme Court granted the motion and defendant appeals.
Since this action was commenced, plaintiff Frank A. Tate, Sr. has died and his sons have been substituted as parties. For purposes of this decision, however, references to plaintiffs are to Tate and his wife.
While recognizing that leave to serve an amended pleading should be freely granted in the absence of significant prejudice (see, CPLR 3025 [b]; Plattsburgh Distrib. Co. v Hudson Val. Wine Co., 108 A.D.2d 1043, 1044), it is also well settled that an independent cause of action for punitive damages does not exist in this State (see, Paroff v Muss, 171 A.D.2d 782, 783; Sylvester v Stephens, 148 A.D.2d 523, 524; Fiesel v Nanuet Props. Corp., 125 A.D.2d 292). In addition, to the extent that plaintiffs' fifth cause of action attempts to allege emotional distress, it has been held that in a breach of contract action such as this, damages for emotional distress are not available (see, Wehringer v Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co., 57 N.Y.2d 757; Klein v Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 173 A.D.2d 1006, 1008, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 863; Fleming v Allstate Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 426, affd 66 N.Y.2d 838, cert denied 475 U.S. 1096). Consequently, Supreme Court erred in allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add the fifth cause of action.
The remaining question is whether plaintiffs may be entitled to recover punitive damages at all (see, Sylvester v Stephens, supra, at 524). This Court has consistently held that "[p]unitive damages are not available for an isolated transaction such as a breach of an insurance contract, even if committed willfully and without justification" (Home Ins. Co. v Karantonis, 124 A.D.2d 368, 369; see, Sweazey v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 169 A.D.2d 43, 46, lv dismissed 78 N.Y.2d 1072; Davis v Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 167 A.D.2d 714, 715-716; Kinnarney v Natale Auto Body, 157 A.D.2d 938). For plaintiffs to recover, they would need to allege facts showing that defendant has engaged in fraudulent conduct (see, O'Dell v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 145 A.D.2d 791, 792), which requires an "'extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure by defendant to carry out its contract'" (supra, at 792, quoting Hebert v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 124 A.D.2d 958, 959, lv dismissed 69 N.Y.2d 1038) or, in other words, morally culpable conduct by defendant (see, Halpin v Prudential Ins. Co., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 907; Kinnarney v Natale Auto Body, supra, at 939). Viewed from this perspective, we find that plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim for punitive damages and, therefore, the motion should have been denied.
Weiss, P.J., Mikoll, Yesawich Jr., Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and motion denied.