Opinion
CASE NO. 00-CV-75042-DT.
November 30, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL I. INTRODUCTION
The Court has before it Plaintiff Michael J. Taormina's pro se civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at the Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan. Having reviewed Plaintiff's complaint, the Court dismisses it pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she was deprived of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie. Hakken v. Washtenaw County, 901 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1995). Under The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), district courts are required to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). If a complaint fails to pass muster under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A, the "district court should sua sponte dismiss the complaint." Id. at 612. Even where a prisoner has paid the full filing fee, as is the case here, a court may properly dismiss the action prior to service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or § 1915A. McClaine-Bey v. Woods, 194 F.3d 1313, 1999 WL 801525,* 1 (6th Cir. September 30, 1999) (citing to McGore, 114 F.3d at 604-05); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1999).
III. COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the Egeler Correctional Facility on December 22, 1998, he was taken to the hospital by prison staff after having difficulty breathing. After initially being taken to the Dwayne Waters Hospital, plaintiff was transported to the intensive care unit at Foote Hospital. Plaintiff lost consciousness thereafter and had no recollection of any events that transpired at the hospital for the next eight days. When plaintiff regained consciousness, he was told that he had suffered double pneumonia and a mild heart attack, as a result of which he had been placed on life support. After being in the intensive care unit for fourteen days, plaintiff was discharged from the hospital and returned to the Egeler Facility.
Upon his return to the Egeler Facility, plaintiff was placed in segregation and was charged with a major misconduct for assaulting a staff member on December 30, 1998, while he was still hospitalized at Foote Hospital. Plaintiff has attached a Michigan State Police report and other documentation to his complaint which indicates that the victim of the alleged assault was Defendant Jason Blaine Wheeler, a prison guard at the Egeler Facility. Plaintiff remained in segregation for ten days before being found not guilty on January 8, 1999 by a Michigan Department of Corrections (M.D.O.C.) Hearing Officer of the assault charges. The hearing officer found plaintiff not guilty on the ground that he was psychotic and therefore not criminally responsible, as well as for the fact that the medication that he was receiving while he was hospitalized would have prevented him from being able to form the intent to commit an assault.
Plaintiff was thereafter transferred to the Parnell Facility where he obtained a job in electrical maintenance. Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 15, 1999, Defendant Wheeler filed a false police report against him with the Michigan State Police for assault and attempted escape. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wheeler's report was false because he already knew that plaintiff was not responsible for his actions because of his mental illness and the medications that he was on. Plaintiff spent another five days in segregation after being charged with the crime of assault on a prison employee. On or about July 6, 1999, the Jackson County Prosecutor moved to nolle prosequi the case and the charge was dismissed without prejudice against plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that the actions of Defendant Wheeler amount to the intentional infliction of emotional distress because Wheeler knew that by having plaintiff charged with a crime, plaintiff would be placed in segregation, his security level would be raised, he would be fingerprinted, and would receive more prison time on false criminal allegations. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Grayson, the warden at Parnell Facility, allowed plaintiff to be placed in segregation after knowing that plaintiff had beaten the assault on staff charges. Plaintiff seeks compensatory or punitive damages against each defendant in the amount of five hundred thousand ($ 500,000.00) dollars, extraordinary damages against each defendant in the amount of five hundred thousand ($ 500,000.00), and any other relief this Court deems just and proper.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed because he has failed to allege that he suffered any physical injury as a result of the defendants' actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) states:
No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) precludes claims for emotional injury without any prior physical injury, regardless of the statutory or constitutional basis of the legal wrong. Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under § 1997e(e), plaintiff would be unable to recover for emotional distress for being placed in segregation, unless he first suffered a physical injury that was a result of his being confined in segregation, rather than in the general population. West v. McCaughtry, 971 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (E.D. Wis. 1997). Because plaintiff has made no allegation of receiving any physical injury as a result of being placed in segregation, he cannot recover for any alleged emotional distress that he may have suffered as a result of being placed in segregation. Id. Since plaintiff has not alleged any prerequisite physical injury from which his emotional distress arises, all of his claims for monetary relief are barred under § 1997e(e). Ashann-Ra v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 112 F. Supp.2d 559, 566 (W.D. Va. 2000). The Court will therefore dismiss the complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff'`s complaint is DISMISSED.