Opinion
No. 2024-CC-00028
02-27-2024
Donald F. TANNER & Dana Francis, Individually and on Behalf of Their Son, Donald F. Tanner, Jr. v. James HOLLIS, Safeway Transportation, L.L.C., RLC Trucking, L.L.C. and Plaza Insurance Company
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Genovese, J., would grant and assigns reasons. Crain, J., would grant. McCallum, J., would grant. CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Applying For Supervisory Writ, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Number(s) 621,070, Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Number(s) 55,639-CW.
1Writ application denied.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., would grant and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., would grant.
McCallum, J., would grant.
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
1I agree with the decision to deny this writ. In my view, the trial judge did not abuse his vast discretion in finding good cause and granting plaintiffs’ motion to continue. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2) ("For good cause shown, the court may order a continuance of the hearing."). This Court recently stated: "[T]he long-held tenet that good cause does not exist when a continuance is granted solely to allow the consideration of untimely filed pleadings or other summary judgment evidence remains." Make v. LCMC Health Holdings LLC, 23-0025 (La. 3/14/23), 357 So.3d 322 (emphasis added). See also Auricchio v. Harriston, 20-1167 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So. 3d 660 (recognizing the trial judge may continue hearing for "good cause" under article 966(C)(2)). Here, the trial judge weighed and balanced several factors, ultimately determining that the motion to continue was not a mere pretext to obtain an extension to file untimely pleadings. Thus, under these circumstances, I agree with the decision to deny this writ.
GENOVESE, J., would grant this writ for the following reasons:
1I find that the trial court abused its discretion and disregarded the time constraints and mandates of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 by granting Plaintiffs’ motion to continue the hearing on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment to allow for further discovery after the time deadline for filing an opposition had passed. Although Plaintiffs asserted that additional time was needed to depose their accident reconstruction exert, the expert had been retained by Plaintiffs in January 2019; therefore, Plaintiffs had over four-and-one-half years to obtain the expert’s opinion prior to the September 25, 2023 hearing date. Further, Plaintiffs did not indicate they needed more time to file a response when they filed their opposition and did not seek to continue the hearing until two days prior to the hearing date.
For these reasons, I find that the trial court’s continuance of the hearing on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was an abuse of its discretion under La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(C)(2), as Plaintiffs failed to show good cause therefor. Therefore, I would grant this writ, reverse the lower courts’ rulings and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.