Opinion
No. 484283
June 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a motor vehicle accident case involving two vehicles that collided on March 30, 2002. The plaintiff has sued Gerald Patrick, the operator of the vehicle that negligently struck her, as well as the defendant Sarah Bella whom she alleges was the owner of that vehicle. With respect to Bella, liability is premised on General Statutes § 52-183, which provides: "In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption."
Bella has moved for summary judgment, claiming that she was not the owner of the offending vehicle on March 30, 2002. Her argument is based on the assumption that the definition of "owner" in General Statutes § 14-1(61) applies to the word "owner" as it is used in § 52-183. In addition she has submitted a copy of the police report on which the investigating police officer indicated that Patrick was owner of the vehicle; a poor quality copy of what appears to be a motor vehicle registration reflecting that the vehicle was registered to Patrick as of March 19, 2002, having been sold to him by Bella for $100; a certificate of search from the Department of Motor Vehicles, stating that Patrick was the owner of record of the vehicle as of March 28, 2002; and a certificate of title indicating that the vehicle was sold by Sarah Patrick to Gerald Patrick on April 21, 2002, after the date of the accident. At oral argument, Bella argued that the fact that the vehicle was registered to Gerald Patrick at the time of the accident negates any claim that she was the owner of the vehicle at that time. Also, at oral argument, the parties stipulated that Sarah Bella and Sarah Patrick were the same person.
The plaintiff opposes the motion for summary judgment pointing to the disparity between the date of transfer on the title and the information reflected in the other documents.
As a preliminary matter, the court observes that General Statutes § 14-1(61) does not control the definition of "owner" in § 52-183. General Statutes § 14-1(a)(61) provides: "Terms used in this chapter shall be construed as follows, unless another construction is clearly apparent from the language or context in which the term is used or unless the construction is inconsistent with the manifest intention of the General Assembly . . . (61) `Owner' means any person holding title to a motor vehicle, or having the legal right to register the same, including purchasers under conditional bills of sale . . ."
However, § 52-183 is not in the same chapter of the General Statutes as is § 14-1. General Statutes § 14-1 is contained in chapter 246 while General Statutes § 52-183 is contained in chapter 899. Thus, the definition of "owner" in § 14-1(61) does not necessarily apply to the word as used in § 52-183. Where a statutory definition of a term is lacking, courts generally turn to General Statutes § 1-1(a) which provides: "In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly."
"The word `owner' has no fixed meaning but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used. Warren v. Borawski, 130 Conn. 676, 679, 37 A.2d 364 (1944)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bauer v. Pounds, 61 Conn.App. 29, 43, 762 A.2d 499 (2000) (discussing owner of motor vehicle). Furthermore, in Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 576, 316 A.2d 407 (1972), where the issue was whether the State of Connecticut owned a vehicle involved in a collision for purposes of General Statutes § 52-556, the court stated: "The term `owner' is one of general application and includes one having an interest other than the full legal and beneficial title . . . The word owner is one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right . . . It is not a technical term and, thus, is not confined to a person who has the absolute right in a chattel, but also applies to a person who has possession and control thereof . . .
"This court has held that one may be the `owner' of a motor vehicle within the meaning of a statute although another has strict legal title; and that the word `owner' in the motor vehicle law in effect at the time, which provided that no suit could be had for injuries to a car unless the owner registered it, referred to any person having an interest in the property even under a special title. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., [ 92 Conn. 252, 254, 102 A. 573 (1917)]. In other cases we have held that `[t]he word "owner" . . . includes both the legal and equitable owner and anyone having an interest in the automobile under a special title.' Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer Lighterage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 120, 123 A. 16; Marciel v. Berman, 104 Conn. 165, 168, 169, 132 A. 397 . . . In Camp v. Rogers, Conn. 291, 298, we held that the term `owner' as used in the statute meant the person in control of the vehicle at the time and not necessarily the actual owner . . . It is clear that the word `owner' is not restricted to one who has the legal or rightful title, whether the possessor or not. This is especially so where the word is applied to motor vehicles. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 254, 102 A. 573; Camp v. Rogers, supra; see also Burakowski v. Grustas, 134 Conn. 205, 56 A.2d 461." Id., 580-82; see also Platcow v. Yasuda Fire Marine Ins. Co., 59 Conn.App. 47, 54, 755 A.2d 356 (2000) (owner of a motor vehicle may be its lessee); State v. Marsala, 59 Conn.App. 135, 140, 755 A.2d 965, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 948, 762 A.2d 905 (2000) (towing company with a recorded lien for towing and storage charges on the automobile registered to another held to be owner); Nisinzweig v. Kurien, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, No. X05 CV 96 0150688 S (Aug. 21, 2001) (Tierney, J.) ( 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 342).
"In seeking summary judgment it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 558, 864 A.2d 1 (2004).
In view of the fact that the certificate of title reflects that the vehicle was sold by Sarah Patrick (also known as Sarah Bella) to the defendant Gerald Patrick after the accident and that the defendant Sarah Bella has failed to show that she had no possessory right to the vehicle as of the date of the accident she has not shown that it is "quite clear" what the truth is and has not sustained her burden of proof on the motion. The motion for summary judgment, therefore, is denied.
BY THE COURT
Bruce L. Levin Judge of the Superior Court