Opinion
3:20-cv-527-TAV-HBG
07-12-2021
NANCY ABBIE TALLENT, Plaintiff, v. POLICE OFFICER PHILLIP KNIGHT, OAK RIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT CITY OF OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE, JAIL ADMINISTRATOR RICHARD PARKER, SHERIFF RUSSELL BARKER, and ANDERSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS A. VARLAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This civil action is before the Court on Defendant Oak Ridge Police Department's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [Doc. 43]. Plaintiff responded in opposition [Doc. 49]; defendant replied [Doc. 52]. Plaintiff then filed a motion to strike defendant's reply [Doc. 53]. For the reasons set forth below, Oak Ridge Police Department will be dismissed.
It is well-settled that a police department is not an entity capable of being sued under 18 U.S.C § 1983, under which plaintiff asserts her claims. See Mathews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that a county police department was not an entity that may be sued); Bradford v. Gardner, 578 F.Supp. 382, 383 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (dismissing sheriff's department as an entity that cannot be sued under § 1983). Plaintiff argues in opposition that “[t]he very essence of Section 1983 allows suit for civil rights violations that supersede immunity” and that granting “this dismissal would in itself be a violation of the Plaintiff's rights” [Doc. 49 p. 2]. However, plaintiff does not provide authority for this proposition, and binding Sixth Circuit case law holds to the contrary.
Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because where a plaintiff has sued an entity that is not capable of being sued, the proper remedy is dismissal of that entity. See Bradford, 578 F.Supp. at 383; Walker v. Union Cty., Tenn., No. 13-102-DLB-HBG, 2013 WL 1912936, at *1-2 (E.D. Tenn. May 8, 2013).
For these reasons, the motion to dismiss the Oak Ridge Police Department [Doc. 43] is hereby GRANTED, and Oak Ridge Police Department is DISMISSED from this case with prejudice.
Plaintiff's motion to strike states that defendant did not serve the motion to plaintiff [Doc. 53 p. 1]. The Court notes that the motion itself contains a certificate of service that the pleading was filed electronically and that it would be sent to all parties indicated on the electronic filing receipt [Doc. 43 p. 3]. The filing system confirms that the motion was electronically mailed to plaintiff's e-mail address. Therefore, plaintiff's contentions regarding service of this motion are incorrect. Furthermore, plaintiff's motion is entitled “Motion to Strike” [Doc. 53]. She does not identify under which rule of civil procedure she brings this motion, but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a “court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). The decision to strike is left to the Court's sound discretion. Welch v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-336, 2015 WL 3795918, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. June 18, 2015). The motion here is not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous, and plaintiff's arguments do not attempt to portray it as such. Accordingly, the motion to strike [Doc. 53] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.