Opinion
No. 4-04-00622-CR
Delivered and Filed: February 22, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2003-CR-5073, Honorable James Barlow, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Camilo Talamantez was charged by indictment with possession of a controlled substance. He filed a motion to suppress, a hearing was held, and the motion was denied. Talamantez pled no contest and the trial court sentenced him to two years of community supervision, a $1200 fine, and 120 hours of community service. He now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Background
On March 14, 2004, around 1:00 a.m., Talamantez was stopped in his vehicle by Deputy Aaron Barasa. Barasa's testimony revealed he believed Talamantez was traveling at a "high rate of speed." This belief stemmed from visual observation, not from the use of radar equipment. After stopping his vehicle, Talamantez was requested to exit the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, Barasa immediately asked Talamantez if he was in possession of any weapons. Talamantez responded affirmatively and handed the deputy a pocketknife. The deputy then opened the knife and noticed a white powdery substance on the tip of the blade. After being asked what the substance was, Talamantez responded it was sheetrock. Barasa conducted a field-test which positively identified the substance as cocaine. Next, Deputy Barasa asked Talamantez if he had any drugs on him, and he responded that he had some inside his pants. After the cocaine was retrieved from within Talamantez's pants, he was placed under arrest. At no time before the arrest was Talamantez given Miranda warnings or cited for a traffic violation.Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress: 1) almost total deference is given to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when those findings involve the evaluation of a witness' credibility or demeanor; and 2) the trial court's application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); State v. Arriaga, 5 S.W.3d 804, 804 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd).Traffic Stop
"Temporary detention of individuals, during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968). In determining whether a detention was reasonable, a dual inquiry is necessary: 1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and 2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Id. at 19-20.A. Justification
Under the first prong, Talamantez contends it was unreasonable for Deputy Barasa to perform a traffic stop when Barasa used no radar equipment to determine the vehicle's speed and he was traveling in the opposite direction of Talamantez at the time of this determination. However, if an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting that a person has committed a traffic offense, the officer may initiate a traffic stop. Zervos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd). Thus, the issue is whether Deputy Barasa had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. We review de novo a trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. In a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility, including what weight, if any, is to be given to a witness' testimony. State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). We review the record in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Deputy Barasa testified that Talamantez's vehicle was speeding. To determine whether this is reasonable, due weight is given to specific reasonable inferences which the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Due to the deputy's visual observation that the vehicle was driving "very fast" combined with Barasa's ten years experience as an officer, which includes previous training as a radar operator, the record supports a conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed to determine Talamantez was violating a traffic law.B. Scope
In determining whether a detention is reasonable, the second step of the analysis requires the officer's actions be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Id. at 19-20. Talamantez alleges the investigatory detention, even if initially justified, went beyond its scope and became a fishing expedition. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (holding an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the detention); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (noting that a stop may not be used as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity). Talamantez claims the deputy went beyond the scope of the stop after he established Talamantez's information was accurate and did not cite him for a violation, but instead pursued further questioning and actions unrelated to the initial stop. Specifically, Talamantez argues the deputy's retrieval of the pocketknife, the narcotics field-test, and the questioning went beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop. We disagree with Talamantez's arguments. Upon contact with Talamantez, Deputy Barasa asked him to step out of the car. Immediately upon exiting the vehicle, Barasa asked him if he had any weapons, to which he responded affirmatively. Due to the risk confronting officers upon approaching people in automobiles, such a question is related to officer safety and does not go beyond the scope of the initial stop. See Diltz v. State, 172 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1997)). Talamantez then handed Deputy Barasa a pocketknife. Barasa testified that the knife was a small pocketknife and was not illegal to carry. Barasa opened the knife to look at the blade, and noticed a white powdery substance on the edge. He asked Talamantez what the substance was, and Talamantez replied that the substance was sheetrock which accumulated on his knife blade during work. Barasa testified the substance was consistent with sheetrock; nevertheless, he took the knife to his patrol car and performed a field-test for narcotics. The Supreme Court has recognized that a valid traffic stop provides an opportunity for inquiry and observation which goes beyond mere investigation of the motorist's driving habits. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 33. During a traffic stop, an officer may perform certain activities incident to the stop, such as demanding proof of insurance and a driver's license, as well as conducting an outstanding warrant check. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Furthermore, `"[W]hen officers are running a computer check, they are entitled to question the offender about things unrelated to the initial stop because it does not extend the length of the stop.'" Montagnino v. State, No. 04-03-00090-CR, 2003 WL 22047213, at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, Sept. 3, 2003, pet. ref'd, untimely filed) (mem. op.) (quoting Green v. State, 93 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd)). Despite the fact that Talamantez's pocketknife was legal to carry, a pocketknife can produce serious bodily injury and can be considered a deadly weapon. See Vaughn v. State, 634 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982) (holding that the testimony provided was sufficient to establish that the pocketknife was a deadly weapon). Because Talamantez handed Deputy Barasa the knife, retaining the knife until the traffic stop was completed did not extend beyond the scope of the traffic stop. Because the knife could be considered a deadly weapon and was voluntarily turned over to the deputy, and because the record reveals no facts which indicate the field-test extended the duration of the stop, we overrule Talamantez's argument.Custodial Interrogation
Talamantez claims that any statements he made must be suppressed because he was never read his rights before custodial interrogation. Talamantez contends custodial interrogation occurred when the deputy asked if Talamantez had any weapons or drugs on his person. Statements stemming from a custodial interrogation may not be used against a defendant unless the State can demonstrate that certain procedural safeguards were present to ensure the defendant's right against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "Although a traffic stop significantly curtails the freedom of action of the driver . . . of a vehicle and constitutes a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it does not, by itself, render the motorist or passengers `in custody' for purposes of the Miranda doctrine." Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990, pet. ref'd). Thus, the requirement to give Miranda warnings is not triggered unless questioning by law enforcement escalates to a custodial interrogation. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). We apply a two-step analysis to determine whether an individual is in custody. First, the court examines all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether there was a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. This initial inquiry is a factual determination which focuses on the objective circumstances of the interrogation. Id. at 323. Our review will give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of these facts. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Second, in light of those circumstances surrounding the interrogation, the court considers whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). This determination is an application of the legal standard to the facts which involves mixed questions of law and fact. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. Our review regarding the second inquiry is de novo. Id. The Supreme Court has clearly held that a custody determination depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not the subjective views of the officer or the person subjected to questioning. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323; Garza v. State, 34 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. ref'd). Therefore, the subjective views of the officer or the suspect are irrelevant to a custody determination, unless those views are manifested by words or actions of the officer which would lead a reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has provided four general scenarios which may constitute a finding of custody:1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way;
2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave;
3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted; and
4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave.Garza, 34 S.W.3d at 593 (citing Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)). However, in the first three scenarios, the restraint on freedom must be associated with an arrest rather than an investigative detention. Id. at 593. Furthermore, the fourth scenario requires the officer's knowledge of probable cause to be expressed to the individual being questioned, and this, considered in the totality of the circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe he is not free to go. Id. A typical traffic stop is more analogous to a " Terry stop" than a formal arrest; however, if a motorist is treated in a manner that renders him "in custody," the full breadth of constitutional protections is required. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1994) (indicating the traffic stop's similarities to a Terry stop because the traffic stop is public in nature, temporary and brief, and the driver knows he will be free to leave after a relatively short time). After applying the two-step analysis to the deputy's first question, asking whether Talamantez had any weapons on his person, we hold that no custodial interrogation took place. Here the objective facts illustrate a routine traffic stop occurred around 1:00 a.m. and the officer asked the question immediately upon Talamantez's exit of the vehicle. The question is consistent with assuring officer safety. See Diltz, 172 S.W.3d at 684. There was nothing to indicate this detention was consistent with a formal arrest. As for the second step of the analysis, at the time of this question, there was no probable cause to arrest Talamantez. The focus of the investigation at this point was the officer's safety and Talamantez's traffic violation, and the purpose of the traffic stop was not yet complete. See id. at 685 (concluding that the officer had already determined the driver was not intoxicated, but the purpose of the traffic stop was for failing to drive within a single lane of traffic and this determination was not yet complete). Because Talamantez was not in custody when this question was asked, no Miranda warnings were required. The officer's second question, regarding possession of drugs, occurred after Deputy Barasa had taken possession of the knife and positively determined that cocaine was on the edge of the blade. For the first step of the custody determination, the same objective analysis applies. This was a routine stop late at night. However, at this point, the officer had confirmed the powder on the knife was cocaine, thus providing the deputy with probable cause to arrest Talamantez. This is analogous to the fourth scenario, provided by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Dowthitt. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254. The court also explained that this scenario requires the officer to relay his knowledge of probable cause to the accused, but this did not happen here. Id. Despite the officer testifying that the defendant was not free to go, this fact was never conveyed to Talamantez. Under the first inquiry of the two-step test for a custody determination, the objective facts here do not equate to a formal arrest or even a restraint similar to that of a formal arrest. Talamantez was still being detained for a traffic stop, and the purpose of the stop was not yet completed. Under the second step of the analysis, the fact which supports a finding of custody reveals that Deputy Barasa had probable cause to arrest Talamantez for narcotics possession. The noncustodial facts show that Talamantez was stopped for a minor traffic violation, and the event occurred in public. The questioning never became accusatorial or threatening, and Talamantez was not placed in handcuffs or in a police car until after answering the question at issue. See Garza, 34 S.W.3d at 593 (indicating that the interrogation had become accusatorial, thus providing support for a determination that the suspect was in custody). Based on the record, we conclude Talamantez was never in custody, thus Miranda warnings were not required.