But both arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent: Even if Plaintiffs could prove fraud, we do not recognize an "extrinsic fraud" exception to Rooker-Feldman. See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that "new allegations of fraud might create grounds for appeal, but that appeal should be brought in the state courts"); see also, e.g., Bradshaw v. Gatterman, 658 F. App'x 359, 362 (10th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the "argument that extrinsic fraud can override Rooker-Feldman"). Second, even if Plaintiffs could prove "no reasonable opportunity" to raise their federal claims in the state court proceedings, it is not the case that the state court "had to actually hear every issue" as Plaintiffs argue (Appellants' Reply Br. at 5). The doctrine applies "regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims."

Our precedent goes the other way: "new allegations of fraud might create grounds for appeal . . . [but] that appeal should be brought in the state courts." Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006). Presumably realizing the implications of his failure to lodge a timely appeal in state court, Bradshaw tells us he is currently seeking a writ of mandamus from the Kansas Supreme Court.

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine " ‘exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the political process by private individuals, even if their intent is to eliminate competition.’ " Tal v. Hogan , 453 F.3d 1244, 1257 n.13, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. , 111 F.3d 1495, 1503 (10th Cir. 1997) ). The scope of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine depends "on the source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue."

laint by reference and central to the plaintiff's claim, unless their authenticity is questioned. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) ("[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice."); Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) ("A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based only on the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice."); Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that court may properly consider on motion to dismiss documents central to plaintiff's claim and referred to in complaint, where document's authenticity is not in dispute); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that no conversion is required when a court takes judicial notice of its own files and records and facts that are matter of public record). The documents, however, "may only be considered to show their contents, not to prove the truth of matters asserted therein."

The Noerr–Pennington doctrine “exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the political process by private individuals, even if their intent is to eliminate competition.” Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1259 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Zimomra v. Alamo Rent–A–Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1503 (10th Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Coll v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876, 894 (10th Cir.2011); see generally United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961). “The doctrine arises from the [Supreme] Court's conclusion that the Sherman Act was not intended to derogate the First Amendment right of citizens to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). “At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires that a plaintiff set forth the ‘who, what, when, where and how’ of the alleged fraud, and must set forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.” United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield, 472 F.3d 702, 726–27 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotations omitted); see Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1263 (10th Cir.2006). To determine if factual allegations satisfy Rule 9(b), courts generally review only the text of the complaint.

George v. Urb. Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2016); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1269 (10th Cir. 2006). RICO also has a causation element.

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010); Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006). Documents attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings, if they are referred to in the complaint, central to the plaintiff's claims, and not challenged as inauthentic.

Plains Res., Inc. v. Gable, 782 F.2d 883, 887 (10th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985)). "The elements of a civil RICO claim are (1) investment in, control of, or conduct of (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006).

And, the Circuit has explained that Article III standing differs from “the standing requirements in the antitrust context” which are “more rigorous than that of the Constitution.” Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir. 2006). While “[h]arm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact” under Article III