Opinion
Civil No. 03-2562 ADM/JSM
June 8, 2004
John M. Gearin, Esq., Gearin Law Office, Oakdale, MN, for Plaintiff
John D. Lamey Ill., Esq., Lamey Law Office, Oakdale, MN, for Plaintiff
Michael J. Rothman, Esq., Winthrop Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment, or alternatively for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 14], was argued before the undersigned United States District Judge on April 28, 2004. Plaintiff Janos Takacs ("Plaintiff") alleges that Defendant improperly ceased paying disability benefits, and brings claims for breach of contract and unconscionability of the contract provisions. Defendant avers that Plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff originally asserted several additional claims including unjust enrichment, duress, promissory and equitable estoppel and waiver. Plaintiff now abandons these causes of action. See Pl's Mem. in Opp. at 21.
II. BACKGROUND
Defendant issued two disability benefits insurance policies to Plaintiff. The first, No. G-538119, was issued on June 12, 1992 ("1992 Policy"), and the second, No. G-557633, was issued on June 12, 1995 ("1995 Policy"). See 1992 Policy at Schedule Page 1 (Donnelly Aff. Ex.1); 1995 Policy at Schedule Page 1 (Donnelly Aff. Ex. 2). Both Policies advise the recipient to " READ IT WITH CARE," and state that "Guardian hereby furnishes insurance to the extent set out in this policy." See 1992 Policy at 1-2; 1995 Policy at 1-2.
The 1992 Policy provides for own occupation disability for five years, and thereafter for any occupation disability until age 65. See Donnelly Aff. ¶ 3; see also 1992 Policy at 3, Schedule Pages 1-2. It pays total disability benefits of $1300 per month if the insured meets the following criteria: (1) becomes totally disabled while the policy is effective; (2) is totally disabled due to sickness or injury; (3) remains disabled to the end of the elimination period; and (4) remains under a physician's care. See Donnelly Aff. ¶ 3; see also 1992 Policy at 3-4, Schedule Pages 1-2. As defined in the 1992 Policy, "Totally Disabled" means the following:
"Elimination period" as defined in the 1992 Policy is "a consecutive number of days for which we will not pay benefits at the start of a claim." The insured "must be disabled on all of those days." The elimination period in the 1992 Policy is three months. See 1992 Policy at 3, Schedule Page 1.
Until we have paid benefits for five years in the same claim, total disability means that, because of sickness or injury, you are not able to perform the major duties of your occupation. After that in the same claim, total disability means that, you are not able to perform the major duties of your occupation and you are not at work in any occupation.
Your occupation means your regular work at the time you become disabled.See 1992 Policy at 3.
The 1992 Policy includes a proof of loss provision explaining that Defendant will not pay benefits if evidence of loss is delayed for more than one year. The provision specifically states:
You must give us proof of loss at our home office or at any agency office:
• for loss from disability within 90 days after the end of the period for which we are liable; and
• for any other loss within 90 days after the date of loss.
If you cannot reasonably give us proof within such time, we will not deny or reduce claims if you give us proof as soon as possible. But we will not pay benefits in any case if proof is delayed for more than one year, unless you have lacked legal capacity.Id. at 6.
Finally, the 1992 Policy also contains a rider for residual disability benefits and defines them as the following:
Residual benefits means that you are at work and are not totally disabled under the terms of this policy; but, because of sickness or injury, you are not able to earn at a rate of at least 80% of your prior income.Id. at Form No. AR606.
Plaintiff exercised an option under the 1992 Policy and purchased the 1995 Policy on June 12, 1995. See 1995 Policy at Schedule Page 1. The 1995 Policy provides for a monthly indemnity of $750 a month, and contains the same proof of loss requirement and definition for total disability as the 1992 Policy. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 10; see also 1995 Policy at 3, 6, Schedule Pages 1-3. Like the 1992 Policy, it also provides for own occupation disability for five years, and thereafter for any occupation disability until age 65. Id. The 1995 Policy includes a rider for residual disability benefits as well. Id. at Form No. RSDL-09E.
Plaintiff is a massage therapist who specialized in deep tissue massage. See J. Takacs Dep. at 217-18 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 15). In the 1992 Policy application, Plaintiff described his occupation as "sports massage therapist," and listed his duties as "President of European Therapeutic, therapeutic/rehabilitation sports massage, and specialist in kinethotherapy [sic]." 1992 Policy, Form No. AP2-01 MN at 2. In the 1995 Policy application, Plaintiff stated that he was employed as a "massage therapist," and claimed his duties were "massage therapy." 1995 Policy, Form No. AP2-94 MN at 2.
For purposes of the instant Motion, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party See Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff was injured in a car accident in April 1997, and suffered a boutonniere deformity to his left index finger. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 13. As a result, his finger does not flex and has a limited range of motion. Husband Dep. at 105-06 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 7). Plaintiff attempted to work after the accident, but found he could not practice deep tissue massage because of his finger injury. Kinney Dep. at 15-16 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 5); Kullman Dep. at 26-30 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 16); Madden Dep. at 39, 45-49 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 6); J. Takacs Dep. at 217-18. Consequently, Plaintiff submitted a claim for total disability benefits on August 11, 1997. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 13. As part of his claim, Plaintiff relied on the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Jeffrey Husband ("Dr. Husband"), that Plaintiff was totally disabled. Husband Dep. at 113-14.
Defendant determined that Plaintiff had become totally disabled on June 1, 1997, and began paying him total disability benefits on September 1, 1997, after Plaintiff satisfied the three — month elimination period. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 13. However, Defendant stopped paying benefits on January 1, 1999, after exercising a policy requirement that Plaintiff be examined by Dr. Melissa Barton ("Dr. Barton"). Id. ¶ 14; Letter from Barton to Birthwright of 12/14/98 at 1-3 (Donnelly Aff. Ex. 3); 1992 Policy at 6; 1995 Policy at 6. Dr. Barton examined Plaintiff on December 10, 1998, and determined that he was not totally disabled because he could perform some types of massage therapy. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 14; Letter from Barton to Birthwright of 12/14/98 at 1-3. She stated that Plaintiff's finger "should be stable enough to perform lighter massage tasks and more gentle massage techniques." Id. Concerning Plaintiff's ability to perform deep tissue massage, Dr. Barton concluded that "although he could do this to some degree, prolonged massage may be difficult and the finger may tire." Letter from Barton to Birthwright of 12/14/98 at 3.
On January 6, 1999, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter that explained Defendant's decision to deny benefits. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 15; Letter from Birthwright to Takacs of 01/06/99. However, Defendant decided to reassess this conclusion after complaints from Daniel O'Leary, Plaintiff's previous counsel, and Joseph Rodwell, the agent who sold Plaintiff the 1995 Policy. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 16; Letter from Rodwell to Klima of 01/14/99 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 6); Letter from Klima to Magnussen of 01/14/99 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 12). To reevaluate Plaintiff's claim, Defendant asked Dr. Husband to review Dr. Barton's report. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 5. Dr. Husband opined that "Dr. Barton performed a thorough and accurate report," and stated that "there is nothing in this report which is inaccurate." Id.; see also Letter from Husband to Casey of 03/08/99 (Donnelly Aff Ex. 5). Dr. Husband later stated that when he reviewed Dr. Barton's report, he still believed that Plaintiff could not perform the "pounding and deep pushing" required for deep therapeutic massage. Husband Dep. at 123-25 (Gearin Aff. Ex. 7).
Defendant also asked licensed massage therapist Carlos Diaz ("Diaz") to review Dr. Barton's report. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 17; Letter from Diaz of 04/01/99 (Donnelly Aff. Ex. 6). Diaz concluded that Plaintiff was "capable of working in the massage field with his limiting hand condition." Id. Defendant paid Plaintiff benefits on an exception basis from January 1, 1999 through April 1, 1999, while it reconsidered his total disability claim. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 16.
After reevaluating Plaintiff's claim, Defendant reasserted its earlier position that Plaintiff was not totally disabled. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant informed Plaintiff of its decision in a letter dated April 6, 1999, and also advised Plaintiff that he might be eligible for residual disability benefits if he returned to work. Id.
In June 1999, Plaintiff submitted a claim for residual benefits. Id. ¶ 19. Based on its belief that Plaintiff was not totally disabled, and evidence from Plaintiff that he was working for reduced wages, Defendant paid him 100% of residual benefits from June 1, 1999, through September 1, 1999, and paid 50% of residual benefits from September 1, 1999, through December 1, 1999. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. On February 8, 2000, Plaintiff's representative informed Defendant that Plaintiff had been unable to work as of November 1999. Id. ¶ 19.
Defendant continued to evaluate Plaintiffs disability status in early 2000, and in February 2000 asked Plaintiff to submit additional information from his treating physician at the time, Dr. Gabor Hejj ("Dr. Hejj"). Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff lived in Hungary during this period and the examination was performed there. After receiving Dr. Hejj's report in March 2000, Defendant forwarded the document to Dr. Barton for her review. In a letter dated May 4, 2000, Dr. Barton told Defendant that Dr. Hejj's report did not give her a basis to make a definitive conclusion. Id. ¶ 21; Letter from Barton to Casey of 05/04/00 (Donnelly Aff. Ex. 8). Consequently, Defendant maintained its determination that Plaintiff was no longer totally disabled, and required Plaintiff to have Dr. Barton examine him again once he returned to the United States. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 22. While Defendant states that it wrote a letter to Plaintiff in May 2000 explaining his disability status, Plaintiff disputes whether he received the letter, which is undated. Id.: Undated Letter from Casey to Takacs (Donnelly Aff. Ex. 9). Plaintiff next contacted Defendant in January 2003, and filed this lawsuit on March 27, 2003. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 22.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant now moves for summary judgment, or alternatively for partial summary judgment, on Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and unconscionability of the contract provisions.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial."Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
B. Breach of Contract Claim regarding Total Disability Benefits
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's breach of contract claim concerning total disability benefits. Defendant argues that there are no disputed factual issues because multiple experts opined that Plaintiff was not totally disabled as a massage therapist during the relevant time period. Defendant bases its argument on Plaintiff's description of his occupation and its major duties in his 1992 and 1995 Policy applications. Plaintiff counters that he was totally disabled because his injuries prevented him from performing deep tissue massage, the only massage therapy he marketed to clients.
In the initial Memorandum of Law supporting this Motion, Defendant requested partial summary judgment limiting own occupation disability payments to five years under the 1992 and 1995 Policies. See Def's Mem. in Support at 9-10. Defendant argues that the Policies' plain language requires this interpretation. See Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2001); 1992 Policy at 3; 1995 Policy at 3. Plaintiff did not contest Defendant's argument in his opposing memorandum or during oral argument. Therefore, due to Plaintiff's apparent acquiescence and the ordinary meaning of the Policies' plain language, Defendant is granted summary judgment on this point.
According to Minnesota case law, insurance policies should be "construed liberally in favor of the insured and every reasonable doubt as to meaning of the language used resolved in his favor." Weum v. Mut. Benefit Health Accident Ass'n, Omaha, 54 N.W.2d 20, 29 (Minn. 1952). Courts will "avoid an interpretation which would forfeit rights which the insured may have believed he was securing. . . ." Id. Applying this standard to a case involving total disability benefits, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded:
Total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness or inability to perform any task relating to one's employment. When used in the occupational sense, it means the inability to perform the substantial and material parts of one's occupation in the customary and usual manner and with substantial continuity.Laidlaw v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, 255 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Minn. 1977) (emphasis added) (citing Blazek v. N. Am. Life Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 36, 41 n. 2 (Minn. 1957)); see also Weum, 54 N.W.2d at 26, 32.
Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment given this definition of total disability. The 1992 and 1995 Policies expressly state that "total disability" means the insured cannot "perform the major duties of your occupation" due to "sickness or injury." See 1992 Policy at 3; 1995 Policy at 3. Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff could complete "lighter massage techniques" despite his finger condition. Letter from Barton to Birthwright of 12/14/98 at 2. However, if light massage techniques do not comprise Plaintiffs major occupational duties, this ability does not foreclose total disability. While Plaintiff did not specify that he performed deep tissue massage in his application, he proffers deposition testimony that this was his specialty. See Dep. of J. Takacs at 217-21; Dep. of M. Takacs at 16-18. Plaintiff asserts that he did not perform other types of massage. Dep. of J. Takacs at 221. Further, both Dr. Barton and Dr. Husband concluded that Plaintiff's injuries limited his ability to practice deep therapeutic massage. Letter from Barton to Birthwright of 12/14/98 at 3; Husband Dep. at 123-25. Because issues of material fact exist concerning both the nature of Plaintiff's job tasks and the extent of his injuries, summary judgment on the breach of contract claim is denied.
Defendant also argues that summary judgment is warranted because Plaintiff failed to comply with the 1992 and 1995 Policies' proof of loss requirement. Plaintiff counters that there are disputed factual issues about whether Plaintiff submitted timely proof of loss, and argues in the alternative that Defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged delay.
Proof of loss and notification deadlines in insurance policies are enforceable under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 62A.04, subd. 2(7);Sterling State Bank v. Va. Sur. Co., 173 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 1969). However, courts liberally construe such provisions in favor of the insured, and an insured's substantial compliance with them is legally sufficient. Id. Moreover, coverage is not forfeited unless the insurance company proves it suffered harm from the delay, and there is no automatic presumption of prejudice. Ryan v. I.T.T. Life Ins. Corp., 450 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Minn. 1990). Though the "mere passage of time between an event and notification can be prejudicial," determining whether prejudice exists "is dependant on the circumstances of each case." Id; see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 239 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1976) (holding that an eighteen-month delay in notification was not prejudicial because the insurance company had not shown that the underlying facts had changed or that the delay hampered its investigation).
Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on its notice of proof of loss argument. First, disputed factual issues about the parties' correspondence undermine Defendant's position. After Plaintiff submitted the report from Dr. Hejj, Defendant apparently sent Plaintiff an undated letter explaining that it would not resume total disability benefits.See Donnelly Aff. ¶ 22, Ex. 9. The letter also required Plaintiff, who was then living in Hungary, to schedule a second examination with Dr. Barton once he returned to the United States. Donnelly Aff. Ex. 9. However, because Plaintiff claims that he did not receive this letter, the parties' last communication may have occurred when Plaintiff submitted Dr. Hejj's report. Under this scenario, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's most recent request and provided proof of loss. Further, Plaintiff was not aware that Defendant had reasserted its belief that he was not totally disabled, or that Defendant requested additional information. The Policies' proof of loss provision does not require additional proof absent a request from Defendant. Consequently, if Plaintiff's version of events is accurate, he did comply with the Policies' proof of loss provision and Defendant's argument is untenable. See 1992 Policy at 6; 1995 Policy at 6.
Additionally, Defendant has not shown that it was prejudiced by a delay, even assuming that Plaintiff received the undated letter. Defendant claims that Plaintiff's untimeliness denied it the opportunity to have Plaintiff undergo an independent medical examination from May 2000 to the present, and that this loss constitutes prejudice. However, Defendant did have an opportunity to have a physician of its choice evaluate Plaintiff's injuries, as Dr. Barton examined Plaintiff. Donnelly Aff. ¶ 14. Despite Defendant's concern that it could not evaluate Plaintiff from May 2000 to present, Plaintiff's treating physician opined that Plaintiffs inability to perform deep tissue massage had not changed since he was injured. Husband Dep. at 118, 123-26. This suggests that Plaintiff's condition is static, and that Defendant's inability to reevaluate Plaintiff's injuries is not prejudicial.
Defendant's reliance on Lane v. Provident Life Accident Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp.2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2001) is misplaced. The facts here differ from Lane, where the court held that the insured failed to provide timely notice of loss and did not rebut the presumed prejudicial impact on the insurance company. Id. at 1283. First, Lane was decided under Florida law which, contrary to Minnesota law, contains an automatic presumption of prejudice for delayed proof of loss. Id. at 1287. Second, unlike Plaintiff who submitted a claim within four months of being injured, the insured inLane did not submit any proof of loss until fourteen months after he was diagnosed with a skin ailment. Id. at 1284. The insured's condition resolved shortly thereafter, and the insurance company never had a chance to examine him while he was sick.Id. Because Defendant has examined Plaintiff, and his injury is a deformity which will persist indefinitely, Defendant has not suffered similar prejudice. Therefore, Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion is denied as to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim concerning total disability benefits.
C. Breach of Contract Claim regarding Residual Disability Benefits
Defendant also moves for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's breach of contract claim on residual benefits. The terms governing residual disability benefits are detailed in riders to the 1992 and 1995 Policies. See 1992 Policy at Form No. AR606; 1995 Policy at Form No. RSFL-09E. The riders incorporate all provisions from the general Policies, including the proof of loss requirement. Id.
Plaintiff is not entitled to residual disability benefits under the terms of the Policies because he has not proffered any evidence that he worked after November 1999. Because payments for total disability benefits and residual disability benefits are mutually exclusive under the Policies, any proof of loss for total disability benefits does not necessarily constitute evidence of loss for residual benefits. See id. Based on information from Plaintiff, Defendant paid him residual benefits from June 1, 1999 through December 1, 1999. Donnelly Aff. ¶¶ 18-19. However, on February 8, 2000, Plaintiff's representative informed Defendant that Plaintiff was unable to work as of November 1999. Id. Defendant has not breached the Policies by not paying additional residual benefits because Plaintiff has not provided evidence of employment or submitted a claim for residual benefits since he stopped working in November 1999. See 1992 Policy at 6, Form No. AR606; 1995 Policy at 6, Form No. RSFL-09E. Therefore, any claim for breach of contract regarding residual benefits fails as a matter of law.
D. Unconscionability Claim
Finally, Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the Policies are unconscionable. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot proceed with this claim to the extent that he seeks equitable relief because he possesses an adequate remedy at law. Defendant asserts further that the insurance policies are not unconscionable, and disputes that Plaintiff may advance the claim under the reasonable expectations doctrine.
Under Minnesota law, a contract is unconscionable if "it is such that no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889); Kaufman Stewart, Inc. v. Weinbrenner Shoe Co., 589 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn.App. 1999). Application of the unconscionability doctrine is meant to prevent oppression and unfair surprise. Osgood v. Med. Inc., 415 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Minn.App. 1987). Whether a contractual provision is unconscionable is a question of law.Id. If a court determines that a contract was unconscionable at the time it was entered, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce it without the unconscionable language, or limit application of the offending clause "to avoid any unconscionable result." See Kaufmann Stewart, Inc., 589 N.W.2d at 502.
Plaintiff's unconscionability claim fails as a matter of law. First, the claim is barred to the extent Plaintiff bases it on equitable concerns because Plaintiff has a legal remedy in his breach of contract action. See ServiceMaster v. GAB Business Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1996) (holding that "[a] party may not have equitable relief where there is an adequate remedy at law available"). Second, neither insurance policy meets the standard for unconscionability under Minnesota law. Plaintiff does not indicate which particular contractual provisions are unconscionable, but suggests generally that Defendant "unfairly refused to pay [Plaintiffs] benefits."See Compl. ¶ 23. However, Plaintiff's disagreement with Defendant about his entitlement to disability benefits does not, by itself, render the contract unconscionable. Plaintiff's argument merely suggests that he disputes Defendant's factual findings in denying his claim. Further, a contract is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it possess unequal bargaining power. See Vierkant v. AMCO Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn.App. 1996) (explaining that not all contracts of adhesion are unconscionable).
Plaintiff's attempt to salvage his unconscionability claim based on the reasonable expectations doctrine is unavailing. The doctrine is a theory of contract interpretation used to analyze insurance policies in limited situations. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277-79 (Minn. 1985); see also St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 695, 702-3 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that Minnesota courts have consistently restricted application of the doctrine to exceptional cases). In applying the doctrine, courts should ask "whether the insured's expectation of coverage is reasonable given all of the facts and circumstances." Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn.App. 1989). If reasonable, an insured's beliefs "will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations."Atwater Creamery Co., 366 N.W.2d at 277. Factors relevant to the analysis include ambiguity of the contract language, existence of hidden or obscure exclusions, the insurer's explanation of such exclusions, and the public's general understanding of the contractual provisions. See Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 311. The doctrine is not meant to automatically favor either party, and does not "remove from the insured the responsibility to read the policy. . . ." Id.; see also Atwater Creamery Co., 366 N.W.2d at 278.
Plaintiff's reasonable expectations argument lacks merit because he does not explain which policy provisions defied his expectations. While Plaintiff emphasizes his belief that he would receive benefits and highlights the parties' disparate bargaining power, these factors alone do not warrant application of the doctrine. See St. Paul Marine Ins. Co., 968 F.2d at 702-03. Rather, Plaintiff's disagreement with Defendant's conclusion that he is no longer totally disabled presents a factual issue that is unrelated to the reasonable expectations doctrine. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's unconscionability claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Defendant The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 14] is GRANTED as to Defendant's assertion that the 1992 and 1995 Policies provide for a five-year own occupation disability benefit period in the same claim;
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is also GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims for Breach of Contract concerning Residual Disability Benefits, Unjust Enrichment, Unconscionability, Duress, Promissory and Equitable Estoppel, and Waiver, but is DENIED as to Plaintiff's claim for Breach of Contract concerning Total Disability Benefits;
3. Plaintiff's Claims for Breach of Contract concerning Residual Disability Benefits, Unjust Enrichment, Unconscionability, Duress, Promissory and Equitable Estoppel, and Waiver [Docket No. 1] are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.