Opinion
No. 14-08-00151-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed October 8, 2009.
On Appeal from the 434th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 08-CV-161345.
Panel consists of Chief Justice HEDGES and Justices YATES and FROST.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case involves a district court's reversal of an agency order. In two issues, appellant Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission ("TABC") asserts that the district court erred by reversing a TABC order cancelling an alcoholic beverage permit held by AGA Trading, Inc., d/b/a San Diego Food Mart ("AGA"). For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and render judgment affirming TABC's original order.
TABC brought an enforcement action against AGA to cancel its Wine and Beer Retailer's Off-Premise Permit, alleging that AGA made a false or misleading statement in connection with its permit application. According to a certificate of service signed by TABC's representative, on July 3, 2007, TABC sent notice of a hearing on the enforcement action to AGA at "Aga Trading Inc., d/b/a San Diego Food Mart, 311 S Doctor Ee Dunlap St, San Diego, TX 783849998"; TABC's records show AGA's address as "311 S. Doctor Ee Dunlap Street, San Diego, Texas 78384." The signed green card was returned and showed that the notice of hearing was delivered on July 5. The typed portion of the green card contains the same address as the certificate of service, but at some point, the part of the typed address on the green card that indicates "St" was marked through and "Hwy" was handwritten alongside it. AGA failed to appear, and the hearing proceeded on a default basis. The presiding administrative law judge made findings of fact — including a finding that AGA "received the Notice of Hearing on July 5, 2007" — and recommended that TABC cancel AGA's permit. TABC's Assistant Administrator subsequently issued an order adopting the administrative judge's findings and cancelling AGA's permit. AGA filed a motion for rehearing claiming it had not received actual notice of the hearing and asserting a defense to the allegation that it had made a false or misleading statement. Attached to the motion was, among other things, an affidavit signed by Rafiq Merchant, AGA's president, asserting he "did not receive actual notice of the hearing." TABC denied the motion for rehearing, and AGA appealed to the districtcourt. The district court reversed, finding that notice was ineffective because there were "address problems" and the signature on the green card "clearly" was not Merchant's. This appeal followed.
In its first issue, TABC argues that the trial court erred in reversing its order because there was substantial evidence to support a finding that AGA received notice of the hearing. We review TABC's order under the substantial evidence rule. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 11.67(b) (Vernon 2007); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2) (Vernon 2008). The substantial evidence rule gives courts a limited standard of review and grants significant deference to agency expertise. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1995); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Guajardo, 970 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). "The true test is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in the record for the action taken by the agency." City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994); see also Guajardo, 970 S.W.2d at 605. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but the record may actually preponderate against the agency decision and nonetheless amount to substantial evidence. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d at 792-93. The agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and the party appealing the agency decision has the burden of proving otherwise. City of El Paso, 883 S.W.2d 185. If evidence can support either affirmative or negative findings, the agency's decision must be upheld. Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tex. 1984); Guajardo, 970 S.W.2d at 605. The substantial evidence rule applies to notice issues in an agency setting. See Anderson v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 963 S.W.2d 217, 219-20 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
At the time TABC sent notice, the Texas Administrative Code provided that hearings could proceed on a default basis where (1) the agency rules authorized service by sending notice of hearing to the party's address of record with the agency and (2) there was credible evidence that notice was sent. See 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 155.55(c) (2007) (State Office of Admin. Hearings, Default Hearings), repealed in 33 Tex. Reg. 9451 (2008) (effective Nov. 26, 2008). At the time, the Administrative Code required that TABC send notice of hearings to permittees at their last known address as reflected in TABC's records. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 37.3(b) (2004) (Tex. Alco. Beverage Comm'n, Service of Pleadings Notice of Hearing), repealed in 33 Tex. Reg. 2535 (2008) (effective Mar. 26, 2008).
TABC presented evidence that it sent the notice to AGA at the address indicated in TABC's records and that it received a signed green card in return. This is substantial evidence from which the agency could have reasonably concluded that AGA had actual notice of the hearing. See Anderson, 963 S.W.2d at 219-20 (concluding that evidence of sending notices to address on file and receipt of signed green cards was substantial evidence to support agency finding of proper notice, even though defendant denied receiving notices); see also Morris v. State, 894 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (finding sufficient evidence to prove ten days' notice of hearing based on mailing notices to address on file, even though defendant denied receiving notices).
AGA argues that actual notice is required and claims it did not have actual notice, relying on Merchant's affidavit. We need not determine if constructive notice is sufficient or if actual notice is required because the agency's finding of actual notice was reasonable and supported by the record. Merchant denied receiving the hearing notice, but his denial does not conclusively prove the truth of his assertion. See Anderson, 963 S.W.2d at 219-20; Morris, 894 S.W.2d at 24-25. The agency was entitled to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and when, as here, the evidence could support a finding either way, the agency's decision must be upheld. See City of El Paso, 883 S.W.2d 185; Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 453; Guajardo, 970 S.W.2d at 605.
The district court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the agency by focusing on what it determined to be "address problems" and a green card signature that the district court did not believe was Merchant's. However, the agency's resolution of these issues against AGA was not unreasonable. As to the address issue, there is no evidence in the record regarding who made the handwritten change in the address from "Dunlap St" to "Dunlap Hwy" or when that change was made. It is just as likely that the change (1) was made by AGA or a third party as by TABC or (2) was made after TABC sent the notice rather than before. Further, there is no evidence that the handwritten change made AGA's address incorrect or would have prevented the notice from reaching AGA.
As to the signature issue, the district court concluded that the signature on the green card was not Merchant's because it did not match the signature on his affidavit. Nevertheless, the agency could have reasonably concluded the signature was Merchant's or that of someone authorized to receive mail for him. Though the signature is mostly illegible, the signature clearly starts with an R, as does Merchant's first name, Rafiq. Further, that the signature on the green card does not appear to be the same as the signature on the affidavit does not make the agency's determination unreasonable; the agency could have determined that the style of Merchant's signature on his affidavit, in which he effectively denied signing the green card showing receipt of the hearing notice, was not representative of his usual signature. Alternatively, the agency could have reasonably concluded that the notice was sent to the proper address (as discussed above) and therefore whoever signed for it had authority to receive mail for AGA. Under either scenario, the agency could have reasonably determined that AGA received the mailing of the hearing notice. Accordingly, TABC's first issue is sustained.
Because we have sustained TABC's first issue, we need not address TABC's second issue, in which it asserts that the default judgment was supported by AGA's failure to comply with the requirements of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).
In conclusion, because the agency's finding that AGA received actual notice is reasonable based on the record, the district court erred in reversing the agency's order. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment and render judgment affirming the agency's order.