Opinion
No. 14–425.
09-11-2015
TABAK ASSOCIATES, LLC, Petitioner–Landlord–Appellant, v. Eunice VARGAS, Respondent–Tenant–Respondent, and “John Doe” and “Jane Doe,” Respondents.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Order (Anne Katz, J.), entered May 21, 2014, affirmed, with $10 costs.
While a stipulation is essentially a contract and should not be lightly set aside, the court possesses the discretionary authority to relieve parties from the consequences of a stipulation “if it appears that the stipulation was entered into inadvisedly or that it would be inequitable to hold the parties to it” (1420 Concourse Corp. v. Cruz, 135 A.D.2d 371, 373 1987, appeal dismissed 73 N.Y.2d 868 1989, citing Matter of Frutiger, 29 N.Y.2d 143, 150 1971 ). In this case, tenant, now represented by counsel, has demonstrated that she has a potentially meritorious rent overcharge claim, which should not be deemed forfeited by her uncounseled decision to consent to judgment. Under the circumstances, we sustain the court's discretionary determination to vacate the stipulation (see Striver 140 LLC v. Cruz, 1 Misc.3d 29 [App Term, 1st Dept 2003] ). In doing so, we express no view as to the ultimate outcome on the merits of the rent overcharge claim. To the extent the motion court appears to have signaled an intention to examine the rental history outside the four-year look-back period (see Matter of Grimm v. State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal Off. of Rent Admin., 15 NY3d 358 2010; Matter of Boyd v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 23 NY3d 999 2014 ), any such determination is “premature and must await further discovery” (Meyers v. Four Thirty Realty, 127 AD3d 501, 502 2015 ).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur.