We have since construed this language to insure that those who were the focus of its protection remain within its ambit. See id.; Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190 (1950) (divorce granted due to respondent's drinking where, although it did not affect his employability, it caused petitioner to lose weight and sleep due to his abusive and profane language and enuresis); Routhier v. Routhier, 128 N.H. 439, 440 (1986) (divorce granted due to defendant's excessive drinking and affairs which caused plaintiff to seek counseling). We have previously held that RSA 458:7, V does not require proof of conduct that would have affected an average or reasonable person, but only that the health or reason of the complaining spouse was actually affected.
We have previously ruled that symptoms similar to the petitioner's suffice. See In the Matter of Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738, 753, 930 A.2d 1165 (2007) (wife suffered “significant emotional distress” and sought assistance of pastoral counselor (quotation omitted)); In the Matter of Gronvaldt & Gronvaldt, 150 N.H. 551, 553–54, 842 A.2d 87 (2004) (wife suffered emotional distress and sought counseling); Routhier v. Routhier, 128 N.H. 439, 440, 514 A.2d 825 (1986) (wife sought counseling); Morgan v. Morgan, 101 N.H. 470, 471, 146 A.2d 585 (1958) (wife became “highly nervous” and lost weight); Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190, 191, 72 A.2d 500 (1950) (wife lost considerable weight and became “a complete wreck” (quotation omitted)). Given the severity of the petitioner's symptoms, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the effect on her physical and mental health is insufficient to sustain a divorce under RSA 458:7, V. II. Alimony
t upon the “innocent” spouse has been much more severe than mere anger and upset and the conduct in which the “guilty” spouse engaged was more brutal than merely e-mailing a former girlfriend. See id. at 553-54 (husband drank alcohol on a daily basis, was verbally abusive to wife, threatened to punch wife, exhibited uncontrolled anger and used scare tactics to intimidate wife, causing wife to suffer emotional distress and undergo counseling during parties' marriage); Routhier v. Routhier, 128 N.H. 439, 440, 514 A.2d 825 (1986) (during marriage, husband admitted to having affairs with other women, drank excessively, and was domineering, argumentative and verbally abusive, which caused wife to seek counseling for two years in the 1960s and again after their separation in 1980); Morgan v. Morgan, 101 N.H. 470, 471, 146 A.2d 585 (1958) (husband hit wife, threatened to kill her, and used obscene and abusive language towards her, causing wife to become “highly nervous and to lose weight”); Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190, 191, 72 A.2d 500 (1950) (husband drank heavily and used abusive and profane language, causing wife to lose considerable weight and to become “a complete wreck” (quotation omitted)).[4, 5] We hold that the respondent's conduct was insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute treatment that seriously injured the petitioner's health or endangered her reason.
This presents the limited question of whether there was evidence to support the court's decree. Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190, 72 A.2d 500 (1950), Buck v. Buck, 97 N.H. 178, 83 A.2d 922 (1951); Kuo v. Kuo, 108 N.H. 460, 237 A.2d 690 (1968). In contesting the granting of the divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty the defendant relies on the fact that the evidence established only one assault by the defendant on the plaintiff.
Evidence of cruelty or other misconduct by the defendant before the parties came to New Hampshire was properly received to explain the plaintiff's apprehension concerning the defendant's conduct toward her while they were domiciled here. Contrary to the suggestion of the defendant's brief, the evidence of conduct injurious to health was not confined to "one selected instance." The testimony presented issues of fact which were peculiarly for the Trial Court (Morgan v. Morgan, 101 N.H. 470, 471) whose determination is binding here, since there was evidence to support it. Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190; Buck v. Buck, 97 N.H. 178; Kotarba v. Kotarba, 97 N.H. 252. Much of the extended hearing was devoted to examination of the assets of the parties, with respect to which the Court ordered a division of property.
Kennard v. Kennard, 87 N.H. 320. However, we are satisfied after a careful consideration of the record, including the supporting testimony of the doctors, that the findings and rulings of the Trial Court were warranted. Buck v. Buck, 97 N.H. 178; Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190. The libelee further claims that the marriage was invalid.
Condonation was an affirmative defense available to the defendant. Cf. Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190. In the absence of conclusive evidence that Mrs. McNally later forgave her husband for his mistreatment of her, the Court's implied finding that she did not do so was not error. The defendant's exceptions are overruled.
There was sufficient evidence to support a decree of divorce on the grounds of treatment such as to seriously injure health. Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190. Accordingly the order must be Exceptions overruled.
This was evidence upon which the Trial Court could find treatment seriously to injure health. Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190, 191. Libelee's motions to dismiss were therefore properly denied and the order must be