His argument appears to be that Mary's testimony had low probative value because her allegations were not corroborated by a police report or her therapist's records, but rather included her own "self-vouching" testimony that she had eventually reported the assaults. But other than citing Syvock v. State , 61 Wis. 2d 411, 413, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973) —which held that a conviction for taking "indecent liberties with a child" could rest solely on the minor's uncorroborated testimony—Herbes provides no authority for the notion that corroboration was required. The circuit court explicitly considered Mary's reliability when deciding the State's motion to admit her testimony, and it concluded that the lack of corroborating records went to Mary's credibility, which was within the province of the jury to assess.
¶61 When the circuit court assessed the weight to be given to the testimony of each witness, it determined that Weissenfluh's appraisals were more reliable than Nicholson's. The weight to be given testimony is for the trier of fact. Syvock v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 411, 414, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973). "When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to each witness's testimony."
Comment 3 to Wis. J I — Criminal 1553 states: We note that this characterization of the standard of proof misstates our holding in Goetsch v. State, 45 Wis.2d 285, 294, 172 N.W.2d 688 (1969), and Syvock v. State, 61 Wis.2d 411, 418-19, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973), which clearly indicates the lower, as opposed to the middle, civil burden. "However, Wisconsin's new Mental Health Act, Chapter 430, Laws of 1975, provides for proof `beyond a reasonable doubt' in all civil commitment proceedings [see sec 51.20(12) and 51.20(14) (e)].
Chapman v. State, supra at 583. Even if the court were to be persuaded by the defendant's argument that the second complainant's testimony was not totally reliable, the conviction is sustainable under the rationale expressed in Syvock v. State, 61 Wis.2d 411, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973) wherein the court stated; "`. . .[w]here the testimony of the prosecuting witness bears upon its face evidence of its unreliability, to sustain a conviction there should be corroboration by other evidence as to the principal facts relied on to constitute the crime.'"
We will not substitute our judgment on the witness' credibility for that of the trial judge, the trier of fact, who was present at the time the testimony was given and had the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor while on the stand. Syvock v. State, 61 Wis.2d 411, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973). In addition to challenging Sandra's credibility the defendant also contends that because she stated at one point that she did not remember the incident of sexual intercourse and only testified as to what she had been told to say the state was required to provide corroborating evidence.
The court said credibility and interest were matters for the jury and only if the evidence were inherently incredible would this court substitute its judgment. In Syvock v. State, 61 Wis.2d 411, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973), this court said the child's inconsistencies about the date of the incident and about how soon she told her mother did not mean the testimony was inherently incredible. As frequently occurs in cases involving this offense, no witnesses were present at the time of the actual commission of the act except the victim and the defendant.
It was the jury to determine what weight it would attach to his testimony. Syvock v. State (1973), 61 Wis.2d 411, 414, 213 N.W.2d 11. Matters of an evidentiary nature are offered to establish the ultimate facts in issue, such as whether a crime was committed, the identity of the perpetrator, and the existence of all of the material elements of the crime charged.
The trier of fact determines the weight to be given testimony. Metropolitan Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶61 (citing Syvock v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 411, 414, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973)). "'When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to each witness's testimony.'"
See State v. Toy, 125 Wis.2d 216, 222, 371 N.W.2d 386 (Ct.App.1985). Where there are inconsistencies within a witness's testimony or between witnesses' testimonies, it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be given to each, see id., and inconsistencies do not make a witness's testimony inherently incredible, see Syvock v. State, 61 Wis.2d 411, 414, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973).¶ 23 Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction is a question of law that we review de novo.
This is especially true because the trier of fact has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor. Syvock v. State, 61 Wis.2d 411, 414, 213 N.W.2d 11 (1973). This court will not reverse a trial court's credibility determination unless we could conclude, as a matter of law, that no finder of fact could believe the testimony.