Sypniewski v. State

53 Citing cases

  1. Lawson v. State

    274 Ind. 419 (Ind. 1980)   Cited 30 times
    In Lawson v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 419, 412 N.E.2d 759, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 919, 101 S.Ct. 3057, 69 L.Ed.2d 424 (1981), this Court sought out and found that an express notice was given the accused of the prosecutor's intention to proceed upon a theory of accessory liability in the prosecutor's response to the defendant's notice of alibi.

    The content of the message, however, tends to speak for itself; it is written in the second person, encouraging a girl named "Sandy" — among other things — to reject other males and have sexual relations with her father. Of course, the jury was free to reject appellant's explanation of the writing and conclude that the letter referred to Sandy and him. Lock v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 315, 403 N.E.2d 1360, 1373; Riggenbach v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 322, 397 N.E.2d 953, 956; Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 232, 368 N.E.2d 1359, 1364. We find this writing bears a great deal of relevance to this case and was properly admitted.

  2. Drollinger v. State

    274 Ind. 5 (Ind. 1980)   Cited 105 times
    In Drollinger v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228, this Court noted that an instruction need not necessarily be read to the jury because it is a correct statement of the law.

    This instruction correctly stated the law. Moore v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 270, 275, 369 N.E.2d 628, 631; Murphy v. State, supra; Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 232, 368 N.E.2d 1359, 1364. For these reasons, the trial court properly refused appellant's tendered instructions.

  3. Brown v. State

    691 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 1998)   Cited 89 times
    Holding that, although defendant did not own the home in which he was staying, he had been living there for two and a half months with his girlfriend and thus had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises search (the bedroom)

    (where the jury was instructed that "knowingly" and "intentionally" may be inferred from the alleged act itself, "if established by the evidence, taken into consideration with all of the facts and circumstances surrounding or related to such act, as disclosed by the evidence, if the jury should determine such an inference should be drawn"); Norton v. State, 273 Ind. 635, 666, 408 N.E.2d 514, 534 (1980) (where the jury was provided an instruction which stated that "If the act of killing is perpetrated with a deadly weapon used in a manner likely to produce death, the purpose to kill may be inferred from the act of killing."); Sypniewski v. State, 267 Ind. 224, 228, 368 N.E.2d 1359, 1362 (1977) (where the court found the following instruction to be an accurate statement of existing law: "An intent and purpose to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death.").

  4. Dorsey v. State

    490 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. 1986)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that IADA was intended to benefit persons serving time in prison

    The language "should attempt" does not bind the jury as to what must or must not be credited. When considering the impact of the instruction as a whole, Sypniewski v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 224, 368 N.E.2d 1359, the jury was properly instructed. Appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support an instruction on accessory liability.

  5. McMurry v. State

    467 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. 1984)   Cited 11 times

    It is well settled that intent to kill can be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily harm. Davenport v. State, (1984) Ind., 464 N.E.2d 1302; Vasseur v. State, (1982) Ind., 430 N.E.2d 1157; Jackson v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 685. The jury may accept or reject the testimony of any witness and was not bound to believe the statements that defendant did not intend to kill the victim. Jackson v. State; Lock v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 315, 403 N.E.2d 1360; Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 368 N.E.2d 1359. There was substantial evidence of probative value from which the jury could have concluded that defendant intentionally attempted to kill the victim. There was no error on this issue.

  6. Hoskins v. State

    441 N.E.2d 419 (Ind. 1982)   Cited 54 times
    Using the words "imagination and speculation" in a reasonable doubt instruction was not error

    Appellant suggested to the trial court the use of the words "remains" or "exists" rather than "arises." Appellant concedes that this instruction comports with reasonable doubt instructions given by courts and approved by the appellate courts in Indiana, see Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 368 N.E.2d 1359, but suggests such approval be reconsidered. This instruction does, in fact, comport with approved reasonable doubt instructions and we approve it again in this case. The instruction told the jury that a reasonable doubt must arise in the mind of the juror after an impartial consideration of all the evidence and circumstances in the case.

  7. Mayes v. State

    440 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. 1982)   Cited 7 times

    Four expert psychiatric witnesses, two of them called by the State, testified that in their opinion Willa Mayes was psychotic and mentally ill. It was the opinion of all four doctors that Appellant could not detect right from wrong and did not have the ability to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law. When appellant Mayes was tried, the burden of proof on the issue of sanity rested with the State, and the law stated that the defendant in a criminal prosecution was presumed to be sane. Young v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 246, 248, 280 N.E.2d 595, 597. Once Mayes challenged that presumption by introducing evidence to show that she was not accountable for her acts at the time the crimes charged were committed, the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt was upon the State. Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 231, 368 N.E.2d 1359, 1363; Montague v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 51, 59, 360 N.E.2d 181, 187. The Court of Appeals reached the conclusion that the State had failed to prove appellant Mayes was legally sane beyond a reasonable doubt.

  8. Evans v. State

    438 N.E.2d 261 (Ind. 1982)   Cited 3 times

    The purpose of this examination is to determine if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the jury could have found Sloan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Further, it is the jury's function to judge the credibility of witnesses, e.g., Love v. State, (1979) Ind., 393 N.E.2d 178, 180; Taggart v. State, (1979) Ind., 390 N.E.2d 657, 659, and the jury may believe whomever it wishes, e.g., Riggenbach v. State, (1979) Ind., 397 N.E.2d 953, 956; Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 368 N.E.2d 1359."

  9. Sanders v. State

    428 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. 1981)   Cited 26 times

    The introduction of any evidence following the denial of a motion for judgment on the evidence constitutes a waiver of any error in the overruling of the motion. Miller v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 635, 640, 372 N.E.2d 1168, 1171; Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 228, 368 N.E.2d 1359, 1362; Parker v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 595, 601, 358 N.E.2d 110, 113. It is also well established that a directed verdict is proper only: (1) where there is a total absence of evidence on a certain issue; or (2) where the evidence is without conflict and leads to only one inference, which is in favor of the accused.

  10. Jackson v. State

    426 N.E.2d 685 (Ind. 1981)   Cited 23 times

    The jury may believe or disbelieve whomever they choose. Lock v. State, (1980) Ind., 403 N.E.2d 1360, 1373; Sypniewski v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 224, 232, 368 N.E.2d 1359, 1364. Appellant also claims that the evidence shows that he was in such an intoxicated state that he could not have formed the specific intent necessary to commit the offenses charged.