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Sylfa v. Stupnick

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
May 27, 1997
239 A.D.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)

Opinion


239 A.D.2d 570 658 N.Y.S.2d 69 Maria SYLFA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Florence STUPNICK, et al., Appellants, Cold Spot Service Corp., Defendant-Respondent. Supreme Court of New York, Second Department May 27, 1997.

        Ryan Perrone s&sHartlein, P.C., Mineola (William T. Ryan and Robin Mary Heaney, of counsel), for appellants.

        Isaacson, Schiowitz, Korsons&sSolny, New York City (Paul F. McAloon, of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.

        Before ROSENBLATT, J.P., and THOMPSON, SULLIVAN and FRIEDMANN, JJ.

        MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

        In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Florence Stupnick, Irwin Feinstein, and Gilda Goldstein appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), dated June 4, 1996, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them.

        ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint and all cross claims are dismissed insofar as asserted against the defendants Florence Stupnick, Irwin Feinstein, and Gilda Goldstein, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

        The defendant Irwin Feinstein is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against him, as he was both the owner of the premises in which the accident occurred and an officer of the corporation which employed the plaintiff (see, Workers' Compensation Law § 29[6]; Iannarone v. Faucetta, 204 A.D.2d 396, 611 N.Y.S.2d 610).

        The defendants Florence Stupnick and Gilda Goldstein are also entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them. Those defendants were out-of-possession landlords. Since they reserved the right to enter the premises for the purpose of making repairs, they may be held liable for injuries which occurred on the premises only if there was a specific statutory violation and the injuries were caused by a significant structural or design defect (see, Stark v. Port Auth. of N.Y.s&sN.J., 224 A.D.2d 681, 639 N.Y.S.2d 57). The plaintiff failed to establish such a defect here (see, Caiazzo v. Angelone, 236 A.D.2d 351, 653 N.Y.S.2d 644; Chrisostomides v. Berjas Realty Co., 231 A.D.2d 601, 647 N.Y.S.2d 973).

Summaries of

Sylfa v. Stupnick

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
May 27, 1997
239 A.D.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
Case details for

Sylfa v. Stupnick

Case Details

Full title:MARIA SYLFA, Respondent, v. FLORENCE STUPNICK et al., Appellants, and COLD…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: May 27, 1997

Citations

239 A.D.2d 570 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
658 N.Y.S.2d 69
658 N.Y.S.2d 691

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