Opinion
No. 1:00CV462-D-D.
January 25, 2001.
OPINION
Presently before the court is the Plaintiff's motion to remand this matter to the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District of Chickasaw County, Mississippi. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted and this cause remanded to state court for ultimate resolution.
A. Factual Background
The Plaintiff instituted this action in the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District of Chickasaw County, Mississippi, on October 9, 2000, seeking compensation for state law claims of negligence, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, in connection with a loan transaction between the parties. The Defendant then removed the case to this court on November 17, 2000, asserting federal question jurisdiction as the basis for removal. On December 15, 2000, the Plaintiff filed the present motion seeking to have the case remanded to state court.
B. Standard for Remand
A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court provided that the federal court has original jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In this case, the propriety of the Defendant's removal depends upon whether any of the Plaintiff's claims arise under federal law, thereby giving this court original federal question jurisdiction over the claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
Whether a claim arises under federal law so as to confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Because the well-pleaded complaint rule provides for the determination of jurisdiction solely on the basis of the plaintiff's complaint, the rule makes the plaintiff master of the claim, and federal jurisdiction may be avoided by exclusive reliance on state law. Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392; Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 53 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995).
The well-pleaded complaint rule is limited, however, by the "artful pleading" doctrine. This doctrine states that "a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2853, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). If a court concludes that a plaintiff has artfully pleaded claims in this fashion, the court may uphold removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiff's state-law claim. Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998)). In other words, if Congress has preempted a particular area of the law, any civil complaint raising a claim in that area is necessarily federal in character. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1545-46, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). A federal cause of action is then, in effect, substituted for the plaintiff's state claim, making it one that arises under federal law, and thereby conferring removal jurisdiction upon the federal court.
C. Discussion
The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff has artfully pled only state law claims that necessarily arise under federal law, thereby rendering removal of this case proper. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims either arise under, or are preempted by, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a-1692o (FDCPA).
It is axiomatic that the artful pleading doctrine may only be applied in cases where the federal statute at issue completely preempts the plaintiff's claims. See Waste Control Specialists, 199 F.3d at 783-84 ("Without complete preemption, the artful pleading doctrine does not apply."). While the FDCPA may preempt some state law claims under certain circumstances, and thus allow for removal of those claims to federal court, no such preemption exists here because the Plaintiff's claims are not covered by the FDCPA. Thus, the FDCPA has no application in this case.
The FDCPA does not apply to the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant because the Defendant is not a "debt collector" as that term is defined by the FDCPA, and the FDCPA provides for civil liability only for "debt collector[s] who fail to comply with any provision of [the FDCPA]." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), 1692k; Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Texas Commerce Bank, 976 F. Supp. 623, 632 (S.D.Tex. 1997). In fact, the FDCPA specifically states that the term "debt collector" does not include "any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The conduct the Plaintiff complains of in this case, therefore, is not made unlawful by the FDCPA because the Defendant is a creditor and not a debt collector under the FDCPA. As such, the Plaintiff's sole remedy is under state law, and he pled only state law causes of action in his complaint. This court, therefore, is without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this action, and remand to state court is proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").
In conclusion, the FDCPA has no application in this case, and does not preempt the Plaintiff's claims. Remand of this action to state court for ultimate resolution is therefore proper. A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
• the Plaintiff's motion to remand (docket entry 10) is GRANTED; and
• this cause is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District of Chickasaw County, Mississippi.