Opinion
Civil Action No. DKC 99-2171
June 5, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the court and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination action are cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Diana Yarbro Swift, alleges that Defendant discriminated against her and limited her employment opportunities based on race, sex, or both in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), (counts I and II), and age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., (counts III and IV). In count V, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrecorded her start date and, as a result, has denied her some retirement benefits to which she is entitled. Defendant, Montgomery County Public Schools ("MCPS"), asserts that Plaintiff has failed to show that she was the victim of illegal discrimination, and, with respect to some of her claims, to exhaust her administrative remedies. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment as to her racial discrimination claims and opposes Defendant's motion. No hearing is deemed necessary and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the court shall GRANT Defendant's motion and DENY Plaintiff's cross motion.
I. Background
The following facts are undisputed or presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Swift, a 52-year old African American female, has been employed with MCPS in various capacities for more than 25 years. From 1975 until 1986, she served as a child development teacher, and from 1986 to 1998, as a vocational support services team leader. Vocational support services teams assist "special needs" students who are enrolled in a school's career development programs, which are a sequence of courses that teach students skills in various professions. The teams are located at schools throughout Montgomery County with high numbers of career development programs. Swift held the team leader position until 1994 at Blair High School, but claims that while there, she was subjected to a hostile work environment and, as a result, transferred to Rockville High School.
In 1997, Swift applied for and was selected to participate in MCPS's "administrative pool," a group from which MCPS selects applicants for assistant principal positions and elementary principal trainees. According to Assistant Superintendent Elizabeth Arons, MCPS principals meet every month, and during those meetings sometimes will recommend to one another teachers in the administrative pool, whom they consider to be good candidates for available assistant principal positions.
In 1998, due to a declining number of career development programs at Rockville High School, the vocational support services team and Swift's position were abolished. She alleges that of the six high schools in Montgomery County that had vocational support services teams, all team leaders, except herself, were white, and that the team at Rockville was the only one that was abolished. Swift also alleges that after her position was abolished, she was offered but declined an offer to return to Blair High School. Swift was then assigned to the position of home economics/child development teacher at Rockville for the 1998-1999 school year. The next year she was transferred to Gaithersburg High School, where she reported for one day, but has since been on sick leave.
Aside from claiming that her position as vocational support services team leader was abolished due to unlawful discrimination, Swift challenges four other positions, which she claims she illegally was denied. In June 1998, she was selected from the administrative pool to apply for an assistant principal position at Briggs Chaney Middle School, but was rejected in favor of an Asian female. In July 1998, Swift interviewed for a student support specialist position at Watkins Mills High School. MCPS's human resources department provided the principal at Watkins Mill a list of eligible candidates to interview for the position, which included Swift. Swift alleges that her interview at Watkins Mill was a "sham, since the real interviews had been concluded and a candidate selected the day before her interview was scheduled." The position went to a Caucasian female. In August 1998, Swift interviewed for a position as a curriculum coordinator, which also went to a Caucasian female. It is unclear at which school that position was located. Finally, in September 1998, she again was selected from the administrative pool to apply for an assistant principal position at Damascus High School, which she also failed to get. The successful applicant was an Hispanic female.
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in July 1997, she interviewed and was rejected for an administrative position at Springbrook High School. She apparently has abandoned her discrimination claim as to that position as she fails to address it in her memorandum.
II. Standard of Review
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Pulliam Inv. Co., Inc. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pulliam, 810 F.2d at 1286 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)).When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1998). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In Celotex, the Supreme Court stated:
In cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be "made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56(e) therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. However, "`a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue.'" Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967)). There must be "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Race and sex-based discrimination claims
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant denied her promotions with respect to four positions: (1) assistant principal at Briggs Chaney Middle School; (2) student support specialist at Watkins Mill High School; (3) assistant principal at Damascas High School; and (4) Curriculum Coordinator. Plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discrimination, and thus the court turns to the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to analyze her claims. To establish a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she (1) belongs to a protected group; (2) applied for the positions at issue; (3) was qualified for those positions; and (4) was rejected under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Evans v. Technologies Applications Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1996) (sex) (citing Texas Dep't. of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1994) (race); McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1991)). To satisfy the fourth prong, Plaintiff need only show that the positions were filled by someone outside of her protected category, i.e., race and sex. See e.g., Carter, 33 F.3d at 458 (black plaintiff met fourth prong by showing that position was filled by white applicant) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87 (1989); Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 537 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991)).
Plaintiff asserts that she was denied three positions as assistant principal. Apparently, she characterizes the student support specialist position at Watkins Mills as an assistant principal position. However, in her complaint, she alleges that the position at Watkins Mill was a "student support position." Defendant contends that the position was "student support specialist" and not assistant principal. The court will assume that Plaintiff erred in her memorandum, and that the position at Watkins Mill was that of a student support specialist. The court draws this conclusion from the fact that there is no allegation or evidence that Plaintiff was selected from the administrative pool to interview for that position, and the administrative pool is the exclusive means by which MCPS selects assistant principal applicants.
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must advance a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision at issue. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000) (citation omitted). A defendant may do so by showing that the person selected was better qualified for the position than the plaintiff. Carter, 33 F.3d at 458 (citation omitted). The presumption of discrimination drops out once a defendant has advanced such a reason. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2106. A plaintiff must then be allowed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but pretext for discrimination. Monroe v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454, 458 (4th Cir. 1983)). In Reeves, the Supreme Court held that in appropriate circumstances, "a plaintiff's prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." 120 S.Ct. at 2108.
1. Race-based failure to promote claims
i. Race discrimination claims as to the assistant principal positions
Plaintiff's arguments and evidence presented in opposition to Defendant's motion, and in support of her race discrimination claims, appear solely to focus on issues surrounding her being selected from the administrative pool to interview for assistant principal positions. Thus, the court will analyze her claims with respect to the assistant principal positions before discussing other positions she challenges. As already explained, candidates for assistant principal positions are drawn exclusively from the administrative pool.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she has not shown that she was treated differently than others outside of her protected group. Defendant also asserts that even if Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of race discrimination with respect to her failure to promote claims, she has not shown that Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its refusal to promote her is false. Plaintiff cross moves on the race discrimination claims, and contends that she, in fact, has established a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote and presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment.
In her complaint, Plaintiff specifically challenges Defendant's failure to hire her for two assistant principal positions. It appears from her memorandum that she now not only challenges the fact that she failed to obtain those specific positions but also claims that, because of race, she was invited to interview for fewer positions than others in the administrative pool. The court will address each argument in turn.
With respect to the two positions she failed to obtain, the court assumes that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendant advances a non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision, by contending that the persons hired were better qualified for those posts than Plaintiff. Evidence that the candidates chosen for the particular positions challenged were better qualified for those positions than the plaintiff suffices to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. See Jefferies v. Harris County Comty. Action Ass'n, 693 F.2d 589, 590 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he promotion of a better qualified applicant is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for preferring the successful applicant over the rejected employee who claims that the rejection was discriminatory.") (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
With respect to the assistant principal position at Briggs Chaney Middle School, principal Laurence Hansch testified that he did not hire plaintiff because her experience exclusively had been at the high school level, while the successful candidate, an Asian female, responded better to the questions during the interview and had experience as a middle school assistant principal. Paper no. 20, Defendant's exhibit 5 at 13-15. Donald Kress, MCPS community superintendent, and Principal Richard Bastress interviewed Plaintiff for the assistant principal position at Damascus High School. Bastress testified that Esperanza Diekhans, the Hispanic female who received the position, answered his questions during the interview in a thorough manner and "extremely well," while Plaintiff's answers were adequate. Paper no. 20, Defendant's exhibit 6 at 16, 17-18. He also asserts that he and Kress agreed that Diekhans was the best candidate. Id. at 20-21. Thus, Defendant has produced legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons as to why Plaintiff failed to obtain these positions, and the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that these reasons were pretextual. Plaintiff fails to meet this burden, as she presents no evidence that she was better qualified for these positions than the successful candidates.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reasons must be presumed to be pretextual because Defendant focuses exclusively on the selection process after the interviews had taken place, i.e., that the candidates chosen were better qualified for those particular positions than Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, this focus is skewed because she was discriminated against on the basis of race when candidates were being invited to interview in the first place. She claims she was limited to interviewing only for those positions for which she was invited to interview.
Characterizing her claims as she does, however, Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Typically, to meet the fourth prong, a plaintiff need only show that she was rejected in favor of a person outside of her protected category, in this case a non-African American. In establishing her prima facie case, Plaintiff focuses exclusively on the fact that the women who obtained the assistant principal positions instead of her were not black. She fails to allege facts or offer any evidence as to the race of any person in the administrative pool who was granted more interviews than she was. Further, she fails to show that others in the pool were not also limited to interviewing only for those positions for which they were invited to interview. Apparently, this is how the system worked for all candidates. See e.g., Paper no. 20, Defendant's exhibit 5 at 6 (candidates were screened by community superintendent and a list of those chosen was given to the principal, who conducted interviews). Thus, she fails to show that her opportunities to interview were more limited or different than anyone outside of her protected group. Because Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to her claim that because of race she was denied opportunities to interview more than non-blacks, the court need not delve into whether the reasons Defendant advances for its employment decision is pretextual, with respect to this particular claim.
However, even if the court were to embark on such an analysis, the evidence Plaintiff presents falls short of raising an inference of unlawful discrimination or showing pretext. Plaintiff presents statements by Mike Glazco, director of the Rockville area, and Durinda Anderson, past principal at Rockville High School, which she appears to claim show that she was given fewer opportunities to interview than non-blacks. In 1999, Plaintiff was selected from the administrative pool and invited to interview at McGruder High School for an assistant principal position, which went to another African American female. After the interview, Plaintiff called Glazco to inquire about interviewing for more positions, and he told her "you've had your one interview and that's it." Paper no. 21, Plaintiff's exhibit 1 at 58. As already explained, Plaintiff fails to allege or provide any evidence as to the number of interviews that other applicants, within or outside of her racial group, in the administrative pool received. Thus, while Glazco may have told her that she had her "one interview," she presents no evidence that non-black candidates were granted more. Further, according to her deposition, Plaintiff does not claim that after Glasco's comment she received no more interviews at all, but rather that she received no more "that summer." Plaintiff also appears to argue that Anderson spoke with other principals to discourage them from interviewing her. MCPS Assistant Superintendent Elizabeth Arons testified that during monthly meetings principals sometimes recommend to one another teachers at their respective schools, who might be good candidates for available assistant principal positions. Plaintiff asserts that Anderson once told her, "[a]ll you have done this year will be to your detriment," and contends that from this statement an inference may be drawn that Anderson told other principals not to interview her for available assistant principal positions. To draw such an inference based on Anderson's isolated comment would be nothing short of conjecture. Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 754 (10th Cir. 2000) (A "[p]laintiff's mere conjecture that [her] employer's explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of summary judgment.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff presents no evidence that Anderson told other principals not to interview or hire her, or even discussed Plaintiff with them. Moreover, neither statement alone raises an inference of unlawful discrimination. Thus, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on her race-based failure to promote claims as to the assistant principal positions.
ii. Race discrimination claims as to the student support specialist and curriculum coordinator positions
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the student support position, and even if she has established a prima facie case, she fails to rebut Defendant's non-discriminatory reason for not hiring her for that position. Plaintiff asserts that she has established a prima facie case, but she fails to present any argument with respect to Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing to promote or hire her for this position.
As already explained, while Plaintiff's memorandum asserts that Defendant's reasons for refusing to promote her to the various positions she challenges is pretextual, the only evidence she presents are comments by Glazco and Anderson, which Plaintiff appears to offer as a means of showing only that she was denied interviews with respect to the assistant principal positions.
According to Watkins Mill High School principal Louis Martinez, when he interviewed candidates for the student support specialist position, he only recently had been hired by MCPS and wanted someone in that position who was familiar with the Watkins Mill community. Paper no. 20, Defendant's exhibit 7 at 12, 19. The white female who received the position was a social studies teacher at the school, so he hired her instead of Plaintiff because of her familiarity with the school. Id. Plaintiff fails to present any evidence that this reason is pretext for discrimination.
Plaintiff alleges but presents no evidence that her interview at Watkins Mill was a "sham" because Martinez told Plaintiff that he already had selected a candidate.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's challenge to the curriculum coordinator position is not properly before this court because she did not allege that she was denied that position in her complaint. Even if it is properly before the court, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was denied the promotion due to race discrimination. The court agrees because Plaintiff fails to show she was denied the position under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. In her deposition, Plaintiff states that it was her belief that she "didn't receive the job" because the woman who received the position was not "working out at Damascus High School," and instead of moving her out of the system, MCPS decided to transfer her. Paper no. 22, Defendant's exhibit 11 at 27. Thus, by Plaintiff's own admission, the reason she failed to obtain the position had nothing to do with race. Consequently, summary judgment as to her claims of race discrimination with respect to both the student support specialist and curriculum coordinator positions is granted in favor of Defendant, and against Plaintiff.
2. Sex-based failure to promote claims
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination with respect to her failure to promote claims because all the positions Plaintiff challenges were filled by women. Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's argument, but simply states that she "acknowledges herein, relevant case law establishes that no sex discrimination can occur where members of the same sex are chosen for a position for which a plaintiff has applied." The court agrees. It is well established that a plaintiff cannot prove disparate treatment in a failure to promote claim, when she and the person promoted belong to the same protected category. See Jefferies v. Harris County Comty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff failed to prove race discrimination under Title VII as she and the person promoted were both black) (citing Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1978) (same holding in sex discrimination case)); Bostron v. Apfel, 104 F. Supp.2d 548, 556 (D.Md. 2000) (in failure to promote case, jury was not allowed to consider positions plaintiff challenged that went to other males, as no sex discrimination could have occurred in those instances). Thus, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on all Plaintiff's sex-based failure to promote claims.
3. Abolishment of the vocational support team leader position
Plaintiff alleges that her position as vocational support team leader at Rockville High School was abolished as a result of unlawful discrimination. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not shown that she was adversely affected by the abolishment of the position or that Defendant's reasons for its abolishment are pretext for discrimination. While Plaintiff fails to provide any basis for her claim, she essentially contends that several vocational support services teams exist at schools throughout the county and that hers was the only one headed by a black female and the only one abolished. She further argues that after her position was abolished, her duties were performed by a white male. Thus, Plaintiff most likely alleges a discriminatory discharge or reduction in force claim based on race and sex. See e.g., Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800, 802 (4th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's claims analyzed as discriminatory discharge and reduction in force after his position was "abolished" due to budgetary constraints). Thus, the court will analyze Plaintiff's claims using the framework established in such cases. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge or reduction-in-force, Plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job and met the employer's legitimate expectations; (3) she was discharged despite her qualifications and performance; and (4) the position remained open to similarly qualified applicants after her termination. Id. at 802 (citing Karpel v. Inova Health System Services, 134 F.3d 1222, 1228 (4th Cir. 1998)). In a reduction-in-force case, a plaintiff can satisfy the fourth element by "introducing probative evidence that indicates that the employer did not treat . . . race [or sex] neutral when making its decision." Id. (citing Blistein v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d 1459, 1470 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff fails to satisfy prongs 3 and 4 of her prima facie case. Although her position was abolished at Rockville, she technically was not discharged, but reassigned as a Home Economics/Child Development teacher. In April 1999, she was told that her teaching position was going to be reduced to part-time and that the following year, she would be reassigned to a teaching position at Gaithersburg High School. She reported to work for one day and has been out sick since that time. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that she was discharged.
Plaintiff alleges that after she learned her team leader position was to be abolished, she was offered a position, in bad faith, at Blair High School, where she earlier had been subjected to harassment. She fails to present any evidence that this offer was made. Ann Frantz, coordinator for community based programs, testified that Plaintiff called her to ask about available team leader positions. Frantz told her that there was an opening at Blair, and Plaintiff initially told her that she was not interested. According to Frantz, she did not "encourage," or "discourage" Plaintiff to apply or "make any kind of comment" to that effect. Sometime later, Plaintiff called Frantz to inquire about the Blair position, but by then, it had been filled. Paper no. 20, Defendant's exhibit 9 at 33-34.
Further, Plaintiff fails to show that her position remained open to similarly qualified applicants after she left or that MCPS failed to treat race or sex neutrally when making its decision to abolish her position. The vocational support services team at Rockville included a team leader position, which Plaintiff held, and two instructional assistants. The Office of Career and Technology Development decided to abolish the vocational support services team at Rockville High School due to a decline in the number of career development programs and students enrolled in those programs. Ann Frantz, coordinator for community based programs, stated that she had been discussing with others the declining number of programs at Rockville for a couple of years before a decision was made to abolish the support services team. Frantz's office decided to abolish the entire team, but Durinda Anderson, the school's principal, requested that one instructional assistant position be maintained for one year to provide a transition for students. Stuart Wilson, one of the instructional assistants who had served under Plaintiff, was selected to remain. There is no evidence that Wilson took over Plaintiff's former position as a team leader. Cf. Causey, 162 F.3d at 802 (plaintiff introduced no evidence that his former job had been filled or that defendant had solicited applicants for it). Moreover, it is undisputed that the entire program, including Wilson's position, was abolished at the end of the 1998-1999 school year. Defendant has presented evidence that Plaintiff's position was abolished for reasons that have nothing to do with race. Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence to the contrary, but merely alleges that because her program was the only one headed by an African American woman in the county and Wilson remained at the school after she left, there is an inference of unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff must present probative evidence to support her claims. See id. She fails to do so, and summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant, and against Plaintiff to the extent she alleges that her position was abolished because of her race.
B. Age discrimination claims
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her age discrimination claims because she did not assert those claims in her EEOC charge. Plaintiff fails altogether to address Defendant's argument or to present any evidence in support of her age discrimination claims. A complainant must file charges with the EEOC regarding her age-related discrimination claims within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, and may not commence a private cause of action under the ADEA, until 60 days after she has filed the administrative charge. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). A plaintiff may only advance claims in federal court that are reasonably related to her EEOC charge and that can be expected to stem from a reasonable administrative investigation of that charge. Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247-48 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir. 1981)). To allow a complaint to include allegations outside the scope of the EEOC charge "would circumvent the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge." Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 127 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). In Evans, 80 F.3d at 963 (4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff was precluded from advancing an age discrimination claim in federal court, because, among other reasons, she only raised sex discrimination allegations in her original EEOC charge.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to raise her age-based claims before the EEOC, and she fails to argue that such claims are reasonably related to, or were uncovered in the course of a reasonable administrative investigation of, the claims she did raise. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and is barred from advancing her age-related discrimination claims in this court.
In count V of her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misrecorded her service start date. Defendant challenged Plaintiff to state the basis for her claim, whether statutory or common law. She has failed to do so, and has presented no authority or evidentiary support for this cause of action. Thus, the court assumes that Plaintiff has abandoned this claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court shall grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment and deny Plaintiff's cross motion. A separate Order will be entered.ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS this ___ day of June, 2001, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED that:
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Montgomery County Public Schools, BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED;
2. The Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Diane Yarbro Swift, BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED;
3. Judgment BE, and the same hereby IS, ENTERED in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on all claims; and
4. The Clerk is directed to transmit a copy of the Memorandum Opinion and this Order to counsel for the parties and CLOSE this case.