Opinion
Case No. C2-02-682.
August 3, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Expenses. Plaintiff, Catherine Swift, as Administrator for the Estate of Allen St. John, requests that the Court award attorney's fees in the amount of $84,151.47, as well as costs and expenses in the amount of $2,826.89. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections . . . 1983 . . . of this title, . . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This Court, therefore, has the discretion under Section 1988 to award attorney's fees to a "prevailing party" in a lawsuit arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The purpose of Section 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial system for civil rights claimants. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). "Although the statute states that the award of attorneys' fees is discretionary, they should normally be granted if a plaintiff prevails" unless special circumstances would render an award unjust. Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 179 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
"The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. The number resulting from this calculation is commonly referred to as the "lodestar." See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 568 (1986). Where the party seeking the fee has established that the number of hours and the rate claimed are reasonable, the lodestar rate is presumed to be the reasonable fee to which counsel is entitled. Pennsylvania. v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986).
Where the plaintiff has obtained "excellent results," her attorney should ordinarily recover a fully compensatory fee. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. In such a case, the fee award should not be reduced solely because a plaintiff did not succeed on each claim. Id. at 436. On the other hand, if a plaintiff has achieved only partial success, the number of hours expended on the litigation as a whole multiplied by the hourly rate may yield an excessive amount. Id. at 436. This may be true even if the claims raised were interrelated. Id.
As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted:
[A] court should not reduce attorney fees based on a simple ratio of successful claims to claims raised. Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369, 374 (6th Cir. 1993). When claims are based on a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, for the purpose of calculating attorney fees they should not be treated as distinct claims, and the cost of litigating the related claims should not be reduced.
Many civil rights cases will present only a single claim. In other cases the plaintiff's claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1169 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
Hence, where, as here, the plaintiff has succeeded on only some of her claims for relief, the Court must address two issues. First, the Court must determine whether the claims on which the plaintiff failed were unrelated to the claims on which she succeeded. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Second, the Court must ascertain whether the plaintiff achieved a degree of success that renders the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award. Id.
Where the Court determines that the fee requested should be reduced, it may attempt to identify specific hours to be eliminated or reduce the overall award to take into account the limited degree of success. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. The Court may not reduce the fee award based on a simple ratio of successful claims to all the claims asserted. See Thurman, 90 F.3d at 1169 (citing Phelan v. Bell, 8 F.3d 369, 374 (6th Cir. 1993)).
II.
A. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate
Plaintiff's counsel charged an hourly rate of $175 for out-of-court work and $200 for in-court proceedings, including depositions. Plaintiff's attorney's affidavit reveals that he has been licensed in the State of Ohio for nearly fifteen years, and has represented numerous clients in civil rights cases since he began practicing law in 1991.
A district court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney. Fuhr v. School Dist. of City of Hazel Park, 364 F.3d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Defendants do not challenge the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought by Plaintiff's counsel for legal services, or contend that the rate exceeds the customary or prevailing market rate. Accordingly, the Court finds that the hourly rates of $175 and $200 are reasonable.
B. Costs and Expenses
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for costs and expenses totaling $2,826.89. Defendants voice no objections related to this amount or the substance of Plaintiff's asserted costs and expenses. Without objection, the Court concludes that the costs and expenses in the amount of $2,826.89 claimed by Plaintiff are compensable and recoverable.
C. Lodestar
Defendants concede that Plaintiff is, to an extent, a prevailing party in this matter and that the Court has discretion to award attorneys' fees under Section 1988. Indeed, this Court initially granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all federal claims, and Plaintiff successfully appealed this decision. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that genuine issues of material fact remain for the jury on the Section 1983 claim regarding whether Defendants had probable cause to arrest Mr. St. John and whether Defendants used excessive force in attempting to place him in the back seat of a police cruiser. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of this Court on Plaintiff's official capacity claims insofar as Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence tending to prove that Defendants Sheriff David Hickey and Vinton County failed to train officers in a manner that constituted deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights.
Consequently, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims, together with her state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and negligence, were reinstated. Prior to trial, the Court held that Defendants were immune under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) as to claims for negligence and that the state law claims against Vinton County and Defendants in their official capacities failed under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.02. The remaining matters proceeded to trial.
At trial, Plaintiff did not prevail on her claims under Section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment that the arrest of Allen St. John was without probable cause, or on her state law claims including malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment. Plaintiff obtained a jury verdict for her claim under Section 1983 for excessive force. The jury assessed damages in the amount of $1,000 against each Defendant for compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages each as against Defendants Wolfe and Boyle, and $1000 in punitive damages against Defendant Hickey. Notwithstanding these verdicts, the Court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendant, Sheriff David Hickey, by Opinion and Order dated May 26, 2006. As a result, in total, the jury awarded Plaintiff $3,000 from Defendants Boyle and Wolfe, which is comprised of $2,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages.
Plaintiff seeks to recover for all attorney time expended on all claims, including those for which she was not successful, with the exception of the time her attorney pursued a claim against Vinton County. Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to recover fees related to her unsuccessful causes of action because she prevailed on the interrelated claim of excessive force.
Plaintiff indicates that she is not seeking attorney's fees associated with claims against Vinton County. (Pl's Motion for Fees, n. 1 at p. 3.)
As a general proposition, the Court finds that 352.47 hours in attorney time over the course of four years of discovery and litigation, prosecuting a case through an appeal and a five-day trial against three Defendants, does not appear unreasonable. Generally, counsel has not included any unnecessary hours in his bill, and maintained billing time records that are sufficiently detailed to enable the Court to review the reasonableness of the hours expended.
At the outset, Defendants request that the Court deduct 6.84 hours, or $1,197.00, for two instances itemized on counsel's invoices that clearly are dedicated to research and briefing the unsuccessful argument related to Plaintiff's claim under Section 1983 for an arrest without probable cause. In both instances to which Defendants refer, counsel for Plaintiff specifically states that he was performing work relating to the theory that probable cause did not support Allen St. John's arrest. Ultimately, this argument failed with the jury.
Plaintiff's claims clearly were "based on a common core of facts" and were "based on related legal theories." Thurman, 90 F.3d at 1169. All of Plaintiff's claims arose from the same set of facts relating to Allen St. John's arrest by the Vinton County Sheriff's Department, and the deputies' attempts to place him in the back of the police cruiser. With the exception of the malicious prosecution claim, which Plaintiff asserted against Sheriff Hickey alone, Plaintiff pursued the same legal theories against all three Defendants. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants by their actions on November 9, 2000 violated Allen St. John's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from an unreasonable arrest without probable cause and to be free from excessive force during the course of his arrest. Plaintiff also asserted state law, companion claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, each of which contained a common element or defense relating to a lack of probable cause to effectuate the arrest.
For purposes of determining a reasonable attorney fee, the Court should not treat claims based on a common core of facts and related legal theories as distinct claims, "and the cost of litigating the related claims should not be reduced." Thurman, 90 F.3d at 1169. Here, Plaintiff's claims are all related because Plaintiff sought relief based upon a single course of allegedly wrongful conduct. Counsel's time generally was targeted to the litigation as a whole. Although in this case, counsel has, in two instances, itemized his invoices evidencing that at least 6.84 hours related to the unsuccessful claim under Section 1983 for an arrest without probable cause, the Court is prohibited from reducing attorneys fees based on a simple ratio of successful claims to claims raised. Id. Certainly, counsel spent well in excess of 6.84 hours in pursuit of his legal theory that probable cause did not support Mr. St. John's arrest, but the Court cannot, and indeed, should not, divide the hours on a claim-by-claim basis. This case involves related causes of action arising from a common set of facts, which is precisely why, in reviewing a motion for fees, the Court may not view the claims independently. "Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation." Id. The Court, therefore, will not deduct 6.84 hours related to the probable cause theory.
Defendants themselves object only to a small number of hours that Plaintiff's attorney spent briefing arguments they claim were not reasonable. Defendants specifically object to the following time, asserting that the arguments associated with it were unreasonable:
• 9.94 hours spent in the pursuit of an argument to preclude Dr. Hartwick, Allen St. John's treating physician, from testifying at trial;
• 1.38 hours to prepare a motion for an entry of default (3½ years after Defendants' Answer was due and 3 weeks prior to trial);
• .26 hours to review Defendants' trial brief regarding Defendants' arguments that they should not be responsible for aggravating Allen St. John's pre-existing conditions;
• .47 hours to review the Court's Orders on the parties Motions in Limine
• 1.11 hours to prepare Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Order denying Daubert challenge to Defendants' police experts
• 4.77 hours in trial preparation for cross-examinations of McManus, Gleeson and Defendant Hickey; and
• .58 hours preparing Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest
Altogether, Defendants object to 18.51 hours, or $3,239.25, essentially asserting that this time was used to making untenable legal arguments.
The Court is disinclined to reduce the amount of fees associated with hours that did not contribute to the ultimate success achieved by Plaintiff:
The question is not whether a party prevailed on a particular motion or whether in hindsight the time expenditure was strictly necessary to obtain the relief achieved. Rather, the standard is whether a reasonable attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was performed.Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp. 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990). The Court concludes the documentation supporting Plaintiff's request for fees provides sufficient detail and probative value to enable the Court to determine that such hours were actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of the litigation. Accordingly, the Court will not exclude the time for work reasonably spent by Plaintiff's counsel at a point in time that he believed the work was necessary, even if ultimately he did not prevail on the motion or the theory pursued.
The Court notes, however, than several of Defendants' objections relate to items that clearly relate to the prosecution of this case, including such time as it took Plaintiff's counsel to prepare his cross-examinations of key witnesses during trial. Defendants have asserted no basis whatsoever, and the Court likewise finds none, to exclude the 4.77 hours Plaintiff spent in trial preparation.
D. Adjustment
Having determined the Plaintiff was a prevailing party, and that the hourly rate and hours spent in the pursuit of this litigation were reasonable, the Court may adjust the sum to reflect the important factor of the ultimate success in the relief obtained. Hensley calls for a reduced fee where "the relief, however, significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
The Court rejects outright Defendants' arguments that Plaintiff recovered only nominal damages and therefore is entitled to no attorney's fees at all. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992), upon which Defendants rely, is distinguishable, in that the plaintiffs there sued for a constitutional violation, asked for $17 million, and recovered $1.00. Here, Plaintiff recovered both $2000 in compensatory damages and $1000 in punitive damages. These awards may be characterized as relatively small, but clearly not as trivial or nominal amounts.
Upward adjustments of the lodestar amount are permissible in certain "rare" and "exceptional" cases. Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2004). As for his request for a one-third upward adjustment, Plaintiff suggests that this is one of the rare and exceptional circumstances in which an increase in the basic fee award is justified. Plaintiff argues that an upward adjustment to the lodestar figure is warranted due to the contingent nature of the fee agreement and the riskiness of not prevailing in this litigation, particularly after the Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
The risk factor of not prevailing in the litigation is applicable only where the district court specifically finds that the case is an exceptional case in which an upward adjustment is appropriate and that there was a "real risk of not prevailing in the case." Geier, 372 F.3d at 793. The risk inherent in counsel taking the case on a contingency basis is not a justification for enhancement of the attorney fees. Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712, 720 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)).
The Court cannot agree that this case was particularly rare or so exceptional as to justify application of an upward multiplier. The case was relatively limited in scope. The legal principles advanced by Plaintiffs under the Fourth Amendment were relatively straightforward, even though factually disputed. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this case presents one of the rare or exceptional instances in which a party should recover more than the actual fees at issue.
Instead, the recoverable fees must conform to and account for Plaintiff's partial success in the litigation. In fact, had the fees requested by the Plaintiff been excessive or had the Court considered the total time invested of approximately 353 hours over the course of this four-year litigation unreasonable in any manner, the Court would be disposed to order a reduction in light of the relief Plaintiff finally obtained.
As it stands, however, the Court, in its discretion, concludes that the base fees sought by Plaintiff, without an upward adjustment, are appropriate and reflect the significance of the overall relief obtained in relation to the hours reasonably expended in the litigation.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Expenses (Doc. # 113) is GRANTED, but her request for an one-third upward adjustment is DENIED. Plaintiff is accordingly awarded $2,826.89 in COSTS AND EXPENSES and $63,113.60 in ATTORNEY'S FEES.
IT IS SO ORDERED.