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Sweda International, Inc. v. Donut Maker, Inc.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts
Jan 21, 1982
13 Mass. App. Ct. 914 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)

Opinion

January 21, 1982.

Paul A. Kramer for the defendant.

Jerrold N. Arnowitz, for the plaintiff, submitted a brief.


The defendant appealed from a summary judgment which was entered against it in the Superior Court on the basis of the prima facie effect of an earlier finding for the plaintiff in a District Court. See G.L.c. 231, §§ 104 and 102C, as appearing in St. 1978, c. 478, §§ 263 and 262, respectively; O'Brion, Russell Co. v. LeMay, 370 Mass. 243, 243-244 (1976). 1. The lone affidavit submitted by the defendant in opposition to the plaintiff's motion was deficient because it failed to recite that it was "made on [the] personal knowledge" of the affiant or to "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein," as required by Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(e), 365 Mass. 825 (1974). Compare Shapiro Equip. Corp. v. Morris Son Constr., 369 Mass. 968, 968-969 (1976); Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 217 n. 5 (1978); Stanton Indus. Inc. v. Columbus Mills, Inc., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 794 (1976). Contrast First Natl. Bank v. North Adams Hoosac Sav. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 790, 793-794 (1979). Although the judge could have overlooked the deficiencies in the affidavit (see Stetson v. Selectmen of Carlisle, 369 Mass. 755, 763 n. 12 [1976]; Stepan Chem. Corp. v. Wilmington, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 880, 881 [1979]), he was not required to do so. 2. The defendant fares no better with its answers to the interrogatories which were propounded to it in the District Court. The particular answer relied on failed to set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine triable issue. See and compare Community Natl. Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 554, 555-556, 558-559 n. 8 (1976); O'Brion, Russell Co. v. LeMay, 370 Mass. at 244, 245; Vaught Constr. Corp. v. Bertonazzi Buick Co., 371 Mass. 553, 561 (1976); Royal Bank of Canada v. Connolly, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 905 (1980). Equally important, none of the answers met the requirements for affidavits which are set out in rule 56(e) and quoted in part 1 hereof. See S S Logging Co. v. Barker, 366 F.2d 617, 624 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1966); H.B. Zachry Co. v. O'Brien, 378 F.2d 423, 425-426 (10th Cir. 1967); Schwartz v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1968); Maryland ex rel. Barresi v. Hatch, 198 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D. Conn. 1961); Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2722, at 480-481, 483-484 (1973). To the contrary, it is quite apparent that the individual who formulated and signed the answers did so only after consulting such of the defendant's "agents, servants and attorneys as [would] enable [him] to make complete and true answers."

Judgment affirmed.


Summaries of

Sweda International, Inc. v. Donut Maker, Inc.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts
Jan 21, 1982
13 Mass. App. Ct. 914 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)
Case details for

Sweda International, Inc. v. Donut Maker, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:SWEDA INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. DONUT MAKER, INC

Court:Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Date published: Jan 21, 1982

Citations

13 Mass. App. Ct. 914 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)
430 N.E.2d 439

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