Opinion
2:22-cv-00009-BHH-MGB
10-18-2022
Jeremy Shay Sweat, #326997, Plaintiff, v. Beulah G. Roberts and Office of Clarendon County Clerk of Court, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jeremy Shay Sweat (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
Notwithstanding the illegible and incoherent nature of the Complaint, the crux of this case appears to be that Defendant Beulah G. Roberts, the Clarendon County Clerk of Court, purportedly denied Plaintiff access to the courts by failing to file his “appeal” following the circuit court's conditional dismissal of his second application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) issued April 6, 2021.(Dkt. No. 1 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.) Records indicate that the circuit court's order granted Plaintiff twenty days to show cause as to “why the application should not be dismissed in its entirety.” See S.C. Code § 17-27-70(b). Plaintiff was served with the circuit court's decision on May 7, 2021, and filed a handwritten response on or around May 18, 2021.
A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records and proceedings of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites). The undersigned therefore takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's underlying state proceedings. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/clarendon/publicindex/ (entering Case No. 2018CP1400463) (last visited October 17, 2022).
On December 4, 2021, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant Roberts asking about the status of his “appeal.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.) Defendant Roberts promptly replied to Plaintiff's inquiry, directing him to contact the South Carolina Court of Appeals “concerning any appeal [he] would have filed.” (Id. at 4.) Defendant Roberts explained, “[t]his office only handles magistrate court appeals, not appeals from orders or hearings from the circuit court.” (Id.) Plaintiff then filed the instant action, alleging that Defendant Roberts violated his constitutional rights by refusing to process his paperwork and failing to give him an explanation for such. (See id. at 2, alleging that Defendant Roberts was “looking for an excuse to not do her job.”) The Complaint asks that Plaintiff be granted a “hearing” to address these issues and seeks confirmation as to whether Defendant Roberts filed the alleged “appeal.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Dkt. No. 8.) Plaintiff also requests $50,000.00 for the “stress” Defendant Roberts has caused. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 8.)
PRCOEDURAL HISTORY
Upon reviewing the initial filings in this matter, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his case was not in proper form. (Dkt. No. 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff had filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, indicating that he did not have sufficient funds to prepay the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 2.) Plaintiff did not, however, provide a financial certificate from his correctional institution verifying his financial status as required under § 1915(a)(2). Instead, he submitted a withdrawal notice directing that $400.00 be taken from his trust account with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and delivered to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 2-1.) Based on the above, the undersigned notified Plaintiff that it was unclear from his filings whether he intended to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the filing fee. Regardless, the Court could not authorize service of the Complaint until Plaintiff either submitted a financial certificate or paid the full $402.00 filing fee. The undersigned granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to bring his case into proper form. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 1-2.)
Shortly thereafter, the Court received a check from Plaintiff in the amount of $400.00 (Receipt No. SCX200018520), apparently confirming that Plaintiff no longer intended to proceed in forma pauperis. As the undersigned previously noted, however, the total filing fee for a federal civil case is $402.00, which includes a $52.00 administrative fee set by the Judicial Conference.Thus, the undersigned gave Plaintiff one final opportunity to bring his case into proper form and pay the outstanding $2.00 balance. (Dkt. No. 10 at 1-2.) The undersigned warned Plaintiff that if he did not follow the instructions within the time permitted by the order, his case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with an order of the Court under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 2.)
See http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Resources/fee.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2022).
Notably, the undersigned's order also informed Plaintiff that while the Court could not evaluate the substance of his Complaint until he brought his case into proper form, a cursory review of the pleading indicated that his action was likely subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the undersigned advised Plaintiff that he would also need to file an amended complaint if he wished to proceed with this action. (See id. at 4.) The undersigned warned Plaintiff that if he did not file an amended complaint that cured the pleading deficiencies identified in the order, the undersigned would likewise recommend that the Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Id.) To date, Plaintiff has not paid the full $402.00 fee or filed an amended pleading, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has lapsed.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 407 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that all civil lawsuits brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity, officer or employee are subject to screening pursuant to § 1915A, even those lawsuits where the full filing fee is paid at the time of filing).
Because Plaintiff is not proceeding pro se at this time, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not govern this analysis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (allowing an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit).
To protect against possible abuses, § 1915A requires that the court dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (“It is well established that a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.”) (internal citations omitted), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions may be dismissed sua sponte at any time. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989). As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all civil actions). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
Despite the undersigned's warnings, Plaintiff has not paid the full $402.00 filing fee in this case. Consequently, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to comply with an order of this Court. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to bring this case into proper form, the undersigned also finds that Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for the reasons discussed below.
Although Plaintiff essentially abandoned his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2), the undersigned reiterates that Plaintiff also failed to file a financial certificate verifying his fiscal status-to the extent he had any intent of renewing that original motion.
As a threshold matter, there seems to be some confusion regarding the proper procedural process here. Indeed, Plaintiff's filings-including his letter to Defendant Roberts-repeatedly reference an “appeal.” As Defendant Roberts explained in her response to Plaintiff, however, the circuit court does not process appeals of PCR determinations. Rather, the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules provide that, “[a] final decision entered under the Post-Conviction Relief Act shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon petition of either party for a writ of certiorari, according to the procedure set forth in this Rule.” Rule 243(a), S.C.A.C.R. Thus, Plaintiff did not submit a viable “appeal” to Defendant Roberts in relation to his second PCR application and any claims to the contrary are mistaken.
It seems Plaintiff may have realized his error after receiving the undersigned's most recent proper form order, which reinforced the appropriate avenue for challenging the dismissal of a PCR application. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 3.) To be sure, several months after receiving the undersigned's order, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of South Carolina challenging the conditional order of dismissal in his underlying PCR action. See https://www.sccourts.org/ACMS/ (entering Appellate Case No. 2022-000766) (last visited October 17, 2022). On or around June 7, 2022, the appellate court dismissed Plaintiff's notice of appeal “without prejudice because the conditional order of dismissal [was] not an appealable order.” The circuit court eventually issued a final order of dismissal on September 16, 2022, resulting in the denial of Plaintiff's second PCR application. Plaintiff has not, however, renewed his appeal at this time.
To the extent Plaintiff is actually referring to the handwritten response he filed following the circuit court's conditional dismissal of his second PCR application, the Clarendon County Public Index confirms that Defendant Roberts did in fact file those documents upon receipt.Nevertheless, even if Defendant Roberts somehow erred in the filing of such documents, clerks of court are generally afforded quasi-judicial immunity on claims involving “tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that [they] are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (internal citations omitted), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020); see also Dupree v. Ward, No. 4:13-cv-803-RBH, 2013 WL 5657689, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 2013) (“The doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to court support personnel because of the danger that disappointed litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/clarendon/publicindex/ (entering Case No. 2018CP1400463) (last visited October 17, 2022).
The undersigned finds that Defendant Roberts is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for performing her official duties-including the filing of court documents-as the Clarendon County Clerk of Court. See, e.g., Adams v. Grant, No. 2:17-cv-2833-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 6048913, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2017) (finding that county clerks of court “are part of the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system” and therefore entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for acts performed as part of their official duties for the court, “such as the filing of documents in the court docket”), adopted, 2017 WL 6060604 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2017); Dupree, 2013 WL 5657689, at *2 (concluding that clerk of court “may not be held constitutionally liable for her management of court records”); Hamilton, 2020 WL 7001153, at *6 (collecting cases where clerks were entitled to quasijudicial immunity for various docketing and filing errors). Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Roberts are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Although not entirely clear, it appears Plaintiff is also attempting to name the Clarendon County Clerk of Court's Office and/or the Clarendon County Courthouse as defendants in this matter. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) However, as the undersigned previously explained, only a “person” can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 3.) See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (explaining that to state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law). A clerk's office and/or courthouse does not constitute a “person” for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., Rankin v. Sykes, No. 1:18-cv-353, 2019 WL 203184, at *15 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 15, 2019). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a claim against the Clarendon County Clerk of Court's Office and/or the Clarendon County Courthouse, those claims are likewise subject to summary dismissal.
Finally, the undersigned notes that insofar as Plaintiff is seeking mandamus-type relief- i.e., asking the undersigned to compel action by the circuit court and/or Defendant Roberts-such relief is unavailable. In short, federal courts have no general power “to compel certain actions by state courts.” See Hamrick v. Seventh Jud. Cir. of S.C., No. 7:20-cv-687-DCC-KFM, 2020 WL 2476174, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (referencing Gurley v. Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, 411 F.2d 586, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1969)), adopted, 2020 WL 2468719 (D.S.C. May 13, 2020); see also Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2nd Cir. 1988).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to comply with an order of this Court pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed without prejudice and without further leave to amend or bring this case into proper form, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022). The undersigned also RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) be dismissed. In light of the foregoing, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons forms or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).