Summary
following Jones and dismissing a breach of contract claim based on an agreement entered into under a grievance procedure because it would require the court to address the relationships of the parties created by the collective bargaining agreement
Summary of this case from Bielozer v. City of N. OlmstedOpinion
Case No. 3:01CV7020
April 26, 2001
Thomas A. Dixon, Eastman Smith, Toledo, OH, representing pty Johnson Controls, Inc.
Jason M. Katz, Foley Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, representing pty Johnson Controls, Inc.
Michael P. Kohler, Foley Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, representing pty Johnson Controls, Inc.
Thomas C. Pence, Foley Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, representing pty Johnson Controls, Inc.
Stephen A. Schaefer, Marsh McAdams Scharfy Brogan Schaefer, Maumee, OH, representing pty Sharon L. Sweat.
Margaret Mattimoe Sturgeon, Eastman Smith, Toledo, OH, representing pty Johnson Controls, Inc.
ORDER
This action is based on a claim by plaintiff Sharon L. Sweat ("Sweat"), who was fired by defendant Johnson Controls on January 27, 1999. Jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Pending is Johnson Controls' motion to dismiss with prejudice Sweat's first claim for relief. For the following reasons, Johnson Controls' motion shall be granted.
Background
Sweat was an employee of Johnson Control, a Wisconsin corporation, beginning January 30, 1996. (Compl. at. 3). She was a member of UAW Local 12. (Id.). Sweat was subjected to discipline by Johnson Controls in 1998. (Id. at 4).
Using a grievance procedure embodied in the collective bargaining agreement between Johnson Controls and the union, Sweat entered into a final letter agreement with Johnson Controls. (Id.). The agreement specified that "Any further quality, scrap or work rule violation [would] result in immediate suspension." (Private letter agreement). The suspension could become termination without appeal. (Id.). The private letter agreement was signed by Sweat, a company representative, and a union representative on November 30, 1998. (Id.).
On January 11, 1999, Sweat was suspended for an alleged rule violation; this suspension became a termination on January 27, 1999. (Compl. at 6, 8).
Sweat filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas for Lucas County, Ohio on December 18, 2000. (Compl.). The complaint contained three claims for relief: 1) a breach of contract claim, 2) a sex discrimination claim with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and 3) a state claim under O.R.C. § 4112.02(I). Johnson Controls filed a notice of removal on January 16, 2001 alleging diversity jurisdiction. (Id.). The case was removed, and on January 23, 2001, Johnson Controls filed a motion to dismiss Sweat's first claim for relief with prejudice, arguing that the claim was preempted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). (Doc. 5).
Discussion
"Questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law."Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). The Sixth Circuit has also held that LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, "pre-empts state law when `employment relationships which are subject to a collective bargaining agreement' are implicated." See Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Jones, the court considered a state law claim for breach of a settlement agreement. (Id. at 382). The claim arose from an agreement negotiated in a grievance procedure and required the court to "address relationships that have been created through the collective bargaining agreement and to mediate a dispute founded upon rights created by a CBA."Jones at 382-83.
The procedure and relationships at issue in Jones are analogous to the current case. The private letter agreement signed by Sweat was arrived at through a grievance procedure established by a collective bargaining agreement. The position she held had been created by that agreement and a resolution of the dispute would require this court to address relationships created by the collective bargaining agreement.
As the Sixth Circuit held in Jones, such an agreement, involving the union, the company, and the employee, is subject to the LMRA, which preempts any state law claims of breach of contract. When resolution of a state-law claim depends on an agreement made by parties to a labor contract, the claim "must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220 (citation omitted). Following this holding, and in consideration of the private letter agreement entered into by the parties, this court finds that Sweat's First Claim for Relief should be dismissed.
Sweat argues in her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss First Claim for Relief that Johnson Controls both denied recourse to her through the grievance procedure and "seeks to close the courthouse door as well." It must be noted, however, that Sweat accepted and signed the private letter agreement that denied her access to the grievance process. In addition, although Sweat cannot bring her breach of contract claim against Johnson Controls, if she truly feels that her interests were not represented in the grievance process, she may bring suit under the LMRA against the union.
Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED THAT Johnson Controls' motion to dismiss Claim One of the complaint (Doc. 5) shall be, and hereby is, granted.
So ordered.