Opinion
No. 12–P–776.
2013-05-20
Steven SURABIAN v. Pauline M. BILLINGS.
By the Court (VUONO, CARHART & AGNES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff appeals from the decree dismissing his petition for removal of the defendant as administratrix brought in the Probate Court. We affirm.
Background. Stephanie LaFlash–Surabian (decedent) died intestate on October 13, 2008. She was survived by her son, Devin Peterson. Her mother, Pauline M. Billings, filed a voluntary administration of the estate. No objection to her petition was filed, and she was appointed as voluntary administratrix of the estate. On November 19, 2010, Steven Surabian, the decedent's biological father, filed a petition to remove Billings as the administratrix and to appoint himself as administrator instead. On November 21, 2011, Billings filed a motion to dismiss Surabian's petition alleging that Surabian lacked standing to file the petition. A hearing on this motion was held on November 22, 2011, in which Surabian argued that he had standing as a creditor to petition for removal of the administratrix. The judge determined that Surabian was not a creditor, nor had any creditor's claim been filed within the required one-year period. See G.L. c. 197, § 9( a ), repealed by St.2008, c. 521, § 16, but, in effect until March 31, 2012. See St.2011, § 24. After hearing from both parties, the judge dismissed Surabian's petition to remove Billings as the administratrix. Discussion. On appeal, Surabian argues that the judge improperly determined that he is not a creditor and that he lacks standing to petition for the administratrix's removal. The Probate Court has broad discretion in determining whether removal of an administrator is proper. Machado v. Brown, 336 Mass. 758 (1957). It is clear from the record that the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that Surabian is not an heir, legatee, or creditor of the estate. Accordingly, Surabian lacks standing to petition for removal of the administratrix. Clymer v. Mayo, 393 Mass. 754, 763 (1985).
Decree of dismissal affirmed.