Opinion
5:21-CV-187-MTT-MSH
08-29-2022
AMMON RA SUMRALL, Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Ammon Ra Sumrall, an inmate currently incarcerated at Wilcox State Prison in Abbeville, Georgia, has filed a pro se complaint (ECF No. 1) seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 31) and Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 41). For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's motion be DENIED, and Defendants' motion be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's claims arise from his incarceration at Wilcox State Prison (“WSP”) in Abbeville, Georgia. Plaintiff names as defendants the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”), Warden Artis Singleton (“Singleton”), and Deputy Warden Tonya Ashley (“Ashley”). Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq., arguing Defendants violated his rights by depriving him of the vegan diet he practices pursuant to his religion. Compl., ECF No. 1.
The Court received Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) on June 7, 2021. After preliminary review, all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants were allowed to proceed for further factual development. Order 1-9, ECF No. 7; Suppl. Order 5, ECF No.13; Order 1-2, Dec. 16, 2021, ECF No. 20 (adopting Order and Suppl. Order). Plaintiff amended his complaint on January 13, 2022 (ECF No. 25). On April 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 31), to which Defendants responded (ECF No. 35) on May 19, 2022. On June 10, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 41). Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 45) on July 5, 2022. Defendants replied (ECF No. 49) to Plaintiff's response on August 5, 2022. Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment are ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on his RLUIPA, First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims. Pl.'s Partial Mot. for Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 31. Plaintiff makes seven requests in his motion. Id. Plaintiff asks the court to (1) grant Plaintiff a jury trial on the issue of damages on his “First, Eighth, and Due Process claims;” (2) require Defendants to allow Plaintiff's family to order him a pair of vegan athletic shoes each year; (3) require Defendants to allow Plaintiff's family to order him vegan food packages “at least four times a year;” (4) require Defendants to “establish and utilize a meaningful due process procedure for prisoners who the GDC wants to deprive of food or otherwise remove from the AEP;” (5) require Defendants to create a store list that informs prisoners of which products are vegan; (6) declare that Defendants violated Plaintiff's RLUIPA, First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (7) grant Plaintiff any other available and appropriate relief. Id. at 1-2.
The Court need not address Plaintiff's second, third, fourth, and fifth requests, that he be provided vegan shoes and food packages and that the GDC develop a procedure for removal from the AEP and store lists that note which products are vegan. Plaintiff has not shown he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Plaintiff claims he specifically requested the vegan shoes and the GDC denied his requests. See, e.g., Pl.'s Dep. 13, 34-41, ECF No. 35-1. However, Plaintiff has not shown that he has exhausted his administrative remedies as to that request or any of his other requests. See Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, since the Court recommends denial of Plaintiff's motion, these requests should likewise be denied.
Defendants responded (ECF No. 35) to Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and filed their own motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 41), arguing they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims because Defendants (1) did not violate Plaintiff's rights; (2) did not violate Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights; (3) did not violate Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights; (4) did not violate Plaintiff's First Amendment rights; and (5) did not violate RLUIPA. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 8-16. Further, Defendants assert they are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 16-19.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
III. Undisputed Material Facts
Plaintiff has been incarcerated in Georgia state prisons since 1992. Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Partial Mot. for Summ. J. 1-2, ECF No. 31-1. Since the late-1990s, Plaintiff has practiced a faith based upon the beliefs of his African ancestors' worship of the Sun God Ammon Ra. Id. at 2. Part of Plaintiff's belief system is that it is a violation of God's will to kill animals unnecessarily, thus he adheres to a vegan diet. Id. In 2007, Plaintiff learned that the Alternative Entree Meal Program (“AEP”) offered by the GDC would accommodate his religious dietary beliefs, and he signed up for it and remained on the program until 2019. Id. at 2. Around July or August 2019, Defendant Singleton removed Plaintiff from the AEP because Plaintiff consistently purchased various non-vegan goods from the prison store. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 2-3, 5-6. Plaintiff quickly reenrolled in the AEP but was removed by Defendants Singleton and Ashley again in July 2020 for the same reason. Id. at 7. Plaintiff concedes that he purchased non-vegan goods, including chicken and beef ramen soup and chili, but claims that he purchased these items to eat in a vegan manner or to sell to other inmates. Pl.'s Dep. 29, 71-74, ECF No. 35-1; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 17-18, ECF No. 30-3.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was off the AEP from July 29, 2020, to October 19, 2020. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that, during that time, he suffered “weeks of bad health,” including stomach spasms, back pain, muscle aches, and fatigue. Id. at ¶ 20-21. Plaintiff admits, though, that he believes he contracted Covid-19 before he began experiencing any of the symptoms he describes. Id. at ¶ 22. However, Plaintiff claims that, while other inmates recovered from Covid-19, his “body and life seemed to worsen,” and medical testing revealed a Vitamin D deficiency and a low white blood cell count, both of which he attributes to poor nutrition. Id. at ¶ 23-24. Plaintiff does not explain, however, how he was able to purchase multiple food items per week while he was on the AEP but became ill due to poor nutrition as soon as he was removed from the program. Id. at ¶ 22. In October of 2020, Plaintiff was admittedly reinstated in the AEP and has remained on the program since. Id. at 16, 20.
Plaintiff further claims that Defendants only removed African American inmates from the AEP and not the white and Jewish prisoners who made similar non-vegan purchases from the commissary. Pl.'s Dep. 14. At the same time, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants removed him from the AEP “out of retaliation” for his past grievances regarding the vegan meals. Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 16, 19, ECF No. 31-3. Plaintiff does not provide any substantive evidence for Defendants' alleged discriminatory behavior, other than uncorroborated accounts from other inmates and “gossip” Plaintiff heard about inmates removed from the AEP list. Pl.'s Dep. 42-48; Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 4. Ultimately, Plaintiff only has personal knowledge of the seven or eight individuals from his dorm- which is one of about twenty in the jail-who were removed from the AEP. Id.
IV. Eighth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff contends both that he should be granted a jury trial on the issue of damages on his Eighth Amendment claims and that the Court should declare that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 1-2. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has met neither the objective nor the subjective standards required to support his claim. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 9-10. The Court agrees with Defendants and recommends that their motion be granted on this ground.
A. Eighth Amendment Standard
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by the government. The Supreme Court has recognized that prisons must provide inmates' basic needs, including “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). However, to successfully plead a conditions-of-confinement claim, a prisoner must show that the deprivations he suffers are objectively and sufficiently “serious” or “extreme” to constitute a denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010). This standard is only met when the challenged conditions pose “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the prisoner's] future health or safety,” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), or if society “considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk,” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). A prisoner must also meet an objective standard and show that prison officials had the requisite state of mind, i.e., that the officials knew of the excessive risk to inmate health or safety and disregarded that risk. See Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999).
B. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff's allegations do not satisfy the standard for an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim as Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show the type of extreme deprivation that would violate the Eighth Amendment. As to the objective “unreasonable risk” component, Plaintiff correctly asserts that the Constitution requires prisoners be provided “reasonably adequate food[;]” however, “[a] well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health, is all that is required.” Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985); Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Partial Mot. for Summ. J. 8-9. Plaintiff concedes that the AEP meals are nutritionally adequate, but asserts that, during the time he was not on the AEP, his health suffered because of an inadequate diet. Id. However, the Eight Amendment does not require that prisons provide meals to conform to inmates' dietary preferences-religious or otherwise. See Robbins v. Robertson, 782 Fed.Appx. 794, 805 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Neither we nor the Supreme Court have ever held that the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to indulge inmates' dietary preferences-regardless of whether those preferences are dictated by religious, as opposed to non-religious, reasons.”). Plaintiff does not allege that any of the meals provided at WSP are inadequate, just that his diet was inadequate for the period he was not on the AEP. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show that Defendants created an unreasonable risk to his safety.
As to the subjective component, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knew about or disregarded any unreasonable risk to his safety. Instead, Plaintiff claims only that Defendants removed him from the AEP as retaliation for his complaints over how vegan meals were prepared and served. Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Partial Mot. for Summ. J. 9-10. Plaintiff does not present any evidence that he even spoke to Defendants about his dietary preferences, much less that they knew of or disregarded any risk as to Plaintiff's health. Because Plaintiff's claims fail as to both components of the Eighth Amendment standard, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on that ground.
V. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff contends he should be granted a jury trial on the issue of damages on his Fourteenth Amendment claims and the Court should declare that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 1-2. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's rights under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 10-13. The Court agrees with Defendants and recommends that their motion be granted on this ground.
A. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A claim under the Equal Protection Clause requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006). It is not enough that the alleged action “results in a . . . disproportionate impact.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256 (1977). “Proof of [ ] discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants only removed African American prisoners from the AEP and not the white or Jewish prisoners, though those prisoners also purchased nonvegan store items. Pl.'s Dep. 14. Plaintiff admits, however, that he only had personal knowledge of the AEP status of prisoners in the dorm he was in at the time. Id. at 49-51. The remainder of his information about which prisoners were removed from the AEP came from “gossip” he heard from other inmates. Id. Plaintiff claims other inmates could corroborate his allegations, but he has not produced any declarations or affidavits from those individuals. Id. at 42-48. In sum, Plaintiff cannot show he was treated differently than similarly situated prisoners on any constitutionally protected basis, or that Defendants possessed any discriminatory intent. Plaintiff was removed from the AEP due to his nonvegan store purchases. Prisoners of various races and religions were removed from the program at the same time, for the same reason. See Declaration of Def. Ashey ¶ 7-8, ECF No. 41-2. Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim.
B. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides for procedural protections, “requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property[.]” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To make out a denial-of-procedural-due-process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally inadequate process.” Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 Fed.Appx. 738, 743 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)).
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes two situations where a prisoner may be further deprived of his liberty such that due process is required. Kirby v. Seigelman, 195 F.3d. 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999). Relevant here, a liberty interest can arise when the state has consistently provided a benefit to a prisoner and “the deprivation of that benefit imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 1291 (citing Sandlin v Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)). The crux of Plaintiff's argument is that he had a liberty interest in continuation in the AEP and he was entitled to notice and a hearing before removal from the program; however, Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in remaining in the AEP and a temporary suspension of his access to the program did not violate his due process rights. See Hathcock v. Cohen, 287 Fed.Appx. 793, 801 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[a] jail should accommodate an inmate's religious dietary restrictions, subject to budgetary and logistical limitations, but only when the belief is ‘truly held[,]” and affirming prison officials' ability to inquire into the sincerity of an inmate's beliefs); see also Reed v. Bryant, No. CIV-16-461-C, 2019 WL 3939068 at *12-13 (W.D. Okla. Jun. 4, 2019) (holding it was not a violation of a prisoner's due process to temporarily suspend a religious diet when informed of inmates consumption of items inconsistent with that diet). Plaintiff concedes he purchased multiple non-vegan items from the prison store, an action inconsistent with his professed religious diet. Thus, Defendants did not violate the Due Process Clause by temporarily suspending his access to the AEP.
Further, Plaintiff points to the fact that the Standard Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) in place at the time of his removal did not specifically prohibit inmates in the AEP from buying non-vegan items from the store, which he claims prohibits removal from the program for that reason. Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Partial Mot. for Summ. J. 2-3. However, Plaintiff concedes that the specific prohibition on purchasing non-vegan items now appears in the SOPs and he does not challenge that provision. Pl.'s Dep. 52. Further, many other inmates were likewise removed from the AEP for purchasing non-vegan store items at the same time as Plaintiff. Declaration of Def. Ashley at ¶ 7-8. In sum, Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's due process rights and are entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
VI. First Amendment and RLUIPA Claim
Plaintiff requests he be granted a jury trial on the issue of damages on his First Amendment claim and the Court should declare that Defendants violated his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights. Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 1-2. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on these claims because they did not violate his First Amendment rights and did not violate RLUIPA. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J.13-16. The Court agrees with Defendants and recommends that Defendants' motion be granted on these grounds.
A. First Amendment and RLUIPA Standards
The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “To establish a violation of his [or her] right to free exercise, [a plaintiff] must first establish that a state actor imposed a ‘substantial burden' on his practice of religion.” Wilkinson v. GEO Grp., Inc., 617 Fed.Appx. 915, 917 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1549 (11th Cir.1993)). The prisoner's beliefs must be sincere, meaning they are “truly held and are religious in nature.” Williams v. Sec'y for Dept. of Corr., 131 Fed.Appx. 682, 685 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Prison officials may limit a prisoner's free exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs if such “limitations are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'” Johnson v. Brown, 581 Fed.Appx. 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
RLUIPA requires the government to justify any substantial burden on a prisoner's religious exercise by demonstrating a compelling governmental interest. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). “To establish a prima facie case under section 3 of RLUIPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate 1) that he engaged in a religious exercise; and 2) that the religious exercise was substantially burdened.” Smith v. Governor for Ala., 562 Fed.Appx. 806, 813 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Once a Plaintiff makes such a showing, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2017).
B. Plaintiff's Motion
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “substantially burden[ed] Plaintiff's Free Exercise rights when they removed him from the AEP in 2019 and 2020.” Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 6. He states that, in response to Plaintiff's grievance about being denied vegan meals for two days, Defendant Singleton stated he could go to the dining hall for a non-vegan tray. Id. Plaintiff claims this is “an example of an official applying substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs” (citing Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of Ind. Employ. Sec. Div, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Id. Ultimately, Plaintiff claims that Defendants' denying him access to the AEP for about 90 days denied him the ability to practice his religion in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Id. at 6-8.
C. Defendants' Motion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not shown his religious rights were substantially burdened. Defs.' Mot. for Summ J. 13-16. Specifically, they contend that Plaintiff was removed from the AEP for a legitimate reason, namely the purchase of numerous nonvegan items from the prison store. Id. at 13. As to the alleged RLUIPA violation, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's religious exercise has not been substantially burdened because “Plaintiff objectively failed to adhere to a vegan diet.” Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 16. The Court agrees.
D. Substantial Burden Standard
The Eleventh Circuit has “applied similar definitions of ‘substantial burden' when assessing claims under both RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause.” Robbins, 782 Fed.Appx. at 802 n.5 (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004)). “[A]n individual's exercise of religion is ‘substantially burdened' if a regulation completely prevents the individual from engaging in religiously mandated activity, or if the regulation requires participation in an activity prohibited by religion.” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. It means “more than an inconvenience on religious exercise” but instead is “akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” Id. Under this definition, Plaintiff's religious exercise has not been substantially burdened.
Plaintiff was not coerced to deviate from his religious exercise, he was merely inconvenienced by his lack of access to the AEP for about 90 days. During that time, Plaintiff could have eaten the vegan elements of the standard food trays, or, more realistically, he could have purchased acceptable food items from the prison store. Plaintiff admits-and records reveal-that he purchased multiple food items from the store each week. See ECF No. 41-1 (showing Plaintiff's store purchases from May to July 2020); see also Pl.'s Dep. 29, 71-74. Plaintiff does not explain how or why he could not continue to purchase food items to sustain himself for the brief time he was off the AEP. Plaintiff's contention that Defendant Singleton's suggestion that he eat the non-vegan trays lacks merit. Merely suggesting an alternative does not amount to coercion or undue pressure.
Further, Plaintiff's removal from the AEP was pursuant to valid prison policy. Plaintiff admits that the prison's SOPs now contain a provision prohibiting inmates in the AEP from buying non-vegan products from the prison store. Pl.'s Dep. 52. However, Plaintiff argues his removal from the AEP violated his rights because it predated the codification of the non-vegan purchase rule in the GDC's SOPs. But, as Defendants correctly state, the policy “just codified common sense[.]” Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 13. If an inmate claims they are vegan for religious reasons, but buys non-vegan items from the prison store, “GDC employees can legitimately and objectively adjudge those purchases as irreconcilable with the prisoner's professed vegan lifestyle” and can remove prisoners from the AEP for that reason. Id. GDP's policy is valid. Prison officials may evaluate the sincerity of in inmate's beliefs in determining whether a religious accommodation is necessary. See Hathcock, 287 Fed.Appx. at 801. Further, officials may use a prisoner's commissary purchase history as a proxy to assess sincerity of need for religious dietary accommodations. See Hill v. Hill, No. 6:20-cv-23, 2022 WL 2793371 at *7 (S.D. Ga., Jun. 24, 2022).
Plaintiff's religious beliefs were not substantially burdened. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show a violation of his right to free exercise under the First Amendment. Similarly, under RLUIPA, because Plaintiff has not shown that his religious exercise was substantially burdened, the government need not demonstrate a compelling governmental interest. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted on First Amendment and RLUIPA grounds, and Plaintiff's motion should be denied.
VII. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiff alleges a state law tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pl.'s Legal Arg. 4-5, ECF No. 1-2. Plaintiff claims that Defendants “intentionally and recklessly removed Plaintiff from the AEP in violation of his rights.” Id. at 5. He asserts Defendants “religiously and racially discriminate[d] against Plaintiff by punishing him for buying non-vegan store goods[.]” Id. Defendants move for summary judgment on this ground, arguing that Plaintiff's claim is barred under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”). The Court agrees and recommends that Defendants' motion be granted.
Plaintiff's state law tort claim is deficient for several reasons. As Defendants correctly argue, the GTCA bars Plaintiff's state law claims against them in their official capacities. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 16-18. The GTCA “constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a state officer or employee.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a). “A state officer or employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his or her official duties or employment is not subject to lawsuit or liability therefor.” Id. The GTCA instructs tort claimants to “name as a party defendant only the state government entity for which the state officer or employee was acting and shall not name the state officer or employee individually.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b). Should the claimant name the individual officer or employee, “the state government entity for which the state officer or employee was acting must be substituted as the party defendant.” Id.
However, even if Plaintiff substitutes the GDC, the appropriate government entity, for Defendants Singleton and Ashley, Plaintiff's claims remain futile for failing to comply with GTCA's service and ante litem requirements. Id. at 17. The GTCA mandates that a plaintiff initiating a civil suit against Georgia “must both: (1) cause process to be served upon the chief executive officer of the state government entity involved at his or her usual office address; and (2) cause process to be served upon the director of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services at his or her usual office address.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-35. Further, no civil “action against the state under [the] [GTCA] shall be commenced and the courts shall have no jurisdiction thereof unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state[.]” Id. § 50-21-26(a)(3). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he complied with these procedural requirements. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims are barred under the GTCA. See Lewis v. Stewart, No. 5:18-cv-00110-TES, 2018 WL 6046832, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2018) (dismissing the plaintiff's state-law claims for failure to “effectuate service or provide the required ante litem notice”); see also Cummings v. Ga. Dep't of Juv. Just., 653 S.E.2d 729, 731-32 (Ga. 2007).
Further, even if Plaintiff named the GDC as a party and followed procedural requirements, his claim would fail because the GTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for tort actions brought against the GDC in federal court. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b). Therefore, even if the GDC was substituted as a party, it would be immune from suit in federal court under Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Jones v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 763 Fed.Appx. 906, 907 (11th Cir. 2019); O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b) (Georgia waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and manner set forth in the GTCA and only for actions brought in Georgia state courts); see also Presnell v, Paulding Cnty., Ga., 454 Fed.Appx. 763, 766 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T] GTCA does not waive Georgia's immunity from suit in federal courts.”). Thus, Plaintiff's state law tort claim is barred, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted on that ground.
VIII. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that, even assuming Plaintiff could show a First Amendment, RLUIPA, or Equal Protection violation, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 18-19. The Court agrees, and therefore, recommends that in the alternative Defendants' motion be granted on this ground.
A. Qualified Immunity Standard
“[Q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 904 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant seeking qualified immunity must show that at the time of the alleged wrongful acts, “he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Id. at 905. Once this is established, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the grant of qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Id. To do so, a plaintiff must “demonstrate: first, that the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation; and, second, that the illegality of the officer's actions was clearly established at the time of the incident.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Defendants' Motion
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on each of Plaintiff's claims because Plaintiff failed to show a violation of his constitutional rights. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 19. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this ground because Defendants acted outside the scope of their discretionary authority when they removed Plaintiff from the AEP and they lacked the authority to promulgate rules regarding the AEP. Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 2-4, ECF. No. 45.
For the reasons stated above, Court finds that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Further, despite Plaintiff's argument to the contrary, Defendants acted within their discretionary authority when they removed Plaintiff from the AEP. Their actions “(1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of [their] duties, and (2) were within the scope of [their] authority.” Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017). The record shows that, in acting as correctional staff at WSP when they removed Plaintiff from the AEP and when they reviewed inmates' commissary purchases, Defendants acted within the scope of their authority. See Hill, 2022 WL 2793371 at * 5. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 31) be DENIED, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 41) be GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy hereof. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED.