Opinion
8:22-cv-00913-TMC-JDA
02-10-2023
Thomas B. Summerell, Plaintiff, v. Clemson University, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Doc. 17.] Plaintiff, represented by counsel, brings this action asserting a claim for violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (the “Rehabilitation Act”), and a claim for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. [Doc. 1-1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in this employment discrimination action are referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
Plaintiff filed this action on February 15, 2022, in the Pickens County Court of Common Pleas [Doc. 1-1], and Defendant removed the action to this Court on March 18, 2022 [Doc. 1]. On September 13, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Doc. 17.] On September 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Defendant filed a reply on October 3, 2022. [Docs. 19; 20.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from the Complaint. [Doc. 1-1.]
Defendant hired Plaintiff in 2016 as a maintenance employee. [Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 7-8.] Before he started working for Defendant, Plaintiff suffered severe facial trauma and was diagnosed with chronic severe pain, depression, and anxiety along with other chronic medical conditions. [Id. ¶ 7.] Before and during his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication to assist him in his daily life. [Id.]
After noticing Plaintiff was acting unalert and inattentive and speaking with slurred speech, Plaintiff's supervisor informed Defendant's Human Resources Department about these concerns in late January 2019. [Id. ¶ 10.] Plaintiff was suspended pending his submitting a fitness for duty form from a physician. [Id. ¶ 11.] Plaintiff was unable to locate a physician who would complete the fitness for duty form; therefore, in March 2019, Defendant sent Plaintiff to a nurse practitioner who worked for Defendant. [Id. ¶ 12.]
Around April 2019, Plaintiff was unable to find a pain management physician and, therefore, discontinued his prescribed pain medication. [Id. ¶ 13.] Because he was not allowed to return to work, he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. [Id.] He informed Defendant that he was no longer on pain medication, but Defendant continued to require that Plaintiff obtain a new pain management physician. [Id. ¶ 14.] Plaintiff was terminated for safety concerns related to the use of prescription main medication in July 2019. [Id. ¶ 15.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A motion for judgment on the pleadings is intended to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint and will operate to dispose of claims “where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noted facts.” Herbert Abstract Co., Inc., v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990). “When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court may consider the pleadings, exhibits attached thereto, documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the plaintiff's claims, and other materials in addition to the complaint if such materials are public records or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice.” In re MI Windows & Doors, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2333, Nos. 2:12-mn-00001, 2:12-cv-02269-DCN, 2013 WL 3207423, at *2 (D.S.C. June 24, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “motion for judgment on the pleadings is decided under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. IRS, 361 Fed.Appx. 527, 529 (4th Cir. 2010).
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support his claim and entitle him to relief. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff filed this action outside the applicable statute of limitations. [Docs. 17; 17-1.] The parties agree that the Rehabilitation Act does not contain its own statute of limitations, and therefore the Court must borrow the statute of limitations that applies to the most analogous state-law claim. [Docs. 17-1 at 5; 19 at 2]; see Ott v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 909 F.3d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 2018). However, the parties disagree over what is the most analogous state-law claim.
Defendant contends that the one-year statute of limitations contained in the South Carolina Human Affairs Law, SC Code Ann. § 1-13-10, et seq. (the “SCHAL”), applies. [Docs. 17-1 at 5-7; 20 at 3-4.] Courts in this district have found that the SCHAL is the most analogous state-law claim and have thus applied its one-year statute of limitations to Rehabilitation Act claims. Woods v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:18-834-MGL, 2020 WL 614076, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2020) (citing cases). However, Plaintiff argues that the cases Defendant cites to support applying the SCHAL's one-year statute of limitations were decided before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Semenova v. Maryland Transit Administration, 845 F.3d 564 (4th Cir. 2017), in which it held that “the appropriate and analogous state law must provide the same or similar rights and remedies as the federal cause of action” [Doc. 19 at 2-3 (emphasis omitted)]. See Semenova, 845 F.3d at 567-68 (applying Maryland's general three-year statute of limitations to an Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim alleging disability discrimination in the provision of public services because Maryland's Anti-Discrimination Law “does not provide a cause of action for disability discrimination in the provision of public services”). Plaintiff further argues that the SCHAL does not provide the same rights and remedies as the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore South Carolina's three-year general statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims. [Doc. 19 at 3-6.]
Plaintiff is correct that courts in this district have, since Semenova, applied South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations-instead of the SCHAL's one-year statute of limitations-to Rehabilitation Act claims arising outside of the employment context. Estate of Valentine by & through Grate v. South Carolina, No. 3:18-895-JFA, 2019 WL 8324709, at *10-14 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2019) (applying South Carolina's general three-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims arising from participation in services, programs, or activities of a public entity at a state-run group home); Gresham v. Arclabs, LLC, No. 9:19-cv-1237-RMG, 2019 WL 3020931, at *2-4 (D.S.C. July 10, 2019) (applying South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations to the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims arising from disability discrimination in education by facilities receiving public funding). However, as Defendant notes, even after Semenova, courts in this district have continued to apply the SCHAL's one-year statute of limitations to Rehabilitation Act claims arising from an employment relationship. McLeod v. Univ. of S.C., No. 3:21-202-SAL-PJG, 2021 WL 2827771, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 21, 2021) (“Because the [SCHAL] provides substantially the same rights and remedies as the Rehabilitation Act with respect to employment discrimination, it is the most analogous here.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 2827368 (D.S.C. July 7, 2021); Woods, 2020 WL 614076, at *3 (applying the SCHAL one-year statute of limitations to the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim against her former employer), aff'd, 811 Fed.Appx. 199 (4th Cir. 2020). Moreover, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has, since Semenova, applied the two-year statute of limitations contained in the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”) to a Rehabilitation Act claim alleging employment disability discrimination. Ott, 909 F.3d at 659-60 (finding that the MFEPA and the Rehabilitation Act “redress discrimination against the same very specific groups of persons” and “provide the same rights and remedies” and that “[a]ny minor differences between the two laws do not magically tip the balance of similarities against applying the MFEPA”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Upon review of the relevant case law, the Court concludes that the SCHAL provides substantially the same rights and remedies as the Rehabilitation Act with respect to employment discrimination claims and is therefore the most analogous state statute in this case. Thus, the SCHAL's one-year statute of limitations applies.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he was terminated in July 2019 [Doc. 19 at 3], and the Complaint is clear that the last purported discriminatory action was Plaintiff's termination in July 2019 [Doc. 1-1 ¶ 15]. Therefore, because Plaintiff did not file this action until February 2022, well over one year after he was terminated, it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. 17] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.