This statute does not, however, expressly require that such person be represented by court-appointed counsel if he is unable to employ counsel." See Sullivan v. State, 181 So. 2d 518, 520 (Ala.Ct.App. 1965) (interpreting Ala. Code § 15-57 (1965) which is now § 15-9-38). At the outset, one undisputed fact is clear.
; Dunkin v. Lamb, 500 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D. Nev. 1980) ("[B]ecause extradition is not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings, there is no constitutional right to an attorney. Instead, such a right is statutory. . . ."); Sullivan v. State, 43 Ala. App. 133, 181 So.2d 518, 520 (1965) (Although statute gives a person under arrest for rendition to another state the right to the assistance of legal counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding, the statute does not expressly require that such person be represented by court-appointed counsel if he is unable to employ counsel. The defendant was denied no constitutional right.); Powell v. State, 19 Ariz. App. 377, 507 P.2d 989, 990 (1973) (No right to have appointed counsel at a rendition hearing.); Rugg v. Burr, 1 Ariz. App. 280, 402 P.2d 28, 28 (1965) ("We find no law giving the right to counsel at an extradition proceeding before the Governor. . . ."); State v. Tyler, 398 So.2d 1108, 1112 (La. 1981) ("We are unable to agree with relator's contention that these extradition proceedings form a critical stage of a criminal prosecution."); Rutledge v. Ingham County Sheriff, 21 Mich. App. 726, 728, 730-31, 176 N.W.2d 417 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1971) (An indigent person is not entitled to appointed counsel when he is a
Compare Mora v. District Court in and for First Judicial District, 177 Colo. 381, 494 P.2d 596 (1972); Denbow v. District Court in and for Twenty-First Judicial District, 652 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1982); People v. Ogilvie, 35 Ill.2d 512, 221 N.E.2d 265 (1966); People v. Braziel, 17 Mich. App. 411, 169 N.W.2d 513 (1969); In re Turner, 410 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Crim. App. 1967) which recognize an indigent's right to counsel in the habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition, with Roberts v. Hocker, 85 Nev. 390, 456 P.2d 425 (1969); and Sullivan v. State, 43 Ala. App. 133, 181 So.2d 518, 520 (1965) which find that indigents do not have a right to appointed counsel. Upon examination of the cited cases, it is our view that the language of section 941.10(1) which originated in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, gives a prisoner the right to legal counsel and that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the denial of this right to indigents, when it has been made available to those able to afford counsel.
However, all of these instances have involved "'adversary judicial criminal proceedings'" ( People v Blake, supra, p. 340, quoting from Kirby v Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689). In contrast, it has been consistently held that the extradition process is not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding and the constitutional right to counsel does not attach thereat (see Powell v State, 19 Ariz. App. 377, 507 P.2d 989, 990; Roberts v Hocker, 456 P.2d 425, 427-428 [Nev]; Matter of Medieros, 552 S.W.2d 156, 158 [Tex]; Utt v State, 443 A.2d 582, 589 [Md]; Sullivan v State, 43 Ala. App. 133, 181 So.2d 518, 520; State v Tyler, 398 So.2d 1108, 1112 [La]). Accordingly, Criminal Term erred in holding that defendant's right to counsel attached as a result of the New Jersey proceeding.