Opinion
C. A. 5:23-CV-1077-SAL-KDW
01-12-2024
Charles T. Sullivan, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Dept. of Mental Health; Capt. Tyrone Werts; Kelly Gothard, Ph.D.; Elizabeth Huto, Esq.; all in their individual and in their official capacities; Wellpath Recovery Solutions, a/k/a Correct Care Recovery Solutions, a/k/a Correct Care of South Carolina, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Charles T. Sullivan is currently in the custody of Defendant South Carolina Department of Mental Health (the “SCDMH” or “DMH”) and has been there since August 2, 2016 when he was involuntarily civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the “SVPA”), SC Code Ann. § 44-48-10 et seq. Defendant Wellpath Recovery Solutionsadministers this program for Defendant SCDMH. On January 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, as well as a Motion for Declaratory Relief, in the Court of Common Pleas for the Fifth Circuit, Richland County. ECF No. 1-1 at 1; 17. Defendant SCDMH filed a Notice of Removal on March 16, 2023. ECF No. 1. The basis for its Notice of Removal was Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants violated his constitutional right to marry because they did not provide transport to a “biometric appointment” for his foreign fiancee's visa application. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. At the time of removal, Defendant Wellpath had not yet been served; therefore, Defendant Wellpath was unable to consent to removal. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff filed a letter on April 3, 2023, acknowledging that this case was removed to federal court and informing the court that he was in the process of preparing an amended complaint. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff did not contest the removal, nor did he file a motion seeking to remand this case to state court. On May 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding Tyrone Werts, Elizabeth Hutto, and Kelly Gothard, all employees with the SCDMH, as Defendants. ECF No. 22. Within his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment regarding his right to marry and an injunction to require Defendants to transport him to a meeting (the biometric appointment) with the United States Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services (the “USCIS”), as well as losses and expenses related to the denial of his visa application. ECF No. 22 at 15. Thereafter, Defendants SCDMH, Kelly Gothard, Elizabeth Hutto, and Tyrone Werts filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 28. Defendant Wellpath filed its Motion to Dismiss on May 31, 2023. ECF No. 34. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to both Motions. ECF Nos. 42; 43. Defendant Wellpath filed Replies to Plaintiff's Responses. ECF Nos. 43; 45. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), this Magistrate Judge is authorized to review pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. This matter is now ripe for review.
Plaintiff named Defendant Wellpath Recovery Solutions a/k/a Correct Care Recovery Solutions a/k/a Correct Care of South Carolina. The undersigned refers to this Defendant as “Wellpath.”
I. Factual Background
The following facts are derived from Plaintiff's allegations within his Amended Complaint, unless otherwise noted. ECF No. 22. At all times relevant to the allegations in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has been in the SVPA Treatment Program (also referred to by Plaintiff as the SVPTP). ECF No. 22 at 4-5. Plaintiff has been involuntarily civilly committed since August 2, 2016. ECF No. 22 at 4.Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Elizabeth Hutto is the general counsel for Defendant SCDMH. ECF No. 22 at 2. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tyrone Werts is an employee and director of Defendant SCDMH's Division of Public Safety. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kelly Gothard, Ph.D. is the SVPTP Coordinator for Defendant SCDMH. Id. Plaintiff alleges that in May 2020, he filed an application for an alien fiancee visa for his “long-time fiancee Christine Tilbury, resident of England.” ECF No. 22 at 5. Plaintiff received a Notice, dated March 23, 2022 informing him that the USCIS was requiring him to attend a biometric appointment on April 18, 2022 in Charleston, South Carolina. ECF No. 22 at 5. Plaintiff alleges this was a necessary appointment because he had filed a Petition for an Alien Fiancee Visa (USCIS Form I-129F) for his fiancee Christine Tilbury. Id.This Notice, referred to in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, as well as the completed Form I-129F, have been provided as an exhibit and attached to Plaintiff's Response. See Exhibits A and B attached to Pl.'s Brief; ECF No. 41-1 at 7; 13.
In his Motion for Declaratory Relief, filed in state court, Plaintiff alleges he has been involuntarily civilly committed since July 27, 2016. See ECF No. 1-1 at 5. The date is immaterial to the analyses of these Motions.
In his Motion for Declaratory Relief, filed in conjunction with his Complaint, Plaintiff explains that he has been engaged to Christine Tilbury of the United Kingdom, since 1997, and the couple was re-engaged in 2012 when Ms. Tilbury visited Plaintiff in prison. ECF No. 1-1 at 6. In Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he says the couple “reaffirmed” the engagement in 2011. ECF No. 22 at 9. According to Plaintiff, after multiple trips made by Ms. Tilbury to visit Plaintiff, they decided to pursue marriage, as well as her relocation to South Carolina. Id. Plaintiff therefore filed an I-129F USCIS Application for Alien Fiancee Visa on May 11, 2020. Id.
Because Plaintiff was confined pursuant to the SVPA, he requested an “accommodations” exception for the on-site appointment from the USCIS; however, his request was denied by USCIS, and his appointment was rescheduled for June 9, 2022. ECF No. 22 at 5. Plaintiff alleges he then sent a letter asking for transportation to the appointment; however, this request was denied because it was “not SVP-related.” Id. at 6. After Plaintiff offered to reimburse SCDMH for the cost of the transportation, his request was again denied by Defendant Werts. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was able to reschedule his biometric appointment, and on June 7, 2022, while the appointment was pending, he appealed Defendant Werts' denial of transport to Defendant Hutto. Id. Plaintiff alleges USCIS subsequently rescheduled his appointment again for August 15, 2022. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 12, 2022, Defendant Hutto denied his appeal. Id. at 7. Within his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff quoted the denial as stating, “SVP will not prevent a resident from exercising their right to marry . . . you are free to arrange for the marriage to take place within the SVP facility.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that because his fiancee is a legal resident of the United Kingdom, “a visa is necessary for her to be able to marry and live in the United States.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that this visa cannot be obtained unless Plaintiff attends the biometric appointment. Id. Plaintiff alleges that on August 12, 2022, he requested USCIS to reschedule his appointment, and that according to USCIS, this was the last reschedule before his application would “likely” be considered abandoned. Id. Plaintiff alleges on January 27, 2023, he was notified by USCIS that his application had been denied and considered abandoned for failure to attend the appointment. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges the notice indicated it was not appealable. Id. The denial letter was attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff's Response. See Exhibit H, ECF No. 41-1 at 26-27. Plaintiff alleges that he retains the fundamental right to marry and that the denial of his request for transport as not being “SVP related” is not related to a legitimate penological interest. Id. at 13.
Within his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the fundamental right to marry is established in the context of prison inmates, citing to Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), a case where an individual brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a Wisconsin statute providing that members of a certain class of residents could not marry without first obtaining a court order to do so. His argument is that the denial to transport him to an appointment, necessitated by the USCIS, for his fiancee to obtain a visa constitutes a de facto denial of his right to marry. ECF No. 22 at 10. He seeks a declaration that he has the right to attend the biometric appointment to secure his fiancee's visa application. ECF No. 22 at 10. He further seeks a declaration that Defendants have violated his “right to marry under established case law, the Constitution and laws of the State of South Carolina, and/or the United States,” and he seeks an injunction ordering Defendants to transport him to the biometric appointment, as well as an injunction requiring Defendants to publish a grievance policy for SVPTP residents to appeal SCDMH decisions. ECF No. 22 at 15. The request for injunctive relief mirrors the relief he seeks in his Motion for Declaratory Relief.
Plaintiff attached several exhibits to his Response to the SCDMH Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. These exhibits include, among other documents, the partial Petition for Alien Fiancee, Form I-129F; three USCIS Notices of Action; the letter from Defendant Hutto, dated June 7, 2022 denying Plaintiff's request for transport; the letter from Defendant Hutto, dated August 12, 2022 denying Plaintiff's appeal; and the denial letter from USCIS, dated January 27, 2023. ECF No. 41. In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs. Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Because the documents are integral to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and either quoted or referred to by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint, were provided to the court by Plaintiff, and have not otherwise been objected to by Defendants, the undersigned has considered these documents in its analysis.
Even if this court were to convert these Motions to Dismiss to Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings, the same standard would still apply. Burbach Broad. Co. of Delaware v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The distinction is one without a difference, as we review the district court's decision to grant judgment on the pleadings de novo, applying the same standard for Rule 12(c) motions as for motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999) and Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 405 (4th Cir.1998)).
The I-129F Petition includes a question asking the applicant to describe how many times the applicant and his or her fiancee have met in person during the two years prior to filing the Petition. See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Response; ECF No. 41-1 at 10. The response provided by Plaintiff was as follows: “[v]isits, between 10/13/2018 and 1/7/2019 in person over 25 times at my physical address listed herein. Also between 1/26/2019 and 4/9/2019 we visited in person over 25 times. Affidavit in support of this enclosed.” See Exhibit A at ECF No. 41-1 at 10. In the decision written by the Director of USCIS, dated January 27, 2023, the director outlined the USCIS's request for Plaintiff to appear at an Application Support Center to be fingerprinted in accordance with Title 8 Code of Federal Regulations. This code section, 8 C.F.R Section 103.2(b)(9), provides in pertinent part: “the USCIS may require any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary or individual filing a benefit request . . . to appear for an interview and/or biometric collection.” See Exhibit H to Pl.'s Response, ECF No. 41-1 at 26 (emphasis added). The decision letter further includes that, “USCIS records indicate that you may have committed an offense that would render you ineligible to act as a petitioner for the family-based visa petition referenced above.” See Exhibit H. Finally, the letter provided that because Plaintiff did not appear for fingerprinting, his petition was considered abandoned and denied, subject to him filing a motion to reopen. See Exhibit H. Plaintiff has not indicated that he filed a motion to reopen the application.
II. Standard of Review
Defendants SCDMH, Kelly Gothard, Elizabeth Hutto, and Tyrone Werts filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant Wellpath filed its Motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2). “A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support his claim and would entitle him to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court considered the issue of well-pleaded allegations, explaining the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Tobey v. Jones, No. 11-2230, 2013 WL 286226, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (affirming district court's denial of Rule 12(b)(6) motion, noting that Twombly reiterated that a plaintiff “was not required to state [] precise magical words” to plausibly plead claim). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court is also to “‘draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)).
Although a court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true, this is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, factual allegations must support the complaint for it to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. Therefore, a pleading that provides only “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” lacking “some further factual enhancement” will not satisfy the requisite pleading standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Further, the court need not accept as true “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs., Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). While the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), court is not required to recognize “obscure or extravagant claims.” Weller v. Dep't of Soc.Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
This matter involves legal considerations beyond an individual's right to marry. It implicates the competing interests of the rights of civilly committed individuals with balancing considerations of the administration of the facility in which he or she is confined, as well as immigration considerations and the laws applicable to an individual who files a petition for a visa. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et. seq., an alien may not enter and permanently reside in the United States without a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 govern the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to “allow[] the uncertain party to gain relief from the insecurity caused by a potential suit waiting in the wings.” United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 1998). Courts have previously determined that it is not an appropriate exercise of the power conferred by the Declaratory Judgment Act to pronounce past actions illegal if the conduct is no longer ongoing. Cochran v. Ballard, No. 2:17-cv-04312, 2019 WL 2323742, at *9 (S.D.W.Va. May 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-cv-04312, 2019 WL 2323882 (S.D. W.Va. May 30, 2019). Here, Plaintiff's allegations are that his application for fiancee visa was denied by the USCIS on January 27, 2023 because it was considered abandoned for failure to attend what he termed the required biometric appointment. His application is no longer pending, though he contends he will reapply sometime in the future. More importantly, the SCDMH has already determined that its policy is that it will not transport Plaintiff to this appointment as it is not “SVP related.” Plaintiff received the final decision on his appeal of this decision on August 12, 2022. While Plaintiff submits that he intends to resubmit an application, there is no current conduct at issue, and there is no uncertainty as to the determination of the SCDMH as it pertains to the transportation of Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to have a court declare that Defendants must transport him to an appointment and enact certain policies; however, the SCDMH has already made their own determination on this issue. Therefore, while Plaintiff submits that this is a declaratory action, the issue is better framed as a determination as to whether Defendants' decision violated Plaintiff's constitutional right to marry and right to due process and whether they should be enjoined from the action described in Plaintiff's Complaint.
Plaintiff also argues that he brought this claim pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act as well as S.C. Code Ann §§ 15-53-10 and 15-53-140. These statutes comprise South Carolina's Declaratory Judgment Act.
A. Wellpath Motion to Dismis
Defendant Wellpath argues that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim against Defendant Wellpath. Defendant Wellpath argues that it is not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Plaintiff fails to attribute any wrongdoing on the part of Defendant Wellpath. Plaintiff first argues that he brings his claims pursuant to state law and the Declaratory Judgment Act, but not 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Plaintiff is correct that he did not specifically delineate his claims as being brought pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff alleged in his Amended Complaint that Defendants “directly and indirectly denied his rights to marry in violation of the United States Constitution's First and Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy, due process, and equal protection clauses.” ECF No. 22 at 8. He further alleges the “right to marry is part of the fundamental privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.” ECF No. 22 at 8. He further argues that “those confined in prison retain basic constitutional rights.” Id. It is clear from Plaintiff's allegations that he contends Defendants have already violated his constitutional rights by denying his request for transport for his fiancee's visa application. The question then becomes whether this denial was constitutionally deficient.
Defendants argue that Defendant Wellpath should be dismissed as a matter of law because Wellpath is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relief may be sought when a plaintiff alleges the violation of a right secured by the Constitution by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Askins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is well-settled law that detention centers and medical facilities cannot be sued under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating “[t]he medical department of a prison may not be sued, because it is not a person within the meaning of § 1983”); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at * 1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (“Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to establish that Defendant Detention Center, as a building and not a person, is amenable to suit under § 1983”). Plaintiff argues he is not bringing a § 1983 claim. Assuming for argument's sake that his allegations that Defendant Wellpath has violated his constitutional rights are not being brought pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is fatal as to Defendant Wellpath for a more fundamental reason. Plaintiff's own allegations establish that neither Defendant Wellpath's employees nor the entity itself made any determination that Plaintiff now seeks to find unconstitutional. Thus, he fails to state a claim for relief against Wellpath.
As outlined by Defendant Wellpath, Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Amended Complaint:
• “Defendant Captain Tyrone Werts is an employee of DMH, and, among other duties, is/was at the times in question in this Complaint, Director of the DMH Division of Public Safety transportation.” ECF No. 22 at 2.
• Defendant Captain Tyrone Werts “made the decision to deny Plaintiff's transportation in this matter.” ECF No. 22 at 2.
• “Defendant Kelly Gothard, Ph.D. is ....the SVPTP Coordinator for DMH . . .[and] [i]ndividually and as part of her duties she is/was at the times in question in this Complaint, responsible for the oversight of the SVPTP, including resident transportation, and it was her to whom Defendant Werts wrote to inform of his denial of Plaintiff's transportation.” ECF No. 22 at 2.
• “Defendant Elizabeth Hutto, Esquire, is an employee of DMH and serves/served at the times in question in this Complaint, in the DMH Office of General Counsel.. .Plaintiff requested her assistance in appealing Defendant's denial of transportation because there was no other available means to do so, and she upheld the decision of Defendant Werts and Gothard[ ] to deny [] Plaintiff's transportation, which directly led to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denying his application for fiancee visa for failure to attend a required appointment.” ECF No. 22 at 2-3.
• “In a letter dated August 12, 2022, Defendant Hutto denied Plaintiff's appeal and upheld the decision of DMH PSO [to] “not allow the transport to Charleston for the purpose of effectuating your application for a visa for your fiancee . . . [s]he continued that “SVP will not prevent a resident from exercising their right to marry . . . you are free to arrange the marriage to take place within the SVP facility.” ECF No. 22 at 7 (emphasis in original).
• “Defendant Wellpath. . .played a role in facilitating requests between Plaintiff and Defendant DMH concerning the transportation to the required USCIS biometric appointment.” ECF No. 22 at 3.
It is therefore abundantly clear that while Plaintiff alleges Wellpath facilitated transportation requests for the facility in which he is committed, the decision whether to allow him to attend the appointment was made by SCDMH employees. Plaintiff does not otherwise allege that whether Wellpath agreed with the decision or not, there would be any basis for Wellpath to overturn that decision. Indeed, as if Plaintiff implicitly acknowledges this crucial point, he argues in his Response that “it behooves Plaintiff to insist that Wellpath remain a Defendant in this action until discovery can be fully developed to ascertain how much has been delegated to Defendant Wellpath, and what, if any role they played in these claims.” Pl.'s Br. at 6; ECF No. 42. Plaintiff ignores the fact that within his own Amended Complaint, Plaintiff continually alleges that SCDMH made the decision to deny him transport, going so far as to cite from the decision he received from the SCDMH and including those documents in his Response. Plaintiff sought and was given the opportunity to amend and add additional parties to his Complaint, all of whom are employees of SCDMH. He now makes a reference to the need for discovery to ascertain what, if any, role Defendant Wellpath had in the denial of his transport; however, Plaintiff states elsewhere that he has already sought and obtained documents from Defendant Wellpath. Pl.'s Br. at 16; ECF No. 42. Indeed, despite the court imposing a stay on any additional discovery, the initial discovery deadline had expired. See ECF No. 10.
As pointed out by Defendant, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states no basis for a claim that Defendant Wellpath is at fault or responsible for not providing an avenue to appeal the SCDMH decision. Surely, Plaintiff realizes this fact because within his Amended Complaint he alleges there is “no established method for Plaintiff, or those similarly situated, whereby an issue concerning a DMH decision such as the one raised herein, can be grieved.” ECF No. 22 at 13 (emphasis added). Plaintiff further alleges, “There is no published DMH grievance policy for SVPTP residents, and to Plaintiff's knowledge, no policy exists.” EDF No. 22 at 13 (emphasis added). Now, Plaintiff seeks to assert in his response that it was “Defendants” (ostensibly, this includes Wellpath) who denied his transport; however, it is clear on the face of his Amended Complaint that the decision was made by an employee or employee(s) of Defendant SCDMH.
The undersigned is mindful of the fact that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant; however, the court may not ignore what are clear allegations within one's own pleadings, particularly when, as in this case, Plaintiff sought to amend his Complaint to add additional claims against employees of the entity he has consistently maintained made the decision to deny him transport. The fact that Defendant Wellpath did not ignore the decision of the SCDMH does not somehow establish liability on its part. Thus, for the reasons outlined above, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant Wellpath's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 34.
B. SCDMH Motion to Dismiss
Defendants SCDMH, Werts, Gothard, and Hutto filed their own Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. These Defendants provide several reasons that dismissal is appropriate, which will be addressed below.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants SCDMH, Kelly Gothard, Elizabeth Hutto, and Tyrone Werts first allege that the individually named Defendants are entitled to the immunity afforded under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
Defendants argue that at all times alleged in the Amended Complaint, they were acting in their official capacity. The undersigned notes that Plaintiff has sued these Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. The Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In response, Plaintiff argues that this case constitutes an exception pursuant to Ex Parte Young. The Ex Parte Young exception allows a private individual to petition a federal court to enjoin state officials in their official capacities from engaging in future conduct that would violate the Constitution or a federal statute. Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)). However, simply seeking declaratory injunctive relief does not automatically allow a private citizen to proceed under this exception. Id. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that any claims brought under § 1983 pursuant to their official capacity should be dismissed and will address the issue of injunctive relief separately.
2. Failure to State a Claim
These Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is well-settled law that the Constitution embraces a fundamental right to marry. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). However, not every restriction on this right violates the Constitution; instead, “reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978). A court is directed to apply strict scrutiny only to a regulation that “interferes directly and substantially” with the right to marry. Waters v. Gaston County, N.C. , 57 F.3d 422, 426 (4th Cir. 1995). Importantly, in this case, SCDMH has not explicitly denied Plaintiff the right to marry.According to Plaintiff, his fiancee travelled on a standard tourist visa at least once to visit him in prison, Defendant Wellpath indicated to him that they “would not interfere” with any arrangements to marry at the SVPTP facility during visitation, and Plaintiff has not alleged that the SCDMH has advised him that he could not marry his fiancee or that he could not marry her while at the facility. Ms. Tilbury apparently travelled to the United States several times in the time in which he has been civilly committed to visit Plaintiff. See Exhibit A; ECF No. 41-1 at 10. Instead, the lynchpin of Plaintiff's argument is, that by denying him the ability to be transported to this biometric appointment, the SCDMH Defendants have acted in a de facto manner to deny him the constitutional right to marry. However, Plaintiff ignores the fact that the restriction on the right to marry, in this case, is necessarily based upon the requirement, established by the USCIS, that he travel to and attend a biometric appointment. In other words, the SCDMH determination that it allows travel only for specified reasons has an incidental effect on Plaintiff's marriage to a foreign citizen. See Waters, 57 F.3d at 426. Aside from this fact, Plaintiff's argument fails for several reasons, which the undersigned outlines below.
The undersigned questions whether, but for, the transportation of Plaintiff to this biometric appointment, he would have been able to obtain the fiancee visa. Within the denial letter, the USCIS notes that he may have committed an offense that would render Plaintiff ineligible to act as a petitioner for the visa. See Exhibit H attached to Pl.'s Br.; 41-1 at 26. Thus, whether Plaintiff has standing to bring this claim is not entirely clear. See Griffin v. Masico, No. 0:17-cv-2852-DCC-PJG, 2018 WL 7820715, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 29, 2018), report and recommendation adopted by Griffin v. Masico, 2019 WL 637624 (D.S.C. February 14, 2019) (explaining that an inmate has standing to claim a denial of the right to marry if the inmate could otherwise obtain a marriage license but the defendant's actions are the cause of the failure to obtain said license). Nevertheless, Defendants do not argue this point and the record does not contain sufficient evidence to determine whether he would be eligible to act as petitioner for his fiancee's visa under the circumstances as provided for in the record before the court.
In order to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”; and (2) “the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In this case, Plaintiff alleges the actions of Defendants have prevented him from marrying his fiancee by denying his due process rights to petition via the USCIS to marry his fiancee. As previously noted, the right to marry is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Zablocki, 434 at U.S. 382. Within Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's own allegations establish that when he informed the SCDMH of his plans to marry, Defendant made clear that it would not bar any such marriage. Indeed, Plaintiff was able to obtain and file a petition, and he has been able to meet in-person with his fiancee multiple times since being confined to the facility at Broad River Road. Plaintiff also alleged within his Amended Complaint that he was told that he would be allowed to marry so long as the person was on his approved visitation list, and the marriage took place in a visitation room. ECF No. 22 at 5. According to Plaintiff's own allegations, the issue arose once USCIS informed him that he needed to appear at a specified Application Support Center to be fingerprinted as part of a petition for a visa. See ECF No. 41-1 at 26. Plaintiff sought or requested to be transported to this appointment which was denied due to the transportation not being related to either an SVP-related legal appointment or medical care. Thus, on the face of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he does not assert a restriction on his right to marry.
In Turner v. Safley, where an inmate challenged a prison's marriage regulation, the Supreme Court acknowledged that when a state penal system is involved, federal courts must accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities. 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Turner established the following standard that, “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. Within Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he alleges that Defendant Hutto informed him that Defendants would not prevent him from exercising his right to marry, and that he was free to arrange a marriage within the facility; however, for the reasons provided, Defendant SCDMH would not allow him transport related to the visa application. ECF No. 22 at 7.Plaintiff now argues that the denial of the request to attend the meeting is unreasonable and an “exaggerated security response.” ECF No. 41 at 20. Yet, Plaintiff offers no reason why it is constitutionally impermissible for the SCDMH to establish neutral policies related to the transport of individuals committed to its care, nor does he otherwise allege that this denial was only provided to individuals seeking the right to marry. Defendants have not prevented Plaintiff from marrying; rather, in following their own procedures, as outlined in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the SCDMH does not allow transport outside of its facility for reasons that do not fall into one of two categories--that is, that SCDMH “only provides non-emergency transport to residents in the case of an SVP-related legal appointment or when a resident requires outside medical care.” Exhibit F, attached to Pl.'s Br; ECF No. 41-1 at 19. Here, as provided for in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendants explained to Plaintiff that the reason for the denial of the transport was because it was not related to a medical or SVP-related legal issue. Thus, they explained their penological reason for denying transport. The inability to be transported to this appointment, which was not a requirement of the SCDMH, resulted in a denial of the visa application, rather than a denial of his constitutional right to marry.
Plaintiff is essentially arguing that Defendants are under an obligation to help facilitate his marriage to a foreign citizen by means of obtaining a visa on her behalf.
As to Plaintiff's argument that his due process rights were violated, the undersigned also finds that these claims against Defendants should be dismissed. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend XIV, Section 1. Prisoners are entitled to claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). While an inmate's rights may be diminished by the needs of the institutional environment of the penal system, a prisoner is not “wholly stripped” of the protections afforded under the Constitution while incarcerated. Id. To state a due process violation has occurred, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest; and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir, 2015).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants prevented him from marrying his fiancee by denying him due process. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges his fiancee will not be allowed to “relocate to South Carolina, and Plaintiff is thereby denied his right to marry her.” Pl.'s Br. at 5. Throughout the course of Plaintiff's pleadings, he comingles the right to marry with the right to have his fiancee, a non-U.S. Citizen, live in the United States. That issue aside, even affording Plaintiff the liberal construction provided to pro se litigants, Plaintiff fails to state a claim sufficient for relief. Plaintiff does not allege, nor does he point to, any allegation or evidence that Defendants denied him the right to marry via a regulation or statute. “There is a ‘simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen's legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only directly or incidentally.'” Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 101 (2015) (quoting O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 788 (1980)).
The Supreme Court has previously held that the denial of a spousal visa application does not constitute the deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 101 (2015) (discussing the denial of a visa application and stating that, “because Fauzia Din [the plaintiff] was not deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property' when the Government denied Kanishka Berashk's admission to the United States, there is no process due to her under the Constitution”); see also Napoletano v. Sessions, No. 17-cv-000837-CMA, 2017 WL 11696395, at *4 (D. Co. Nov. 3, 2017) (considering a Fifth Amendment due process claim and explaining that the denial of a spousal visa application does not constitute deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest).; see Mostofi v. Napolitano, 841 F.Supp.2d 208, 212 (D.C. 2012) (stating, “plaintiff's constitutional rights are not implicated by defendants' decision to deny her alien spouse entry into the United States.”). Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to allege or establish a fundamental liberty interest that these Defendants deprived him of when the USCIS required him to attend a biometric appointment to obtain a visa, not for himself but for his fiancee. To the extent Plaintiff argues that his due process rights were violated because there is not an established grievance procedure in place to adequately appeal the SCDMH decisions, the undersigned also finds this argument unavailing because there is no constitutional right to participate in grievance proceedings. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, for the reasons outlined above, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion on this claim, as well.
As to Plaintiff's equal protection claim, Defendants argue that on the face of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he fails to establish he has been treated differently than others similarly situated. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause “does not take from the States all power of classification,” Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979), but “keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike,” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has not provided any argument that he has been treated any differently than any other civilly committed individual, or that the alleged unequal treatment he claims he suffers from, that of the inability to attend a biometric appointment, is the result of discrimination. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that Defendants denied him the ability to be transported for this appointment, while also allowing other individuals to be transported for reasons that were not SVP related. Thus, the undersigned recommends dismissing this claim against Defendants.
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). When a qualified immunity defense is raised, the courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor make out a violation of one's constitutional rights, and second, whether the violated right was clearly established at that time. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)). Here, the undersigned has determined that Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation on the part of Defendants. Moreover, whether a civilly committed individual has the right to require the SCDMH to transport him to a biometric appointment to obtain a visa for his fiancee is not clearly established law. Thus, the undersigned recommends finding Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to any damages claims or for his claims for reimbursement for funds paid by Plaintiff.
4. Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief with his initial Complaint, seeking this court to order Defendants to transport him to a biometric appointment and to publish grievance procedures requiring judicial oversight for the denial of such transportation requests. See ECF No. 1-1 at 5. “Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001). To establish the need for a preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must show: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A preliminary injunction is never awarded as of right. Id. at 24. The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending a resolution on the merits of a case. See Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 180 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1960)).
First, for the reasons outlined above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff is unable to succeed on the merits of his claim, and as to the grievance procedures, has previously found that Defendants are under no obligation to provide an established set of grievance procedures. Second, Plaintiff has not established the other factors required for injunctive relief. Specifically, while it is at least conceivable that Plaintiff suffers personal harm in that he is not able to obtain the visa he desires for his fiancee, he has not explained how the balance of equities tips in his favor, particularly when considering that the USCIS ultimately decides whether to grant or deny Plaintiff's application. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to establish that such relief in any way favors the public interest in this case. Thus, the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.
IV. Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motions, ECF Nos. 28 and 34 for the reasons stated herein. As to Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 1-1, the undersigned recommends denying this Motion for the reasons stated above.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).