Summary
dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction because default judgment did not expressly dispose of appellee's claim for prejudgment interest, despite "Mother Hubbard" clause in judgment providing that "[a]ll remedies not granted herein are specifically denied"
Summary of this case from Amendola v. Micro Layer Energy, LLCOpinion
No. 05-02-01039-CV
Opinion issued April 3, 2003
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. cc-02-3886-d.
DISMISSED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a medical malpractice lawsuit in which a no-answer default judgment was rendered in favor of appellee Linda F. Phillips and against appellants Jerry Sudderth, M.D., Individually, and White Rock Otolaryngology Associates, a D/B/A and Professional Association of Dr. Sudderth (collectively "Sudderth"). Because we conclude the default judgment was not a final, appealable judgment, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Phillips sued Sudderth alleging negligence, gross negligence, and malice. In her petition, Phillips sought actual damages, exemplary damages, prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, and costs. Sudderth did not file an answer to Phillips's petition. After a hearing, the trial court signed a "Final Default Judgment" against Sudderth awarding Phillips $1,226,430.92 in actual damages, $150,000 in exemplary damages, postjudgment interest, and costs. The default judgment did not, however, expressly dispose of Phillips's claim for prejudgment interest. At the end of the default judgment was a Mother Hubbard clause providing "All remedies not granted herein are specifically denied."
Generally, we have jurisdiction to review only final judgments and orders. Lehmann v. Har-Con., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). For appellate purposes, a judgment or order is final "if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties." Id. at 192-193. The default judgment before us is not final because it does not actually dispose of Phillips's claim for prejudgment interest nor does it with unmistakable clarity state that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.
As noted in Lehmann, that the default judgment includes the word "final" and contains a Mother Hubbard clause is an insufficient indication of the trial court's intention to render a final appealable judgment. See id. at 205-206. Because the default judgment does not contain language reflecting a clear and unequivocal intent to finally dispose of all claims, the default judgment is interlocutory. See id. at 206. We, therefore, have no jurisdiction over this appeal. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Lehmann proposes the following suggestion for such clear and unequivocal language, "This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable."