Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 30-2008-00102709, Glenda Sanders, Judge.
Karl H. Sturckow, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Michael G. York and Michael G. York for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.
Appellant Karl Sturckow claims the trial court erred in entering judgment against him in a dispute over a promissory note, deed of trust, and conveyance of real property. Appellant has failed to provide adequate citations to the record, and has failed to cite any legal authorities, in support of his arguments. In short, he has failed to meet his burden to show reversible error. We affirm.
I
FACTS
A. Appellant’s Recitals:
According to his opening brief, appellant owned more than 90 acres of property in Lakeside California. In December 1980, he borrowed $300,000 from Union Home Loans, secured by a deed of trust against the property. Union Home Loans later sold the loan to a pension fund, in 1984. Appellant says that, in 1991, certain easements were recorded to effectuate access to his property and certain neighboring properties. In connection with the recordation of easements, a subordination agreement was recorded by one party and a reconveyance of the deed of trust securing his promissory note was also recorded. Appellant says that the holder of the promissory note could have simply recorded a subordination agreement, just as another party had done. Instead, it chose to record a full reconveyance.
Appellant nonetheless acknowledges that even though his loan was then unsecured, he still owed money and so he continued to pay. He says that over the years, he paid enough money to have paid off the principal plus interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum. Although he acknowledges that 9 percent was lower than the rate of interest he had contracted to pay, he says he thinks 9 percent was fair.
Appellant also acknowledges that at some point he was unable to continue making loan payments and he filed for bankruptcy. He claims that he received a full discharge of all his debts, including the debt in question, through the bankruptcy proceedings. This notwithstanding, the holder of the promissory note later purported to sell the property at a trustee’s sale. The result was that in November 2007, appellant and his family were evicted from the property.
Appellant has failed to cite any portion of the record in support of his statement of facts. And, it is his burden to do so. It is not our obligation to search the record on our own to provide support for an appellant’s point. (ASP Properties Group, L.P. V. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1270.) That notwithstanding, we chose to review the documents attached to appellant’s motion to augment, as we discuss below.
B. Documents Attached to Motion to Augment:
In reviewing the many real estate documents attached to the motion to augment, we find support for many of appellant’s factual recitations concerning the note, deed of trust, and reconveyance. However, we also find several key documents revealing material facts that appellant omitted to mention.
The record reflects that appellant obtained a discharge in bankruptcy on September 24, 2001. The record does not show what debts were discharged.
However, the record does show that on February 3, 2006, appellant, Horace C. Jenkins, both individually and as trustee of the ORS Medical Group Pension Plan, SBS Trust Deed Network, and certain others, entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release. That agreement recites that appellant borrowed $300,000 from Union Home Loans, secured by a deed of trust, and that Union Home Loans assigned the debt to Jenkins as trustee of the ORS Medical Group Pension Plan. The debt was later modified and assigned to Jenkins in his individual capacity. A reconveyance of the deed of trust was recorded in November 1991, even though appellant had not then paid the note in full. The parties disputed the validity of the reconveyance and the amount of interest owing under the debt, but appellant did not dispute that the debt remained unpaid as of the date of the Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release.
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release, appellant agreed to make certain payments on or before March 20, 2006. In exchange, Jenkins agreed to postpone certain foreclosure proceedings that had already been scheduled.
Later, on June 1, 2006, appellant and others executed a Loan Purchase Agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Jenkins sold the note and deed of trust to Daybreak Group, Inc. for $825,000. Furthermore, by document recorded September 5, 2006, Jenkins assigned to Daybreak Group, Inc. all of his right, title and interest in the deed of trust purportedly securing the promissory note. A trustee’s deed was recorded on December 28, 2006 in favor of Daybreak Group, Inc. as grantee.
II
DISCUSSION
As the documents attached to the motion to augment show, well after appellant obtained his discharge in bankruptcy, he acknowledged that the debt had not been paid and he then promised to pay an agreed amount. Inasmuch as a foreclosure sale later took place, it would appear that he did not pay that amount.
Because the clerk’s transcript does not contain a copy of the complaint, we do not know what causes of action appellant alleged. However, the judgment reflects that appellant filed a lawsuit against Daybreak Group, Inc., Jenkins, Paul Velasquez, and others. Presumably, appellant sought, inter alia, to quiet title to the property in himself. In any event, the judgment decreed that appellant had no right, title or interest in or to the real property in question.
In challenging the judgment against him, appellant makes three arguments. First, he claims the court erred in admitting the deposition testimony of Jenkins.
Appellant makes reference to three pages of the reporter’s transcript. The reporter’s transcript shows that at trial, counsel for respondent presented Jenkins’s deposition testimony, because Jenkins was then living outside the state. In his deposition testimony, Jenkins stated that he had never asked anyone to reconvey the deed of trust and that “the reconveyance obviously was done by someone else and it was a fraud.”
Appellant claims the court erred in admitting Jenkins’s deposition testimony because it was not rebuttal testimony. However, appellant cites no legal authority in support of his position. “Having failed to support his argument with citation to legal authority, it is waived. [Citations.]” (Roden v. AmerisourceBergen Corp. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 620, 648-649.)
Second, appellant claims that the court erred in ruling that he “had to prove that the reconveyance was not done by mistake.” Appellant cites no portion of the record to show that this was the court’s ruling. He also cites no legal authorities with respect to the applicable burden of proof. His argument is waived because it is not supported by citations either to the record or to legal authority. (Schubert v. Reynolds (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 100, 109.)
Finally, appellant contends the trial “court erred in allowing in denying standing to Appellant.” He claims this was error because he did have standing, inasmuch as Barona Estates LP had conveyed the property to him by grant deed recorded October 9, 2007. Appellant fails to cite any portion of the record containing the challenged ruling. Appellant also fails to cite any legal authority in support of his position. Consequently, his argument is waived. (Schubert v. Reynolds, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.)
On appeal, we presume that the judgment of the trial court is correct. (Virtanen v. O’Connell (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 688, 709.) It is appellant’s burden to show reversible error. (Id. at p. 710.) “We recognize the fact that [appellant] is appearing without the benefit of legal counsel. However, we are unable to ignore rules of procedure just because we are aware of that fact. ‘When a litigant is appearing in propria persona, he is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys [citation]. Further, the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney [citation].’ [Citations.]” (County of Orange v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1444.)
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P.J., IKOLA, J.