Opinion
Jan. 21, 1975.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Loa E. Bliss, Colorado Springs, for petitioner.
John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert L. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado).
PIERCE, Judge.
Claimant filed two unemployment claims with the Industrial Commission. The deputy denied both claims and informed claimant of its decision and his rights of appeal by mailing this information to him at his last known address, as shown in the Commission's files, under the provisions of s 8--74--102(2), C.R.S.1973 (1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 82--5--2(2)). After the expiration of time allowed for appealing these decisions, as provided by statute, claimant attempted to appeal both claims.
Claimant's counsel alleged that while claimant was awaiting the decision on his claims, he found it necessary to go to the state of Michigan to seek employment. Claimant allegedly went to an office of the Commission and informed one of the Commission's clerks that he was going to Michigan to seek employment and was given permission by the clerk to make the trip. He was not given any instructions as to furnishing the Commission with a Michigan address nor was he informed of any appeal procedures or time limits should his claims be denied during his absence.
It was the claimant's position that since the Commission had actual knowledge of the change of address, he was not served with the deputy's decision at his last known address. The Commission found that the expiration of the time limits specified by s 8--74--102(2), C.R.S.1973 (1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 82--5--2(2)), deprived it of jurisdiction to consider his request for review of their decision. We disagree and reverse. The issue before us is a narrow one: Was this claimant entitled to a factual hearing before the Industrial Commission on the issue of his alleged attempt at changing his address, before the Commission determined that he was not entitled to a review under the provisions of s 8--74--102(2), C.R.S.1973 (1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 82--5--2(2)). The facts in this case are not readily distinguishable from those in Henderson v. Industrial Commission, Colo.App., 529 P.2d 651 (1974), and this action is controlled by that decision.
The order is set aside and the cause remanded to the Commission in order that it may conduct a hearing to determine if claimant's allegation is true, and, if true, whether the request for review was timely made, and for such other proceedings as are not inconsistent with this opinion.
ENOCH and STERNBERG, JJ., concur.