Opinion
FBTCV176061372S
10-12-2017
Suzanne Studioso v. Bridgeport Planning & Zoning Commission
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Dale W. Radcliffe, J.
FACTS
The Plaintiff, Suzanne Studioso, is the President of the 19th Hole, Inc., a Connecticut corporation, which she owns and controls. The corporation maintains a long-term leasehold interest in a portion of a mini-mall located at 650 Brooklawn Avenue, in the City of Bridgeport.
650 Brooklawn Avenue is located in an Office Retail (OR) Zone, and for forty (40) years has been the location of the 19th Hole Restaurant (ROR 18, TR p. 4). The 19th Hole, Inc. leases approximately 2, 200 square feet of space in the 9, 000-square-foot mini-mall. Seven other tenants rent space in the building (ROR 18, TR p. 2).
The 19th Hole Restaurant was operated as a neighborhood restaurant and bar by Susanne Studioso's father, Sal Studioso, for many years, prior to his death in 2012 (ROR 18, TR p. 32-33; p. 41). During 2012, the restaurant experienced problems with the kitchen. The floor began to collapse, and the kitchen could not be used. The kitchen has now been restored, and the 19th Hole now functions as a full service restaurant (ROR 18, TR p. 5; p. 32-34).
Consistent with Table 2.A of the Bridgeport Zoning regulations, a restaurant is a permitted use in an Office Retail (OR) Zone, subject to the special permit process.
Approximately three years ago, the current owner of the restaurant, Suzanne Studioso installed two seven-foot pool tables inside the establishment. The decision to bring pool tables into the restaurant, according to Suzanne Studioso, was made following requests from 19th Hole Restaurant patrons.
On October 20, 2016, the 19th Hole Restaurant, Inc., acting through Suzanne Studioso, filed a special permit application with the Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission (ROR 1). The petition sought permission to locate two seven-foot pool tables within the 19th Hole Restaurant. As an alternative, permission for a single pool table was requested.
The special permit application (ROR 1), which Suzanne Studioso testified was completed with the assistance of Bridgeport Zoning Enforcement Officer Neil Bonney, was submitted following an investigation conducted by Suzanne Studioso. The investigation sought to determine whether any city permits or approvals were required, prior to the installation of pool tables. Inquiries were made of the Bridgeport Police Department, the Town Clerk, the City Attorney, and others, in an attempt to secure the proper approvals (ROR 18, TR p. 10-11).
Having been informed by Bridgeport city officials to pursue the special permit process, an application (ROR 1) was submitted. No cease and desist order concerning the pool tables had been issued, prior to October 20, 2016.
The Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission noticed a public hearing (ROR 9), for Monday, November 28, 2016, concerning the special permit application (#16-56). The hearing was convened and conducted on that date (ROR 18; ROR 17).
The Plaintiff, along with several patrons, spoke in favor of having pool tables in the 19th Hole Restaurant. Speakers claimed that the pool tables create a pleasant atmosphere in the bar, and have become the focal point of activity (ROR 18, TR p. 13-14). Counsel for the 19th Hole argued that the pool tables help with the ambiance of the restaurant, and he analogized the impact to the " Cheers" bar of television fame (ROR 18, TR p. 8).
Counsel maintained that no provision of the Bridgeport Zoning Regulations declares that pool tables are either a permitted or a prohibited use in the OR Zone. Suzanne Studioso claimed that other establishments in Bridgeport maintain pool tables, and were not required to obtain a special permit in order to operate (ROR 18, TR p. 11).
The special permit application drew vehement opposition from neighbors whose properties abut the 19th Hole Restaurant, or are located in the immediate neighborhood. They argued that the intensity of the use of the property had changed since the pool tables were brought to the property, and that the nature of the clientele which frequented the 19th Hole had changed (ROR 18, TR p. 18-27). Neighbors complained of noise and disruptive behavior in the early morning hours, and contrasted the current circumstances with the impact of the full service restaurant without pool tables prior to 2014.
Police incident reports, according to the neighbors, increased dramatically between 2014 and 2016 (ROR 18, TR p. 20). Opponents insisted that the increase in incident reports and disturbances coincided with the arrival of the pool tables.
It was argued that a restaurant and bar with pool tables is incompatible with the stated purpose of an Office Retail (OR) Zone, situated adjacent to a residential neighborhood (ROR 18, TR p. 25-26).
A City Council member submitted a written statement in opposition to the pool tables, and a member of the Connecticut General Assembly spoke in opposition to the special permit application (ROR 18, TR 29-31).
Bridgeport Zoning Enforcement Official Dennis Buckley, who also serves as clerk of the Planning and Zoning Commission (ROR 15), reviewed the history of the 19th Hole Restaurant as a full service restaurant. Buckley explained that the establishment has a kitchen, and holds a valid restaurant license. He also said that the Bridgeport Zoning Board of Appeals had approved two enlargements of the restaurant through variances, when Salvatore Studioso operated the 19th Hole Restaurant (ROR 18, TR p. 32-36).
Buckley opined that the Zoning Regulations were amended in 2010, and that a special permit was required of the applicant. He stated that other cafes may have pool tables, but, at the time they were installed, no permit was required (ROR 18, TR p. 31-32).
Suzanne Studioso disputed the testimony provided by the owners of residential properties in the immediate vicinity. She claimed that many of the reports were false or fraudulent, and that the 19th Hole cooperated with the Bridgeport Police Department when requested (ROR 18, TR p. 40-41).
The public hearing was closed on November 28, and the Planning and Zoning Commission discussed the special permit application as part of the same meeting (ROR 18, TR p. 41-45; ROR 17, p. 10-11).
The Commission voted, unanimously, to deny the special permit application, and cited three reasons in support of its decision (ROR 17, p. 10; ROR 15).
1. The addition of pool tables to the existing restaurant facility does not comply with the Site Plan Review Standards of Sec. 14-2-5 or the Special Permit Standards of Sec. 14-4-4.
2. An approval of this petition would reinforce the existing adverse impact, noise and complaints to the City of Bridgeport Police Department in the immediate Area, as well as being an overuse of the subject premises.
3. The restaurant is located in an area with critical traffic congestion with virtually no off-street parking, and the introduction of an additional use has added to the traffic congestion, as well as increasing the possible detriment to the public safety.
Notice of the decision (ROR 16) was published in the Connecticut Post, and this timely appeal followed.
AGGRIEVEMENT
The Plaintiff, Suzanne Studioso, is the owner and operator of the 19th Hole Restaurant. She is also the sole owner of The 19th Hole, Inc., the entity which holds a written lease to the premises for which the special permit was sought.
Suzanne Studioso testified that she is a personal guarantor on the lease with the owner of the mini-mall. The lease has eight more years to run, and The 19th Hole, Inc. has a right to renew.
The Plaintiff manages the day-to-day affairs of the restaurant, and derives earnings from the establishment. She hires and manages all restaurant employees.
Pleading and proof of aggrievement are a prerequisite to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an appeal. Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 192, 676 A.2d 831 (1996); Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 306, 592 A.2d 953 (1991). The question of aggrievement is one of fact, to be determined based upon evidence presented at trial. Primerica v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 93, 558 A.2d 646 (1989); Hughes v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 508, 242 A.2d 705 (1968). The burden of proving aggrievement rests with the plaintiff. London v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn. 282, 284, 179 A.2d 614 (1962).
Aggrievement falls into two basic categories--statutory aggrievement, and classical aggrievement.
Statutory aggrievement exists by virtue of legislative fiat, rather than through an examination of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Weill v. Lieberman, 195 Conn. 123, 124-25, 486 A.2d 634 (1986); Pierce v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 7 Conn.App. 632, 635-36, 509 A.2d 1085 (1986). One claiming statutory aggrievement must show that a particular statute grants standing to appeal, without the necessity of demonstrating an actual injury based on the particular facts at hand. Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143, 156, 953 A.2d 1 (2008).
Classical aggrievement, on the other hand, requires a party to satisfy a well-established two-fold test: 1) the party claiming aggrievement must demonstrate a personal and legal interest in the decision appealed from, as distinguished from a general interest such as concern of all members of the community as a whole, and 2) the party must show that the specific personal and legal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by the action of the agency. Cannavo Enterprises v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43, 47, 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Hall v. Planning Commission, 181 Conn. 442, 444, 435 A.2d 975 (1980).
Legal title to property is not necessary in order to satisfy the test for aggrievement. Antennucci v. Hartford Catholic Dioceses Corporation, 142 Conn. 349, 355, 114 A.2d 216 (1955). Aggrievement has been found where a party is a contract purchaser; Shapero v. Zoning Board, 192 Conn. 367, 376, 472 A.2d 345 (1984); has an oral contract to enter into a long-term lease; Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 669, 899 A.2d 26 (2006); holds a leasehold interest; Michel v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 28 Conn.App. 314, 324-25, 612 A.2d 778 (1992); or held a security interest in the property. Goodridge v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 58 Conn.App. 760, 767, 755 A.2d 329 (2000).
It is not necessary for one seeking to establish aggrievement, to have an actual ownership or legal interest in the property in question. A court, based upon the facts established at trial, should focus upon a plaintiff's ultimate goal in determining whether aggrievement has been proven. DiBonaventura v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 24 Conn.App. 369, 376, 588 A.2d 244 (1991). Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest has been affected. Pomazi v. Conservation Commission, 220 Conn. 476, 483, 600 A.2d 320 (1991); O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80, 83, 98 A.2d 660 (1953).
In DiBonaventura, the plaintiff, who was the son of the property owner, sought a certificate of approval from the zoning board of appeals in order to locate a used car dealership on property owned by his father. Although the father had consented to the use of his property, no written lease or other instrument had been executed, granting use of the property to his son, Richard DiBonaventure, Jr.
The Appellate Court determined that the son's interest, while lacking in legal enforceability, was readily distinguishable from a general interest such as a concern of all members of the community as a whole. Therefore, he was aggrieved by the denial of the requested certificate. DiBonaventura v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 376. The DiBonaventura decision has been cited with approval by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 668-69.
Here, Suzanne Studioso is the sole owner of the corporation which leases the property which is the subject of the special permit application. She operates the existing restaurant, and derives income from the property. She personally guaranteed the performance of the corporation, pursuant to the existing long-term lease.
It is found, that the Plaintiff, Suzanne Studioso, is aggrieved by the decision of the Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission, which generated this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW--SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION
A special permit allows a property owner, or one in possession, to use property in a manner expressly permitted by the zoning regulations. A.P. & W. Holding Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 182, 185, 355 A.2d 91 (1984); Kobyluck v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 84 Conn.App. 160, 169-70, 852 A.2d 826 (2004). The terms " special permit" and " special exception" have the same meaning, and may be used interchangeably. Summ v. Zoning Commission, 150 Conn. 79, 87, 186 A.2d 160 (1962).
The authority of a municipal planning and zoning commission to issue a special permit is derived from § 8-2 of the General Statutes. When ruling upon a special permit, a commission sits in an administrative capacity, rather than in a legislative or quasi-judicial capacity. Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 627, 711 A.2d 675 (1998); Goldberg v. Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 23, 29, 376 A.2d 385 (1977). The commission has no independent discretion beyond determining whether an application, as presented, satisfies the standards set forth in the regulations. Quality Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 55 Conn.App. 533, 537, 738 A.2d 1157 (1999).
Section 8-2, C.G.S.--" . . . regulations . . . may provide that certain . . . uses of land are permitted only after obtaining a special permit . . . subject to standards set forth in the regulations and conditions necessary to protect public health, safety, convenience and property values . . ."
However, even though the commission acts administratively, when reviewing a special permit request, the special permit process is not purely ministerial. A special permit may be denied, on the basis of enumerated general considerations such as public health, safety and welfare. Whisper Wind Development Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 229 Conn. 176, 177, 640 A.2d 100 (1994); St. Joseph's High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn.App. 570, 170 A.3d 73 (2017). The commission has a right to interpret its regulations, and to determine whether a particular regulation applies to a given situation, and whether general standards concerning health, safety and welfare have been satisfied. Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 627. Based upon an examination of general standards in the regulations, a special permit may be denied if the proposed use is not in harmony with the general character of the neighborhood. Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 436, 941 A.2d 868 (2008).
In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, a reviewing court is called upon to determine whether the challenged action is unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal. Schwartz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 146, 152, 543 A.2d 1339 (1988); Raczkowski v. Zoning Commission, 53 Conn.App. 636, 639, 733 A.2d 862 (1999). Conclusions of the commission must be upheld, if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is enough evidence, if the trial were to a jury, to justify the refusal to direct a verdict, where the conclusion sought to be drawn is one of fact. Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 541, 525 A.2d 940 (1987). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions does not prevent a decision from being supported by substantial evidence. Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 226 Conn. 579, 588, 628 A.2d 1286 (1993).
On factual questions, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the commission. Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 380, 401, 610 A.2d 620 (1992). The burden is upon the party challenging the agency's action to show that it acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally. Baron v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 22 Conn.App. 255, 257, 576 A.2d 589 (1990).
Where, as here, the commission has stated collective reasons in support of its decision, a court should not go beyond the reasons provided by the commission, but should only determine whether any reason given is supported by substantial evidence. Gibbons v. Historic District Commission, 285 Conn. 755, 770-71, 941 A.2d 917 (2008); De Maria v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 534, 541, 271 A.2d 105 (1970). If any reason given is a valid basis for upholding the decision of the commission, the action must be upheld. Cottle v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 100 Conn.App. 291, 294, 917 A.2d 1030 (2007).
COMMISSION'S PROCEEDINGS COMPLIED WITH STANDARDS OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
The Plaintiff argues that she was denied a fair hearing by the Defendant, Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission. Specifically, she alleges that Dennis Buckley, Bridgeport's Zoning Enforcement Official, who also serves as clerk of the Planning and Zoning Commission, dominated the Commission. She claims that Buckley gave false information to the Commission, and engaged in ex-parte communications with those opposed to the granting of the special permit.
These claims find no support in the record, and are unavailing.
Although proceedings before a municipal land use board are informal, and the agency is not constrained by strict adherence to the rules of evidence, the conduct of a hearing must not violate the fundamentals of natural justice. Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 207, 355 A.2d 21 (1974); Miklus v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 399, 406, 225 A.2d 637 (1967). The fundamentals of natural justice require that there be due notice of a hearing, and that, at the hearing, no person may be deprived of the right to produce relevant evidence, or to cross examine witnesses produced by an adversary. Megin v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 106 Conn.App. 602, 608-09, 942 A.2d 511 (2008). Due process requires that the parties have an opportunity to know the facts on which the commission is asked to act, and to offer rebuttal evidence. Grimes v. Conservation Commission, 243 Conn. 266, 274, 703 A.2d 101 (1997).
Although lay members of a land use agency are entitled to receive professional assistance during an executive session, the receipt of ex-parte information by the agency, supplied by a party to the controversy, without offering the opponent an opportunity to know the information and to offer evidence in rebuttal, is improper. Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 208. Once an ex-parte communication is shown, the burden of showing that the communication vas harmless, shifts to the party seeking to uphold the commission's decision. Blaker v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 212 Conn. 471, 480, 562 A.2d 1093 (1989). However, even the inclusion of improper evidence in the record, in and of itself, does not invalidate the decision reached. First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 165 Conn. 533, 545, 338 A.2d 490 (1973).
A review of the record lends no support to the Plaintiff's claims.
Buckley, during the course of the public hearing, explained the special permit process, and reviewed the history of the 19th Hole Restaurant at the location. He claimed that the plaintiff was required to obtain a special permit, while other establishments with pool tables were not. The special permit did not seek permission to operate a restaurant, because no such permission was necessary. The only permission sought concerned pool tables in the establishment, Buckley explained (ROR 18, TR p. 31-37).
The Plaintiff, and her attorney, were given an opportunity to rebut Buckley's assertions, and accepted the invitation of the Commission to respond (ROR 18, TR p. 38-40).
Buckley's comments were made on the record, and were primarily explanatory in nature. The Commission was free to evaluate the comments, along with other information provided at the public hearing, prior to making a decision regarding the special permit application.
No evidence was presented at the hearing, concerning the receipt of ex-parte information or communications by any member of the Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission. The fact that Dennis Buckley may have had discussions with opponents of the special permit, does not implicate notions of fundamental fairness or due process.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff did not claim during the course of the public hearing, and did not claim at trial, that any particular member of the Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission had prejudged the special permit application, or was subject to a conflict of interest.
There is a presumption that members of an administrative agency are not biased. Jutkowitz v. Department of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86, 100, 596 A.2d 374 (1991). To overcome this presumption, actual bias, not merely potential bias, must be shown. O& G Industries, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 232 Conn. 419, 429, 655 A.2d 1121 (1995).
The Plaintiff has not even attempted to make the necessary showing.
Nor is there any evidence in the record, which would suggest that any member of the Commission had a personal or financial interest in the special permit application. No information was presented which would create the appearance of impropriety on the part of any Commission member, thus mandating disqualification. Candlewood Hills Tax District v. Medina, 143 Conn.App. 230, 246, 74 A.3d 421 (2013).
PLAINTIFF CANNOT CHALLENGE THE NEED TO OBTAIN A SPECIAL PERMIT AS PART OF THIS APPEAL
The Plaintiff next claims that she is not required to seek a special permit as a prerequisite to the use of two pool tables in the 19th Hole Restaurant. She insists that no provision of the Bridgeport Zoning Regulations requires a special permit to be obtained, and that she may utilize this appeal to raise a challenge to the special permit process.
This claim fails to resonate.
The Plaintiff seems to argue that the court should determine that a special permit is not required, and that her appeal should be sustained. Presumably, upon the sustaining of the appeal, she would seek an order of this court directed to the Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission, ordering that her special permit application be approved.
Since the Plaintiff initiated the request for special permit approval, she cannot challenge the need for the very relief she sought by way of her application (ROR 1).
Had the Plaintiff sought to challenge the validity of any provision of the Bridgeport Zoning Regulations, that claim could properly be advanced through an administrative appeal.
At one time, any attack on the validity of a land use regulation could only be instituted through the filing of a declaratory judgment action. Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 209 Conn. 544, 563, 552 A.2d 796 (1989). The Cioffoletti rule was expressly abandoned by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 245 Conn. 551, 582, 715 A.2d 46 (1998); where a tax appeal was combined with claims seeking declaratory relief.
Since Stafford Higgins, the Appellate Court has made it clear that one found to be aggrieved may attack the validity of zoning regulations having general application, without resorting to a declaratory judgment suit. Warner v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 120 Conn.App. 50, 56, 990 A.2d 1243 (2010); Berlin Batting Cages, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 76 Conn.App. 199, 214, 821 A.2d 269 (2003); Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 62 Conn.App. 284, 297, 771 A.2d 167 (2001).
However, in this appeal, the Plaintiff does not seek to challenge any provision of the Bridgeport Zoning Regulations as unconstitutional, void for vagueness, or beyond the statutory authority of the Commission to enact.
Instead, she argues, a special permit is unnecessary, notwithstanding the Bridgeport Zoning Regulations applicable to special permits.
The Plaintiff's claim is not assisted by the case of Thomas v. City of West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 734 A.2d 535 (1995), which is cited in her brief.
Thomas involved an action brought against the City of West Haven, the city planner, and zoning commissioners. The plaintiff claimed that property had been taken without due process of law, and in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Connecticut. The underlying case involved a claim that an application for a zone classification change had been prejudged by members of the municipal land use body. No administrative appeal was involved in the litigation.
The Thomas court recognized that when a government official acts as a moving force behind a deprivation of constitutional rights, liability may attach pursuant to U.S.C. S. 1983. Thomas v. City of West Haven, supra, 409.
However an administrative appeal is not the proper vehicle for a claim, pursuant to U.S.C. § 1983.
DENIAL OF SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the unanimous decision of the Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission to deny her special permit application is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
This attempt is not persuasive.
The Commission gave three reasons in support of the denial of the special permit. Each is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The first reason provided by the Commission cited a failure to comply with site plan review standards, and the special permit standards enumerated in S. 14-4-4 of the Zoning Regulations. Section 14-4-4 reads, in relevant part:
S. 14-4-4 Special Permit Standards--No application for a special permit shall be granted until the Planning & Zoning Commission has made the following findings:
b. The special permit use(s) and site plan will not impair the future development of the surrounding area . . .
d. The proposal includes adequate safeguards to protect adjacent property and the neighborhood in general from any detrimental impacts the proposed use might otherwise have . . .
f. In the case of any special permit use located in, or directly adjacent to, a residential district, the location and size of such use, the nature and intensity of operations involved in or conducted in connection therewith, its site layout and its relation to access streets shall be such that pedestrian and vehicular traffic to and from the use and the assembly of persons in connection therewith will not be incongruous with residential uses, and will not present an undue hazard or inconvenience to residents . . .
i. The special permit use will not be disruptive to or cause conflicts with existing uses within the immediate vicinity . . .
The information in the record concerning the impact upon the adjacent residential neighborhood, particularly residences along Cleveland Avenue and Laurel Avenue, fully justified the Commission's decision to deny the special permit. The Commission had ample evidence from which to conclude that the intensity of the use, and its impact on nearby residences, had become more pronounced since the arrival of the pool tables. The denial of a special permit may be upheld, based upon general standards regarding the intensification of a use. St. Joseph's High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra ; Meriden v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 146 Conn.App. 240, 248-49, 77 A.3d 859 (2013).
Substantial evidence also supports the Commission's finding that the use of the property as a restaurant with pool tables increases and intensifies the impact upon the abutting residential neighborhood. Upholding the denial of a special permit based upon an intensification of use represents an appropriate determination by a planning and zoning commission. Children School, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 66 Conn.App. 615, 626-31, 785 A.2d 607 (2001).
The record fully supports each of the reasons given by the Defendant, Bridgeport Planning and Zoning Commission, in support of its denial of the special permit.
ISSUES NOT DECIDED
As already indicated, in sustaining this appeal, the court is not called upon to determine whether Suzanne Studioso is required to obtain a special permit, in order to bring pool tables into the 19th Hole Restaurant. The Plaintiff initiated the special permit application, and cannot be heard to complain that the permit is not necessary, in view of an adverse decision by the Planning and Zoning Commission.
Should a cease and desist order (Order To Comply) be issued concerning the pool tables, the Plaintiff is free to appeal any such order to the Bridgeport Zoning Board of Appeals. The Board, sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity, would be called upon to either uphold, or deny the cease and desist order, and to make findings based upon the evidence presented.
In that regard, it should be noted that the Commission did not find, as suggested at the public hearing, that the pool tables constituted " adult entertainment" under the Zoning Regulations. The court declines to make any such finding.
CONCLUSION
The appeal of the Plaintiff, Suzanne Studioso, is DISMISSED.