Opinion
Civil Action H-00-4037
February 12, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service's ("the Commissioner") Motion to Dismiss (#8). The Commissioner seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Beauregard Stubblefield, Sr.'s ("Stubblefield") action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this court is of the opinion that dismissal is warranted.
I. Background
Stubblefield, a pro se litigant, requests in his original complaint that the court assist him in obtaining a redetermination of his obligations to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") for tax years 1996 and 1997 "and now, maybe for the Year 1995." According to the complaint, Stubblefield timely filed tax returns for tax years 1996 and 1997. The IRS subsequently informed him of potential errors on the returns. While not altogether clear, these errors may entail: (1) indicating an incorrect filing status on the returns (selecting "married filing separately" instead of "married filing jointly"); (2) failing to file an Earned Income Credit form; and (3) improperly claiming expenses on Schedule C for an investment that was not entirely "at risk."
Stubblefield maintains that he and his wife, Barbara, made several attempts to correct certain discrepancies in their tax returns by contacting the IRS. He claims to have visited the Houston IRS office with his wife on January 22, 1999, and to have made a later trip on his own. These two visits, in addition to further correspondence and telephone conversations with the IRS, apparently failed to remedy the matter to Stubblefield's satisfaction. The essence of Stubblefield's difficulties appear to stem from his perceived inability to obtain accurate and relevant information from the IRS.
Stubblefield now turns to the court for assistance, although it is unclear what specific relief he seeks. In his original complaint, he merely asks the court to "rule that Petitioner is due a more favorable determination as to his indebtedness to U.S. Internal Revenue Services for the tax years in question and any other relief that this Court deems appropriate." He claims to be "at a loss to understand just what is going on and is asking this court to help resolve this situation." Stubblefield makes no effort, however, to identify the specific determinations of the IRS that he is challenging or to clarify the relief he is seeking. Hence, the court is at a loss to understand either the exact nature of his complaints or the redress sought.
II. Analysis
The Commissioner contends that dismissal is mandated because the court lacks jurisdiction of this action under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, that Stubblefield has failed to state a viable cause of action under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Commissioner asserts that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars Stubblefield's action against the United States, the IRS, and its agents sued in their official capacity. The Conunissioner further maintains that neither declaratory nor injunctive relief is available in a controversy involving federal income taxes.
A. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
Motions to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). "`A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.'" Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, absent jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, lack the power to adjudicate claims. See Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998); Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996); Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking to invoke it. See Stockman, 138 F.3d at 151; St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998); Boudreau v. United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1071 (1996); Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). Indeed, "there is a presumption against subject matter jurisdiction that must be rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal court." Coury, 85 F.3d at 248 (citing Strain, 742 F.2d at 889).
"In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3791 (U.S. June 11, 2001) (No. 00-1842); accord Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997); McAllister v. FDIC, 87 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1996); Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996); Ynclan v. Department of Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As, 241 F.3d at 424; Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Cloud v. United States, 126 F. Supp.2d 1012, 1017 (S.D. Tex. 2000), aff'd, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 1734813 (5th Cir. Dec. 19, 2001). Thus, when examining a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), unlike a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court is entitled to consider disputed facts as well as undisputed facts in the record. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986); Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413; Cloud, 126 F. Supp.2d at 1017.
It is well settled that "a district court has broader power to decide its own right to hear the case than it has when the merits of the case are reached." Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413. "Jurisdictional issues are for the court — not a jury — to decide whether they hinge on legal or factual determinations." Id. To determine whether jurisdiction exists, the court will generally resolve any factual disputes from the pleadings and the affidavits submitted by the parties. See Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1248 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1985). The court may also conduct an evidentiary hearing and "may hear conflicting written and oral evidence and decide for itself the factual issues which determine jurisdiction." Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413; see Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511-12. The court must always be mindful, however, of "`"the first principle of federal jurisdiction,"'" which requires a federal court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Stockman, 138 F.3d at 151 (quoting Veldhoen, 35 F.3d at 225 (quoting HART WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 835 (2d ed. 1973))).
B. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests only the formal sufficiency of the statement of a claim for relief. It is not a procedure for resolving contests about the facts or the merits of a case. In ruling on such a motion, the court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1999); Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274 (2000); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1999); Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Generally, the court may not look beyond the four corners of the plaintiff's pleadings. See Indest, 164 F.3d at 261; Baker, 75 F.3d at 196; McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992). The court may, however, consider matters that are outside the pleadings if those materials are matters of public record. See Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1995); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n. 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994); see also 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1357, at 299 (1990).
"`A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) `is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted."'" Id. (quoting Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983))). The motion must be denied unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Brown, 188 F.3d at 585; Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1250; Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S. Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Exploration Producing U.S., Inc., 39 F.3d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1994); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994). "`The question therefore is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.'" Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2193 (2001) (quoting 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, supra., at 332-36).
"`In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.'" Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)). "`[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.'" Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1250 (quoting Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)); accord Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995); see Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1067. "`[T]he complaint must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial.'" Campbell, 43 F.3d at 975 (quoting 3 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1216, at 156-59 (1990) (footnote omitted)). "`[A] statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a right of action' is insufficient." Id. (quoting 3 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, supra., at 163 (footnote omitted)). "`Dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief. . .'" Id. (quoting 2A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 12.07 [2.-5], at 12-91 (1995) (footnote omitted)). "The court is not required to `conjure up unpled allegations or construe elaborately arcane scripts to' save a complaint." Id. (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988)).
C. Sovereign Immunity
"It is elementary that `[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.'" United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); see Jeanmarie v. United States, 242 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2001); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 225 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 2000); Linkous v. United States, 142 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1998); Brashear v. United States, 138 F. Supp.2d 786, 789 (N.D. Tex. 2001). The doctrine of sovereign immunity operates to preclude lawsuits against the United States, its agencies, and its employees acting in their official capacity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983); Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am., Inc. v. Chasm, 845 F.2d 113, 115-16 (6th Cir. 1988); Smith v. Booth, 823 F.2d 94, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1987); Carelli v. IRS, 668 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 1982). Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar to such actions unless the United States waives immunity and consents to suit. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475; Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586-87; United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940); Bank One Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16, 33 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906 (1993). "Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475 (citing Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 554; Federal Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940)); see Spawn v. Western Bank — Westheimer, 989 F.2d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994). The principle of sovereign immunity "has been deeply embedded in our federal system from its inception." Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 488 (1987). It is based "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
Thus, a court may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a claim against the federal government except as Congress allows. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976); Armendariz-Mata v. United States Dep't of Justice, 82 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 932 (1996) (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475); Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112, 118 (5th Cir. 1995). The existence of congressional consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 212; Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586. "Congress has broad powers over the jurisdiction of the federal courts and over the sovereign immunity of the United States. . ." California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 66 (1979). When the United States consents to be sued, the terms of the waiver of sovereign immunity define the contours of a court's jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475; United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 538; United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); Williamson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 374 (5th Cir. 1987).
A waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign and not enlarged beyond that which the statute requires. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 590; Jeanmarie, 242 F.3d at 604; McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085, 1087 (5th Cir. 1991). Therefore, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed by statute. See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981); Testan, 424 U.S. at 393-94; United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); Wilkerson, 67 F.3d at 118; Shanbaum v. United States, 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 538); Taylor, 970 F.2d at 33; Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. United States, 769 F.2d 299, 306 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986); Carelli, 668 F.2d at 904. Furthermore, when Congress attaches conditions to a waiver of sovereign immunity, "those conditions must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied." Block, 461 U.S. at 287. Similarly, when a court is confronted with a purported waiver of immunity, the court must construe any ambiguities in favor of immunity. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995); see also Linkous, 142 F.3d at 275.
At a minimum, to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to point to a statute evincing Congress's unequivocal waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity and its consent to suit in actions of the type asserted in the complaint. See Humphreys v. United States, 62 F.3d 667, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1995); Simon v. Montgomery, 54 F. Supp.2d 673, 675 (M.D. La. 1999). Here, in response to the Commissioner's motion, Stubblefield directs the court's attention to 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(1), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws. . .28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(1). While this passage appears to vest the court with jurisdiction over disputed income tax matters, Stubblefield's reliance on the statute is misplaced. He overlooks the fact that § 1346(a)(1) must be read in conjunction with other statutory provisions which impose additional requirements on a taxpayer seeking relief in federal district court. See, e.g., Williams, 514 U.S. at 532-34 n. 7; United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601 (1990); PALA, Inc. Employees Profit Sharing Plan Trust Agreement v. United States, 234 F.3d 873, 877 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2000).
Under § 1346(a)(1), "[t]he United States has consented to be sued for taxes improperly assessed or collected, but only if the plaintiff complies with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7422." Brashear, 138 F. Supp.2d at 789. Section 7422(a) states in relevant part:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary. . .26 U.S.C. § 7422 (a). Thus, there is no jurisdiction in the district court until the taxpayer has paid the taxes assessed in full and filed a claim for a refund. See Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329, 1346 (5th Cir. 1989); Smith, 823 F.2d at 97; Thomas v. United States, 755 F.2d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court has explicitly held that "§ 1346(a)(1), correctly construed, requires full payment of the assessment before an income tax refund suit can be maintained in a Federal District Court." Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960).
Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 "provides federal district courts with jurisdiction to review an IRS determination only in the context of a tax refund suit brought by a taxpayer who has fully paid the assessment." Smith, 823 F.2d at 97 (citing Flora, 362 U.S. at 177); accord Pena v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 154, 156-57 (S.D. Tex. 1994), aff'd, 66 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 1995). Hence, if a taxpayer chooses not to seek relief in tax court, before bringing suit in federal district court, he must satisfy "the prerequisites for such jurisdiction, which include filing an administrative claim for a refund, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7422, and making full payment of all tax liability." Humphreys, 62 F.3d at 672; see Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 251 (1996); Gustin v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 876 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1989); Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1983). "Failure to file a claim for a refund deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction." Gustin, 876 F.2d at 488 (citing Zernial, 714 F.2d at 434). Otherwise, "[t]he taxpayer would be barred from the District Court by the Flora full payment rule." Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 125 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091 (1976). In this instance, the record is devoid of any evidence that Stubblefield has fully paid his disputed tax liability or that he has filed an administrative claim for a refund.
Moreover, injunctive relief is not available in the context of disputes involving federal income taxes. The Anti-Injunction Act provides, with limited exceptions not applicable here, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (a). "The Act bars taxpayers from challenging their tax liabilities by methods other than those specifically prescribed in the Code for the resolution of tax disputes." Sage v. United States, 908 F.2d 18, 26 (1990). "The Act insures that, once a tax has been assessed, the taxpayer ordinarily has no power to prevent the IRS from collecting it; his only recourse is to pay the tax in full, and then sue for a refund." Jones v. United States, 889 F.2d 1448, 1449-50 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 376 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)). The principal purpose behind the Anti-Injunction Act is the "protection of the Government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference `and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.'" Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 736 (quoting Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7). The Act applies not only to actual assessment and collection but also to activities leading up to and culminating in such assessment. See Kemlon Prods. Dev. Co. v. United States, 638 F.2d 1315, 1320 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 646 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); United States v. Dema, 544 F.2d 1373, 1376 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977). In this situation, the issuance of an injunction would have precisely the effect on the tax laws that the Act was designed to prevent. See Sage, 908 F.2d at 26.
Similarly, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides no basis for relief under these circumstances. The Act states in pertinent part that "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a). Thus, while the Declaratory Judgment Act allows the court to declare the rights and legal relations among the parties to a controversy, the Act specifically excludes from its scope most disputes relating to federal taxes. See Warren v. United States, 874 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 1989); Smith, 823 F.2d at 97. This exclusion reflects congressional antipathy for premature interference with the assessment or collection of federal taxes. See Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 732 n. 7. Taken together, "these two provisions prohibit federal courts from entertaining proceedings for declaratory relief in cases involving federal taxes." Warren, 874 F.2d at 282; Smith, 823 F.2d at 97; Melton v. Kurtz, 575 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1978); McCabe v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1976). "It is . . . well settled that a declaratory judgment cannot be issued in a tax case." Horne v. United States, 519 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir. 1975); accord Willis v. Alexander, 575 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1978); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 36 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); In re Statmaster Corp., 465 F.2d 978, 980 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Wingreen Co., 412 F.2d 1048, 1051 (5th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[t]he federal tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the prohibition of the Anti-Injunction Act" against suits fors the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes. Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n. 10 (1974); accord McCabe, 526 F.2d at 965. Hence, as with the Anti-Injunction Act, "Congress has barred the side door to actions `with respect to Federal taxes' under the Declaratory Judgment Act." Crenshaw County Private Sch. Found. v. Connally, 474 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
Stubblefield does not appear to be relying on § 7428 as grounds for relief in this action.
Hence, Stubblefield has failed to demonstrate a waiver of the Commissioner's sovereign immunity, and neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available in cases of this type. The court, therefore, is foreclosed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from entertaining Stubblefield's claims. Consequently, in the absence of payment in full of the tax liability in dispute and the filing of a claim for refund with the IRS, the court is without jurisdiction of his action.
Furthermore, Stubblefield's complaint fails to raise a single claim cognizable under federal law or to identify a specific remedy available in this situation. He simply asks the court for help in resolving an ill-defined problem he has experienced with the IRS and requests an undisclosed type of "favorable decision as to his indebtedness to U.S. Internal Revenue Services for the tax years in question and any other relief that the Court deems appropriate." This Court, however, is not an ombudsman for the IRS, nor is it required to investigate the underlying facts regarding his tax liability and generate legal arguments to save his complaint. Thus, even if jurisdiction existed, dismissal is warranted because Stubblefield fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commissioner's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim is GRANTED. Under the circumstances presented here, the Commissioner is entitled to sovereign immunity, and Stubblefield can prove no set of facts consistent with his allegations that would entitle him to relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.