Opinion
Case No. 03-3310-JAR.
July 29, 2004
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff Gordon E. Strope, a.k.a. Michael Lee Strope, who is imprisoned at the Lansing Correctional Facility, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the conditions of confinement at the Lansing facility constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion For Temporary Injunction. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering defendants to: (1) clean all tables in the prison dining hall; (2) allow inmates adequate time to eat by preparing Kosher meals in advance so that inmates do not have to wait in line for food; (3) serve healthy meals that provide nutritionally adequate food, specifically that no spoiled or undercooked food be served. In addition to this relief, plaintiff also asks the Court to: (1) establish a resolution policy for inmate complaints to resolve such complaints within seventy-two hours; and (2) appoint "someone of an honest nature . . . to assure proper and safe operations of the food service areas." In support of his Motion, plaintiff has submitted affidavits from himself and other prisoners concerning the quality of food and conditions of food service at Lansing. The Court has considered all of plaintiff's proffered evidence and is now prepared to rule. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion is denied.
Discussion
Plaintiff's burden, necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction, is well settled. Plaintiff must show the following:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the case; (2) irreparable injury to the movant if the preliminary injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party under the preliminary injunction; and (4) the injunction is not adverse to the public interest. In addition, `the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal' because `a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy.'
Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., LLC v. AT T Corp., 320 F.3d 1081, 1099 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Certain types of preliminary injunctions are disfavored. They include: "(1) a preliminary injunction that disturbs the status quo; (2) a preliminary injunction that is mandatory as opposed to prohibitory; and (3) a preliminary injunction that affords the movant substantially all the relief he may recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits." For one of these disfavored preliminary injunctions to issue, the movant must carry the heavier burden of showing that the following four factors "weigh heavily and compellingly in the movant's favor." "[M]andatory injunctions are not granted in doubtful cases in which the facts and law do not clearly favor the moving party." In this case, plaintiff seeks mandatory relief which would disturb the status quo, as well as substantially all of the relief he may receive at the conclusion of his trial and thus, he bears a heavy burden.
SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1098.
Am. Carriers, Inc. v. Baytree Investors, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 800, 806 (D. Kan. 1988) (citations omitted).
Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975) (the movant bears the burden of establishing the preliminary injunction factors).
The Court need only address the first element of a preliminary injunction, the likelihood of success on the merits, for plaintiff must satisfy each of the preliminary injunction elements before an injunction may issue. Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of his confinement violate his Eighth Amendment rights. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions of confinement, a prisoner must show that the condition complained of is "sufficiently serious" to implicate constitutional protection, and that prison officials acted with "`deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." A condition is sufficiently serious if it poses a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health or safety. And, deliberate indifference means more than mere negligence; the prisoner must show reckless behavior, in which "a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware." Plaintiff alleges and provides affidavits suggesting that he and other inmates at Lansing were: (1) served spoiled and undercooked food; (2) not given adequate time to eat; and (3) served food on tables that were not properly cleaned. The Court addresses each of plaintiff's claimed constitutional violations in turn.
DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
Id.
Spoiled and Undercooked Food
The Court finds that plaintiff's allegation of spoiled and undercooked food may be of sufficient seriousness to invoke constitutional protection. Plaintiff alleges that he was constantly served spoiled food, particularly spoiled milk and fruits. In addition, he states that hamburgers and chicken are often served raw. The Court notes, however, that there is no evidence that any inmate ever visited the infirmary as a result of eating the alleged spoiled and undercooked food, which plaintiff alleges is constantly being served.
Even though plaintiff may have stated a constitutional claim, he has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim because he has not shown that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the problems with food service. Rather, the evidence suggests that defendants are working to correct these problems. For instance, on April 26, 2004, defendant Cummings provided a letter to plaintiff indicating that "action is being taken to address issues pertaining to the food service operation." And, on May 7, 2004, Roger Hayden, Deputy Secretary of the Kansas Department of Corrections, sent plaintiff a letter indicating that he informed ARAMARK, the food service provider at Lansing, of plaintiff's concerns and expected ARAMARK's District Manager to respond. Finally, on May 20, 2004, defendant Cummings sent plaintiff a letter stating, "[a]s you were told by Warden McKune, action has been taken to address some areas of concern in the food service department at Lansing Correctional Facility. Our review of the procedures for serving special diets, including Kosher diets is ongoing." Plaintiff has shown no evidence of deliberate indifference, and therefore is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim.
Inadequate Time to Eat
Plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that he was given inadequate time in which to eat. It is unlikely that this allegation even rises to the level of constitutional concern. The evidence suggests that inmates sometimes have only ten minutes to eat after passing through the line in the dining hall. It apparently takes longer for plaintiff to receive his food because he is on a special diet. Plaintiff states that this is equivalent to him receiving only one and a half meals per day, instead of three. But, the failure to receive three meals a day does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment provided that inmates are given sufficient food to maintain normal health. There is absolutely no evidence that plaintiff has been denied sufficient food to maintain normal health as a result of the time period in which he is given to eat. Thus, plaintiff's claim of inadequate time to eat in all likelihood does not state a constitutional violation.
See, e.g., Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were not violated when he was served only one meal a day for fifteen consecutive days where the one meal furnished was sufficient to maintain normal health for the fifteen days); White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267, (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an inmate's allegation that he was only receiving two meals a day on the weekends was insufficient to allege an Eighth Amendment violation in the absence of evidence of deleterious physical or mental effects from the meal schedule); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that even providing an inmate only two meals a day on a permanent basis may be adequate).
Even, assuming arguendo, that plaintiff's allegation violates his Eighth Amendment rights, there is no evidence that defendants have been deliberately indifferent to this problem. In addition to informing plaintiff by letter that they were currently reviewing plaintiff's complaints, the record reveals that defendant McKune reviewed videotapes to ensure that inmates were receiving adequate time to eat. Defendant McKune also reminded the deputy warden of the prison's General Order that inmates be given twenty minutes to eat and directed that all shift captains comply with the order. Thus, the evidence falls far short of demonstrating that defendants acted recklessly and disregarded a risk of harm of which they were aware. Instead, it appears that defendants recognized plaintiff's complaint and took appropriate corrective action.
Food Served on Dirty Tables
Plaintiff also grieves that the tables in the dining hall are dirty; this allegation is not "sufficiently serious" to implicate constitutional protection. Merely eating at a table that has not been wiped off by food service employees does not pose a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health or safety, nor does it deprive plaintiff of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." As such, plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (The Eighth Amendment is implicated in prisoners' claims concerning conditions imposed on their confinement only where the prisoner is deprived of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities").
Conclusion
Plaintiff has not shown that the "likelihood of success on the merits" preliminary injunction element weighs heavily and compellingly in his favor, and is therefore not entitled to an injunction. In addition, plaintiff's requests that the court establish a new inmate resolution policy and appoint "someone of an honest nature . . . to assure proper and safe operations of the food service areas" are denied as plaintiff has shown neither that the current inmate resolution policy is inadequate nor that defendants' oversight of the food service operation at Lansing is insufficient. Plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction is therefore denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Injunction (Doc. 31) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.