Summary
dismissing paid complaint which alleged that government agents transmitted from their bodies "electomagnetic extremely low frequency radio energy from master satellites"
Summary of this case from Shafirovich v. TrumpOpinion
04-CV-6190CJS(P).
June 1, 2004
ORDER
Plaintiffs Bethel Julius Strode, III; Marletta Leeming-Strode; Daniel Arthur Leeming; Alexandria Joy Strode; Curtis John Strode; and the Strode family, filed this pro se action seeking to have the defendants "stop emitting or transmitting electromagnetic extremely low radio frequency energy from maser satellites . . . on [their bodies]." They have paid the filing fee, and requested service of the Summonses and Complaint by the United States Marshal (Docket No. 2). Plaintiffs claim that the defendants have violated their right to privacy and have caused physical harm. For the reasons set forth below, the request for service by the United States Marshal is denied and the complaint is dismissed.
First, plaintiffs Bethel Julius Strode ("Strode") and Marietta Leeming-Strode ("Leeming-Strode") have attempted to bring this action on behalf of other plaintiffs, some of whom appear to be their children. Nevertheless, they may not act as representatives for others in this action. An individual may proceed "pro se" on one's own behalf, but may not represent the interests of others unless one is an attorney admitted to practice before this Court. See Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Foundation of Buffalo, 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the claims Strode and Leeming-Strode have raised on behalf of the other plaintiffs are dismissed.
Second, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint "should be plain because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
"[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee, just as the Court of Appeals may dismiss frivolous matters in like circumstances." Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp. 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, the complaint is set forth in conclusory terms, with confusing allegations. It is not clear how plaintiff's have been harmed and what relief they are seeking. Strode states that he is a nationally certified professional satellite technician, and asserts that the Defense Department governs all maser satellites. Therefore, he argues, the Defense Department and J. Wiss, are liable for whatever harm he suffers from the electromagnetic extremely low radio frequency energy allegedly emitted from maser satellites. Similar claims are made on behalf of the other plaintiffs. The complaint is unanswerable in this fashion. "When a complaint fails to comply with these requirements [of Rule 8], the district court has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the complaint or to strike such parts as are redundant or immaterial." Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995).
The entire complaint fails to comport to the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and is therefore dismissed. Pro se plaintiffs, whether fee-paying or proceeding in forma pauperis, are normally afforded the opportunity to amend a complaint "prior to its dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim." Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597-98 (2d. Cir. 2000); Salahuddin, at 42. See also Simmons, 49 F.3d at 87; Wynder v. McMahon, 2004 WL 370665 (2d Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, such leave may be denied where amendment would be futile, see Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("Where it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend."). Here, plaintiff's fantastical allegations which comprise the complaint present paranoid conclusions unsupported by any factual statements. No potential cognizable claims appear in these papers, either directly or by implication. The flaws in this complaint are not remediable through amendment. Compare Baldwin v. U.S. Army, 223 F.3d 100, 101 (2d. Cir. 2000) ( pro se litigant paid the filing fee). In Baldwin, the District Court dismissed a complaint after finding that the allegations contained there were "fantastic, delusional and incredible." The Court, however, permitted Baldwin to file an amended complaint solely on employment discrimination claims against the United States Army, because, unlike the complaint filed in the instant action, the Court found that plaintiff appeared to have asserted a claim about a denial of an EEOC discrimination claim. There are no such hints of hidden claims here.
Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed. The request for service by the United States Marshal is denied as moot.
SO ORDERED.