Opinion
C/A No. 6:18-02438-MGL-KFM
09-28-2018
Cale Marcus Strickland, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office, Chuck Wright, Lieutenant Wilson Lieutenant Sinner, Officer Campbell, Sergeant Bleu, Sergeant Atkins, and Sergeant Piccolo, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants, and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
On September 12, 2018, the undersigned filed an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint contained deficiencies which could subject it to summary dismissal (doc. 7). The plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies for review for possible service of process (Id.). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends summary dismissal of the complaint for the reasons set forth below and for failing to comply with an order of the court.
BACKGROUND AND ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a non prisoner and former pre-trial detainee, filed this action on September 4, 2018 naming the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office (SCSO), Sheriff Wright, Lieutenant Wilson ("Lt. Wilson"), Lieutenant Sinner ("Lt. Sinner"), Officer Campbell, Sergeant Bleu ("Sgt. Campbell"), Sergeant Atkins ("Sgt. Atkins"), and Sergeant Piccolo ("Sgt. Piccolo") as defendants. He asserts claims against them arising out of his arrest, on April 22, 2018, for a suspended license and his detention in the Spartanburg County Detention Center ("SCDC") from April 22, 2018 until June 12, 2018 (doc. 1). The plaintiff sues the defendants in their official capacities (Id. at 2-4). He appears to allege claims for unreasonable seizure and excessive force against the SCSO and Sheriff Wright, and a conditions of confinement claim against all defendants. As to his claim for unreasonable seizure/false arrest, he alleges he was arrested for a suspended license, but asserts he had previously paid the ticket which led to the suspension. As to his claim for excessive force, he alleges he was maced on April 28th and May 22nd (Id. at 8). As to his conditions of confinement claim, he alleges he was not provided with proper hygiene and bedding, and was forced to take showers during his 55-day stay in the SCDC (Id. at 5). The plaintiff contends he sustained psychological injuries, injuries to his teeth from being unable to brush them for fifty-two days, injuries to his legs and knees from his sleeping arrangements, and burns to his testicles from the mace (Id. at 10).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant officers are located at the SCSO (doc. 1, at 2-4), and, as such, are considered deputies or employees of the Sheriff.
The plaintiff indicated he received medical treatment when he was maced (doc. 1 at 10).
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1501(2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office
The SCSO cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a person. It is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, so a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." However, sheriff's departments and similar groups of people or offices are not persons subject to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a detention center, as a building, is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not "person" under the statute); Green v. Murdaugh, C/A No. 5:12-1086-RMG-KDW, 2012 WL 1987764, *2 (D.S.C. May 07, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 1987259 (D.S.C. June 04, 2012) (dismissing because police department was not subject to suit under § 1983). Therefore, the SCSO is not subject to suit under § 1983.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
With respect to the plaintiff's allegations against Sheriff Wright and the remaining officer defendants in their official capacities, they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity "extends to 'arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity," Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted), because "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office . . . [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself," Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacity from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
"[U]nder South Carolina law, the sheriff and sheriff's deputies are State, not county employees." Edwards v. Lexington Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 386 S.C. 285, n. 1 (2010). As such, the plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Wright, Lt. Wilson, Lt. Sinner, Officer Campbell, Sgt. Bleu, Sgt. Atkins, and Sgt. Piccolo, all employees of the SCSO, in their official capacities are subject to summary dismissal because they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Sheriff Wright, Lieutenant Wilson, Lieutenant Sinner, Officer Campbell, Sergeant Bleu, Sergeant Atkins, and Sergeant Piccolo- Individual Capacity
Even if the plaintiff intended to make claims against Sheriff Wright, Lt. Wilson, Lt. Sinner, Officer Campbell, Sgt. Bleu, Sgt. Atkins, and Sgt. Piccolo in their individual capacities, his allegations are insufficient to state a claim and are subject to summary dismissal. First, as to the allegations against Sheriff Wright, the plaintiff appears to allege a supervisory liability claim against him solely because he is the official in charge of the SCDC. This claim fails because the plaintiff makes no allegations that Sheriff Wright personally denied him hygiene, maced him or forced him to take showers. To successfully allege a conditions of confinement claim against Sheriff Wright, the plaintiff must show that the Sheriff was aware of the plaintiff's purported mistreatment and was deliberately indifferent thereto, causing the plaintiff's injuries. No such allegations are presented here.
To the extent the plaintiff is alleging a malicious prosecution/improper seizure claim against Sheriff Wright (or any other defendant) for arresting and jailing him, such claim is barred because the plaintiff pleaded guilty. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.In so holding, the Heck court found that § 1983 actions for unlawful conviction or confinement necessarily require a finding that the plaintiff's underlying criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. Id. at 484-86. Here, the plaintiff stated he pleaded guilty (doc. 1. at 7). Because the plaintiff has not shown that he received a favorable termination of the April 22nd suspended license charge, the plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted with respect to a Fourth Amendment claim.
512 U.S. at 487.
Next, the plaintiff fails to state a claim against Lt. Wilson, Lt. Sinner, Sgt. Atkins, Sgt. Piccolo, and Sgt. Bleu in their individual capacities. The plaintiff states that
[F]or not being provided hygiene the people in charge of the jail are the sergeants, lieutenants, and Captains. So I got some of their names and I allege that Sheriff Chuck Wright, Lt. Wilson, Lt. Sinner, Sgt. Atkins, Sgt. Piccolo, and Sgt. Bleu are responsible for me not being provided hygiene . . . .(Id. at 8). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Here, the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient factual allegations to support his claim that these defendants violated his constitutional rights. Although the plaintiff generally complains about not being provided sufficient hygiene, he does not provide information as to what hygiene was lacking so as to rise to a constitutional violation. To the extent he complains that not being allowed to brush his teeth amounts to being denied hygiene, he fails to state who denied him the opportunity to brush his teeth. The plaintiff's conclusory allegation that these defendants are in charge and should therefore be held liable is insufficient to state a claim against them. As the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient factual allegations against these defendants, the plaintiff's claims against them should be summarily dismissed.
Officer Campbell-Individual Capacity
The plaintiff fails to state a claim against Officer Campbell in his individual capacity. The plaintiff alleges that Officer Campbell violated his constitutional rights when Officer Campbell kept bedding from him and took his away his blanket (doc. 1 at 5, 8). He asserts he was without a blanket for twelve days. Because at all relevant times the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In any event, "[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Although the plaintiff asserts he sustained injuries to his knees and legs from "sleeping arrangements", he fails to allege sufficient facts to establish the taking of his bedding was sufficiently serious or that Officer Campbell was deliberately indifferent to any such deprivation. Moreover, the lack of a blanket for 12 days does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. As such, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Officer Campbell.
Federal and State Statutes
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. However, while these are federal statutes dealing with civil rights violations, they are part of the criminal code of the United States, and cannot be used as a vehicle for civil prosecution. As for the alleged violations of S.C. Code of Laws Sections 24-5-80 and 24-9-30, the court should abstain from considering these state law claims. Such claims can be considered by this Court through the exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction," which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal claims. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387(1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Here, the Complaint fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.1999) ("[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.").
RECOMMENDATION
By order dated September 12, 2018, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 7). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (stating that district court should, "in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge September 28, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a),(d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).