Opinion
KNLCV166025971S
12-13-2018
STRAWBERRY PARK PROPERTIES, LLC v. TOWN OF PRESTON PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Handy, J.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are not in dispute. By way of a complaint, dated January 14, 2016, the plaintiff, Strawberry Park Properties, LLC, has appealed from the defendant’s, Town of Preston Planning and Zoning Commission’s (Commission) December 22, 2015, adoption of amendments to Section 15.11 of its zoning regulations regarding recreational campgrounds. (Return of Record [ROR], exh. 1 and 12.) The plaintiff owns property located at and adjacent to 43 Pierce Road, Preston, Connecticut. A public hearing on the amended regulation was scheduled at the Commission’s November 23, 2015 regular meeting (ROR, exh. 7 and 9) to be held on December 22, 2015. (ROR exh. 8 and 10.) At that hearing both the plaintiff and the public had an opportunity to be heard. (ROR, exh. 8 and 10.) At the conclusion of the public portion of the December 22 meeting, the Commission closed the hearing and voted to approve the application with several amendments. (ROR, exh. 8 and 10.) Notice of the Commission’s decision was published in the Norwich Bulletin on December 31, 2015. (ROR, exh. 11.) It is from this decision that the plaintiff has appealed.
Both parties agree that there was a second public hearing on this same amendment to the Commission’s regulation subsequent to the December approval. Both parties also agree that whatever procedural issues might have affected the December approval were rectified by the second hearing. Finally, both parties agree that the subject of this appeal is solely based on the December 22, 2015 Commission’s approval of its recreational campground amendment.
The court held a hearing on this matter on September 27, 2018, at which time all parties were present and had an opportunity to be fully heard. At the conclusion of that hearing, counsel for the defendant requested and was granted the opportunity to file a supplemental brief limited to clarification of a citation error in its original brief. The defendant’s supplemental brief was filed on October 10, 2018.
II. LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. AGGRIEVEMENT
"[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal ... [I]n order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alvord Investment, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 282 Conn. 393, 399, 920 A.2d 1000 (2007). "Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and the party alleging aggrievement bears the burden of proving it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 400. It is well established that a party may be aggrieved for purposes of an appeal by virtue of a person’s status as a property owner. Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 671, 889 A.2d 26 (2006); see also Bossert Corp. v. Norwalk, 157 Conn. 279, 285, 253 A.2d 39 (1968). A plaintiff may prove aggrievement by testimony at trial; Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 308 n.4, 592 A.2d 953 (1991); or "by production of the original documents or certified copies from the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quarry Knoll II Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 256 Conn. 674, 703, 780 A.2d 1 (2001).
At the hearing held before this court on September 27, 2018, plaintiff’s counsel submitted an affidavit from Ed Mayer, a member and the president of Strawberry Park Properties, LLC, attesting to the fact that the plaintiff has been the owner of parcel 43 known as 43 Pierce Road, Preston, Connecticut as well as other adjacent parcels, currently operating as a recreational campground. (Plaintiff’s exh. 1.) The plaintiff also submitted a certified copy of a quit claim deed showing that the 43 Pierce Road parcel in question was conveyed to the plaintiff from TD Bank, N.A. on June 10, 2013. (Plaintiff’s exh. 2.)
Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff is aggrieved.
B. TIMELINESS OF THE APPEAL
General Statutes § 8-28 provides that "[n]otice of all official actions or decisions of a planning commission, not limited to those relating to the approval or denial of subdivision plans, shall be published in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality within fifteen days after such action or decision. Any appeal from an action or decision of a planning commission shall be taken pursuant to the provisions of section 8-8."
General Statutes § 8-8(b) provides in relevant part: "[An] appeal shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with subsections (f) and (g) of this section within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes." General Statutes § 8-8(f) states in part: "Service of legal process for an appeal under this section shall be directed to a proper officer and shall be made as follows: ... (2) For any appeal taken on or after October 1, 2004, process shall be served in accordance with subdivision (5) of subsection (b) of section 52-57." General Statutes § 52-57(b) provides that "[p]rocess in civil actions against the following-described classes of defendants shall be served as follows: ... (5) against a board, commission, department or agency of the town, city or borough, notwithstanding any provision of law, upon the clerk of the town, city or borough, provided two copies of such process shall be served upon the clerk and the clerk shall retain one copy and forward the second copy to the board, commission, department or agency ..."
Notice of the Commission’s decision was published in the Norwich Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation in the town of Preston on December 31, 2015. (ROR, exh. 11.) The plaintiff commenced this appeal on January 15, 2016, fifteen days from the date of publication and within the fifteen-day statutory mandate, by service of process on the Commission on that same date, by leaving two copies of the appeal with the Town Clerk of the town of Preston. (Marshal’s Return, Docket Entry 100.31.) Accordingly, the service of process on the defendant Commission was proper and timely. The court, therefore, has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s appeal.
C. SCOPE OF REVIEW
A zoning authority has the authority to change a regulation or a zone classification. In amending zoning regulations, a commission acts in its legislative capacity. Zimnoch v. Planning & Zoning Commission of Town of Monroe, 302 Conn. 535, 522, n.19 (2011); Lord Family Windsor, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission of Town of Windsor, 288 Conn. 730, 736, 954 A.2d 831 (2008). This standard differs from when a local commission reviews applications like special permits and variances when it acts in an administrative capacity. Pansy Road, LLC v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission of Town of Fairfield, 283 Conn. 369, 374, 926 A.2d 1029, 1032 (2007); Kaufman v. Zoning Commission of City of Danbury, 232 Conn. 122, 151, 653 A.2d 798 (1995). Its legislative action is reviewed to determine if the action is "reasonably supported by the record" when a zoning agency has stated its reasons for its actions. Protect Hamden/North Haven From Excessive Traffic & Pollution, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 527, 542-43, 600 A.2d 757 (1991); Gaida v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 108 Conn.App. 19, 31-32, 947 A.2d 361, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 151 (2008).
However, if a zoning agency fails to formally state the reasons behind its actions, then the court is required to search the entire record to find a basis for the commission’s decision. Protect Hamden/North Haven from Excessive Traffic & Pollution, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 220 Conn. 544. "If any reason [obtained] from the record demonstrates a ... reasonable relationship to the general welfare of the community, the decision of the commission must be upheld." Parks v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 178 Conn. 657, 662-63, 425 A.2d 100 (1979). In all such cases, the court is foreclosed from substituting its discretion for the liberal discretion which the legislature has conferred on land use agencies, but may, however, grant relief when it is shown that the agency has acted illegally or arbitrarily, and consequently, has abused its power. Gordon v. Zoning Board, 145 Conn. 597, 604, 145 A.2d 746 (1958). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the land use agency acted improperly. Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 707, 535 A.2d 799 (1988).
The court should review the record and in so doing adhere to the substantial evidence rule. Substantial evidence is "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence." Heithaus v. Planning & Zoning Commission of Town of Greenwich, 258 Conn. 205, 221-25, 779 A.2d 750 (2001); Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 541, 525 A.2d 940 (1987).
D. THE LEGAL ISSUES
As previously indicated, the plaintiff owns property adjacent to the 43 Pierce Road property which is currently developed as a recreational campground. It is the intent of the plaintiff "to create a new campground with individual campsites and other amenities on 43 Pierce Road, in conjunction with its existing campground on the Property ..." (Plaintiff’s brief, exh. 1, para. 5.) The plaintiff concedes that it is only challenging the facial validity of the newly adopted regulations, and it is not challenging them as applied to the plaintiff’s property and current operations. (Plaintiff’s brief, p. 2.)
The plaintiff seems to advance three arguments: (1) certain of the approved amendments exceed the authority of the Commission under § 8-2 of the General Statutes, (2) others are so indefinitely worded as to be impossible to apply or understand, and (3) some were enacted contrary to expert evidence. The plaintiff further claims that the record is devoid of any reference to the amendments’ consistency with the town’s plan of conservation and development. The court will address the plaintiff’s individual arguments as they relate to each of these three categories.
1. The Commission’s Statutory Authority
Section 15.11 as amended provides that "Campgrounds shall conform to the applicable requirements of the Connecticut Public Health Code, Section 19a-2a-29, the Connecticut Fire Safety Code, and the Building Code; however, it is not the intent of these Regulations to duplicate (or enforce) the above noted codes. If there is an inconsistency between any of the codes and the zoning regulations, the more restrictive code or regulations shall apply." (ROR, exh. 12, p. 1.) The plaintiff contends that such a regulation exceeds the Commission’s statutory authority. Section 8-2 of the General Statutes provides in pertinent part: the zoning commission "may ... designate subject to standards set forth in the regulations and to conditions necessary to protect the health, safety, convenience and property values ... Such regulations shall be designed to secure safety ... to promote health and the general welfare ..." The court finds that adherence to other applicable municipal codes as recited in the amendment is reasonably related to "promot[ing] health and the general welfare" and accordingly, is within the Commission’s statutory authority.
A review of the record reveals that the proposed amendments are reasonably related to the police powers enumerated in § 8-2, specifically to promote the health and general welfare. In adopting subsections (e) and (f) of 15.11.7, "Liquid Petroleum Gas" and "Fire Extinguishers," the record reveals that the commission had a genuine concern for mitigating fires throughout the campground. (ROR, exh. 9, pp. 8-19, 24-25.) Kathy Warzecha, Preston Town Planner, voiced concerns over how potential fires at a campground are different than a typical house fire because of the proximity of each person’s camper to the other. (ROR, exh. 9, pp 12-13.) Further, the board was concerned with mitigating fires caused by tents used by campers, as they are more likely to catch fire because of the lights and heaters used inside them. (ROR, exh. 9, 12-14.) From this evidence, the commission reasonably could have found that amending the regulations to require fire extinguishers and limiting the use of liquefied petroleum gas promoted the health and general welfare of the campground by improving fire safety throughout the property.
Additionally, evidence was presented in favor of subsections 15.11.8, 15.11.9, and 15.11.10 that reasonably supported how these subsections promote the health and general welfare and actually complied with prior practices of the campground. Testimony from the public hearing revealed that under prior ownership the campground had no issues in obtaining information from campers such as names, addresses, vehicle numbers, and phone numbers. (ROR, exh. 10, pp. 35-37.) Additionally, the defendant commission stated that the purpose for the amendments to subsections 15.11.8, 15.11.9, and 15.11.10 is to ensure compliance with a zoning regulation that prevents campers who are visitors from becoming permanent residents of the campground. (Defendant’s brief, pp. 5-6.) From this evidence, the commission reasonably could have found that amending the regulations fell within its statutory power of promoting the health and general welfare of the campground by ensuring that visitors, or other part-time campers, and their personal property do not become permanent residents and fixtures of the campground.
Lastly, the commission concedes in its brief that the subsections dealing with the calculation of gross acreage, connection to a numbered state highway, and annual permitting would not apply to the plaintiff because the campground would be exempt as a legal nonconforming use. (Defendant’s brief, pp. 5-7.)
In conclusion, there is no particular evidence in the record that supports the plaintiff’s claim that the above amendments are unnecessary, inadequate, or impossible to comply with, other than its own speculative testimony. Although the plaintiff presented expert testimony, the defendant commission is not required to follow the advice of the plaintiff’s expert evidence. As such, no contradictory evidence exists in the record that would indicate that the defendant commission based its decision to amend its regulations on anything other than substantial evidence in the record.
Discussed below in part c.
Accordingly, the court finds that all of the above sections are reasonably related to "promoting health and the general welfare," authority provided to the defendant in General Statutes § 8-2.
2. Construing Regulations: The Wording of the Amendments
"[Z]oning regulations are local legislative enactments ... and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principles that apply to the construction of statutes ... Moreover, regulations must be interpreted in accordance with the principle that a reasonable and rational result was intended ... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language or ... the relevant zoning regulation as applied to the facts of the case ... The words employed are to be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Egan v. Planning Board, 136 Conn.App. 643, 649-50, 47 A.3d 402 (2012). Additionally, "Our courts have long held that rulings of local land use commissions must be sustained even if they are inartfully phrased, as long as they are reasonably supported by the record." Cicero v. Windsor Planning & Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. CV-92-0505454-S (February 8, 1993, Sheldon, J.).
Our courts have held that "[w]ords used in legislative enactments shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language." Fisher v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 358, 360, 122 A.2d 729 (1958). "[A] court that is faced with two equally plausible interpretations of regulatory language ... properly may give deference to the construction of that language adopted by the [zoning commission] charged with enforcement of the regulation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trumbull Falls, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 97 Conn.App. 17, 23, 902 A.2d 706, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 545 (2006). Further, if an ambiguous term is not defined in the regulation, the court may analyze how the word is used throughout the regulatory scheme, and "focus upon its common understanding as expressed in the law and upon its dictionary meaning." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Builders Service Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 267, 276, 545 A.2d 530 (1988).
The plaintiff contends that subsections 15.11.2, 15.11.5, 15.11.6, 15.11.7(g), 15.11.13, and 15.11.15 all contain terms that are ambiguous or are contradictory to other terms in the regulations. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the definitions of "Recreation Campground" and "Camper Unit" in sections 15.11 and 15.11.15 are not identical to the definition in the Definitions chapter of the zoning regulations. Further, the plaintiff argues that these differences can lead to confusion about which definition would apply in a given situation. A principle of statutory construction states that if two different definitions in the regulations exist, then they must be read together when they relate to the same subject matter, because the court is guided by the principle that the zoning commission is presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law. Cockerham v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn.App. 355, 367, 77 A.3d 204 (2013); see also Kraiza v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 121 Conn.App. 478, 492, 997 A.2d 583, rev’d on other grounds, 304 Conn. 447, 41 A.3d 258 (2012). Absent some minor differences, the different definitions stand for the same proposition. Upon a reasonable reading of both definitions pertaining to "Recreation Campground" and "Camper Unit," it is clear that both definitions for each term are equivalent to each other. A "recreation campground" is a parcel of land intended to be primarily used for temporary lodging by means of camper units, tents, recreation vehicles, or other temporary shelters and a "camper unit" is a tent or vehicle designed, used, or intended for temporary use while camping.
In addition, the plaintiff argues that certain sections of the amended regulations contain terms that are indefinitely stated and are impossible to apply or comprehend. To illustrate its point, the plaintiff argues in its brief that terms such as "interior vehicular system," "primary access," "staging areas," "road" and "deck" are not defined anywhere in the regulations. Because these terms are not defined, the focus must turn to the common understanding of the terms as expressed in their dictionary meanings and how they are used in the regulations themselves.
For example, although the term "internal vehicular system" may arguably be inartfully phrased by the commission, its purpose and definition is clear from a reasonable reading of § 15.11.2. The regulation states that an "internal vehicle system" is designed to serve the needs of the campground and lists the design standards for internal vehicular roads. Further, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines "internal" as "existing or situated within the limits or surface of something." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) p. 654. The dictionary also defines "vehicle" as "a means of carrying or transporting something" and "system" as "a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) pp. 1269, 1386. As applied to the facts of this case, in conjunction with the verbiage of the regulation itself, it is reasonable to interpret the term "internal vehicle system" as meaning a system of roads and pathways for vehicle use within the confines of the campground. Similar analysis of the other terms leads us to the same result. Section 15.11.2 states that a "primary access road" shall serve each newly established campground and connect directly to a state highway. The dictionary defines "primary" as "first in order of time or development" and "access" as "a way or means of entering or approaching." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) pp. 7, 986. Reading these definitions in conjunction with the rest of the language contained in § 15.11.2, it is clear that "primary access road" must mean the main road that connects the campground to a state highway.
Further, § 15.11.2 requires a "staging area" to be provided to accommodate campers at the entrance of the campground. "Staging area" is defined as "an area in which participants are assembled and readied." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) p. 1214. Again, a reasonable application of this term would lead one to infer that a "staging area" is a place at the entrance of the campground where newly arrived or departing campers can assemble in preparation to go to their initial destination or exit from the campground.
The same type of analysis can be done for the additional terms the plaintiff argues are ambiguous, including "road," "street," "safe pedestrian access," "deck," and "addition." The plaintiff argues that the references to "roads" and "streets" are not necessarily the same thing and that the difference is not readily determinable from the context in § 15.11.2. The court disagrees. Specifically, the regulation requires that "there shall be no on-street/road parking on any street/road ..." The dictionary defines "road" as "an open way for vehicles, persons, or animals" and "street" as "a thoroughfare in a city, town, or village that is wider than an alley or lane ... reserved for vehicles." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) pp. 1076, 1234. Reading these definitions in conjunction with the language contained in § 15.11.2, it is reasonable to interpret "street" and "road" as being synonymous and interchangeable. Both words are references for any open way where a vehicle can travel and it is unlikely that their use in § 15.11.2 is likely to cause confusion.
Additionally, § 15.11.2(d) requires "safe pedestrian access" between campground amenities, such as swimming areas and picnic areas, to campsite areas. The plaintiff argues that "safe pedestrian access" is not defined nor does the defendant set standards by which to apply it. However, the court disagrees. Section 15.11.2 is titled "Campground Design" and, as discussed above, deals with design elements such as vehicle systems within the campground, staging areas near the entrance of the campground, and general design requirements. A reasonable interpretation of "safe pedestrian access" is a path where campers can safely walk across a street or road, from one of the numerous campground amenities back to their campsites. Although the term might arguably be inartfully phrased, the court believes it is synonymous to the terms "pedestrian crossing" or "crosswalk" which are defined as "a marked path where people can safely walk across a street or road," and therefore, it is unlikely that this term is ambiguous and that there are no set standards by which to apply it. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) pp. 298-99.
Further, the plaintiff argues that the words "deck" and "addition" are not defined in § 15.11.5 or anywhere else in the regulations and are therefore ambiguous as applied to the regulations. Again, however, the court disagrees. "Deck" is defined as "a flat floored roofless area adjoining a house" and "addition" as "a part added as to a building or residential section." Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) pp. 14, 322. Reading these definitions in conjunction with the rest of the language contained in § 15.11.5, it is reasonable to interpret these terms as any roofless area or structure added to a camper or campsite.
Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the defendant’s reference to "objectionable noise" in § 15.11.13 is impermissibly vague. "We have held that the burden of showing that regulations are unconstitutionally vague rests with the plaintiff. Russo v. East Hartford, 179 Conn. 250, 257, 425 A.2d 1282 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 1334, 63 L.Ed.2d 773 (1980). Additionally, the plaintiff is required to show that the regulation is impermissibly vague as applied to the facts of the particular case. Barberino Realty and Development v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 607, 620, 610 A.2d 1205 (1992). The plaintiff argues that the terns "objectionable noise" is impermissibly vague because it does not identify the specific section of the General Statutes being incorporated into the regulation. Section 15.11.13 provides that "the volume of sound ... shall be controlled as to prevent objectionable noise off the premises as defined by the Connecticut General Statutes." The court interprets this section, specifically the term "objectionable noise" as noise that would violate General Statutes § 22a-69, "State-wide program of noise regulation," and the regulations adopted thereunder. The term "objectionable noise" is another instance of a provision the defendant may have inartfully phrased, but nonetheless, its application is apparent.
Through the above analysis, it is readily determinable, from the context of the regulations, in conjunction with their reasonable and plain dictionary meanings, exactly what the defendant is referring to, or trying to accomplish, in the regulations. As the defendant accurately argues, "a zoning regulation is entitled to a presumption of validity. This presumption only yields when the party challenging the regulation establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the regulation is invalid." (Defendant’s supplemental brief, p. 1.) Viewing the plaintiff’s concerns in light of the language cited above, the court does not find that the plaintiff has sustained its burden.
3. Expert Testimony
The plaintiff argues that the defendant, in amending § 15.11 of the zoning regulations pertaining to recreational campgrounds, rejected the testimony of the plaintiff’s experts. There is nothing that the plaintiff notes in the record indicating that the defendant Commission did not consider the testimony of plaintiff’s experts. The Commission, after hearing from those experts at the public hearing, chose not to follow their suggested advice. As our case law clearly indicates, the Commission was not required to do so.
Several of the allegations in the plaintiff’s appeal relate to this argument. In subsection 15.11.7(a), the language prohibits individual campsites to be more than 300 feet from a public restroom served by a health department approved sanitary sewage disposal system. The plaintiff’s expert, David Gorin, argued that this language should be modified to apply only to individual campsites that do not have individual sanitary sewer, water and electrical connections. (ROR, exh. 3, pp. 2-3.) Subsection 15.11.7(f) deals with fire extinguishers required in each camper unit, additionally requiring the campground owner or operator to maintain records that all extinguishers are up-to-date with their inspection requirements. Again, Gorin opined that owners would be unlikely to make such a certification and thus, the language should be modified. (ROR, exh. 3, pp. 3-4.) Similarly Gorin felt that language in § 15.11.8 relating to off season use and its record keeping component was an extreme onus on the park owner and may well be expensive and produce unnecessary paperwork. (ROR, exh. 3, p. 3.)
Attorney Gorin spent considerable time during the public hearing to present his views on how these regulations, and specifically those cited above, should be worded and modified. Our case law is clear that a commission is not required to take expert evidence into account in amending zoning regulations. The plaintiff contends that the defendant Commission is prohibited from rejecting such expert evidence in the face of uncontroverted expert evidence. This is not the standard which the court should apply. Instead, when it comes to expert evidence, a commission is free to reject such evidence as long as its denial is based upon the commissioners’ own common knowledge concerning matters readily within the competence of lay members of a commission, such as local traffic congestion, street safety and real estate needs. Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 427, 429 A.2d 910 (1980). However, when it comes to technically sophisticated or complex subjects for which commissioners do not possess expertise, they may be prevented from relying on their own knowledge without more. Id. When dealing with complex issues, the commission may not reject the expert’s testimony which goes beyond the ordinary knowledge and experience of the commission. Jaffe v. Dept. of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 349, 64 A.2d 330 (1949); see also Conetta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 42 Conn.App. 133, 139, 677 A.2d 987 (1996).
That is not the case here. The plaintiff’s expert made recommendations regarding restrooms, fire extinguishers and off season use of the campground. These are not complex issues, rather they are issues upon which commissioners would be permitted to rely on their personal knowledge. Judge Sheldon articulated on a such a situation, where he stated, "local land use commissioners may rely upon their own knowledge and experience, instead of or in addition to the testimony of interested parties and their experts, in deciding all but the most sophisticated of technical issues." (Emphasis added.) Cicero v. Windsor Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-92-0505454-S; see also Central Bank for Savings v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 13 Conn.App. 448 451, 537 A.2d 510 (1990).
4. CONSISTENCY WITH THE PLAN OF CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The plaintiff also alleges in its complaint that the commission’s adoption of the zoning amendments is invalid because there is no reference to, or showing, that the amendments are consistent with the town of Preston’s Plan of Conservation and Development. However, the plaintiff failed to address this claim in its brief. "Where a claim is simply asserted but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned." Szynkowicz v. Bonauito-O’Hara, 170 Conn.App. 213, 220-21, 154 A.3d 61, (2017); Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 312 n.15, 124 A.3d 977 (2015) (where claim was abandoned because it was not properly briefed). Consequently, the court finds that because the plaintiff failed to adequately address this claim in its brief, it is considered abandoned. Therefore, the court declines to address it.
5. NUMBER 18-132 OF THE 2018 PUBLIC ACTS
Finally, in its supplemental brief, the plaintiff calls to the court’s attention No. 18-132 of the 2018 Public Acts, which amended General Statutes § 8-2(a). Although the plaintiff correctly describes the public act, the plaintiff has not applied it to the facts of this case or made an argument regarding how the defendant’s amended regulations would violate the statute as amended. Accordingly, the court concludes that this part of the supplemental brief is inadequately briefed and it is deemed to be abandoned. Therefore, the court declines to review it. Szynkowicz v. Bonauito-O’Hara, supra, 170 Conn.App. 220-21; Braham v. Newbould, supra, 160 Conn.App. 312 n.15.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.