Opinion
No. CV 05-401 52 75 S
October 8, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Motion #121.50)
The question presented by this motion is whether there remains an issue of factual dispute between the parties concerning the existence of a current property tax lien that appears to have previously been subject to foreclosure proceedings or whether that prior case bars the court's review of these claims under the principle of res judicata. For the reasons more fully set forth below, the court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment because material facts remain in dispute and the parties to this case are not in privity with those in the prior action.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Strategic BCICFC Acquisitions, LLC (Strategic), commenced this suit to foreclose on outstanding real property taxes for the 1993, 1994, and 1995 Grand Lists for the property located at 451 Valley Street, New Haven, Connecticut. The defendant Constitution Holding, LLC filed a motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2008, which was supported by a memorandum of law and various exhibits. The plaintiff objected to the motion, filing its supporting memorandum of law and exhibits in court on June 16, 2008. The parties presented their oral arguments to the court during short calendar on June 16, 2008.
The City of New Haven assesses the tax due on real property on October 1st of each year, which is then added together to form the Grand List for that tax year. Property owners then have to pay those taxes by January 1 of the following year. Thus, the tax lien for the 1993 Grand List refers to the taxes that were due on this property for tax year 1993, which had to be paid by January 1, 1994. Notwithstanding the defendant's reference in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment to tax liens for the 1996 and 1997 Grand Lists, the court notes that these years are not disputed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not reference tax liens for these years in its complaint nor in its memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court does not address tax years 1996 and 1997 because they do not appear to be in dispute or to be a part of this litigation.
The parties agree that, through a series of assignments, the City of New Haven assigned its complete interest in the tax liens for this property for the 1993, 1994, and 1995 Grand lists (the "Liens") to various parties, culminating in the plaintiff acquiring ownership of the Liens through an assignment on March 19, 2003. It is also undisputed that all of these assignments were properly recorded in the New Haven Land Records. The parties also agree that the defendant Constitution Holding, LLC, is the current owner of the property located at 451 Valley Street, New Haven, Connecticut (the "property"), which it acquired through a foreclosure sale on August 28, 2004.
Also named as defendants in the lawsuit are South Central Connecticut Regional Water Authority and Water Pollution Control Authority, both of whom are non appearing. The reference to "parties" in this decision is to the parties to the motion for summary judgment, namely, the plaintiff Strategic BCICFC Acquisitions, LLC and the defendant Constitution Holding, LLC.
The primary dispute between the parties concerns whether the Liens owned by the plaintiff were foreclosed on during the 2004 foreclosure sale. See New Haven v. Alston, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 04 0485752 (May 24, 2004, Celotto, J.) ("Alston Foreclosure"). The plaintiff maintains that the City of New Haven assigned its interest in the Liens prior to that foreclosure sale, and that, consequently, it could not foreclose on those liens in the Alston Foreclosure because it no longer held a legal interest in them. Moreover, the plaintiff argues that, at a minimum, the question of whether the Liens were foreclosed out by virtue of the Alston Foreclosure is a disputed fact, which bars summary judgment in this case at this time. In support of this position, the plaintiff submits uncertified copies of the various assignments of the Liens, an affidavit of debt prepared by the servicer for the collection of real estate taxes for the City of New Haven in connection with the Alston Foreclosure that states the principal balance outstanding on the property did not include the Liens, and a current tax bill from the City of New Haven for the premises that shows a current outstanding balance for the Liens.
In response, the defendant argues that the Liens were discharged in accordance with the Alston Foreclosure sale. As a result, the defendant contends that, because there is privity between the plaintiff in this case and the plaintiff in the Alston Foreclosure sale, res judicata places an affirmative bar to this action. To support its theory, the defendant submits an uncertified copy of the complaint in the Alston Foreclosure that enumerate in the first three counts, respectively, claims for the Liens, an uncertified copy of the Committee's Deed in that action stating that the sale foreclosed out tax liens from 1993 through 2002, and an uncertified copy of the Notice to Bidders in that case. Moreover, while the parties did not submit certified or otherwise authenticated documents as exhibits, the defendant correctly notes that the court may take judicial notice of the court records in the Alston Foreclosure. See McCarthy v. Warden, 213 Conn. 289, 293, 567 A.2d 1187 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 110 L.Ed.2d 667 (1991) (court may take judicial notice of court files in another suit, "especially when the relevance of that litigation was expressly made an issue at this trial").
Although "[o]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment . . . [which contemplates] that supporting documents to a motion for summary judgment be made under oath or be otherwise reliable;" (internal citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) New Haven v. Pantani, 89 Conn.App. 675, 678, 874 A.2d 849 (2005); uncertified documents can be "admitted at trial without objection to create an evidentiary foundation for the determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists, particularly where . . . both parties submitted uncertified [documents]." Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006); see Day v. Trybulski, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 0340476646 (April 28, 2008, Bellis, J.) (noting the court has discretion to admit evidence that has not been authenticated or certified if the opposing party does not object); Daniels v. Ericson, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 06 5001423 (July 17, 2007, Hurley, J.T.R.) (also noting the court has discretion to admit evidence that has not been authenticated or certified if the opposing party does not object). Accordingly, because neither party has objected to the other's use of these documents, the court relies upon them for the limited purpose of determining the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.
DISCUSSION
Before turning to the merits, it is first necessary to consider the relevant standard of review. "Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Atkinson, 283 Conn. 243, 253, 926 A.2d 656 (2007). Moreover, "[t]he courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). Finally, "[b]ecause res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).
With respect to "[t]he principles underlying the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [they] are well settled. [A] valid, final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties, or those in privity with them, upon the same claim or demand . . . Furthermore, the doctrine of claim preclusion . . . bars not only subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but subsequent relitigation of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made. [T]he appropriate inquiry with respect to [claim] preclusion is whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding . . . The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sotavento Corp. v. Coastal Pallet Corp., 102 Conn App. 828, 833-34, 927 A.2d 351 (2007).
The court begins by noting that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant in this case were parties to the Alston Foreclosure, and accordingly addresses whether there is privity between Strategic and the City of New Haven such that res judicata is applicable here. To this end, it is observed that "res judicata applies to subsequent actions between the same parties or those in privity with them on the same claim . . . Thus, under certain circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata may apply even if . . . the subsequent action does not involve the identical parties." (Emphasis added; citation omitted.) Stein v. Horton, 99 Conn.App. 477, 483, 914 A.2d 606 (2007). Privity, however, is not easily defined, nor is it evaluated according to rigid criteria. See LaBow v. Rubin, 95 Conn.App. 454, 462 n. 5, 897 A.2d 136 (2006). Indeed, "the concept of privity has moved away from the conventional and narrowly defined meaning of mutual or successive relationships to the same rights or property. It now signifies a relationship between one who is a party of record and another who is a nonparty, but is sufficiently close to mandate the application of res judicata or collateral estoppel." Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 813 n. 12, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997).
In view of these considerations, courts "employ an analysis that focuses on the functional relationships of the parties. Privity is not established by the mere fact that persons may be interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same set of facts. Rather, it is, in essence, a shorthand statement for the principle that [res judicata] should be applied only when there exists such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights so as to justify preclusion." LaBow v. Rubin, supra, 95 Conn.App. 462 n. 5, quoting Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Morris, 90 Conn.App. 525, 536, 877 A.2d 910, cert. granted on other grounds, 276 Conn. 907, 884 A.2d 1027 (2005). In this case, the Strategic is not in privity with the City of New Haven because they did not share the same legal interests. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the City of New Haven bringing a foreclosure action to collect on the Liens that it sold to Strategic in any way vindicates Strategic's interests in those Liens. While both the Alston Foreclosure and this case involve the same liens, Strategic and the City of New Haven have opposing interests in that property as both parties appear to believe they are entitled to remuneration for the Liens.
In this respect, it is additionally noteworthy that the defendant's argument that privity exists because Strategic was a successor in interest in the Liens to the City of New Haven is misplaced in this case. Although Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Bruoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 230-31, 828 A.2d 64 (2003), stands for the proposition that assignees are in privity with assignors as to the rights assigned and are therefore bound by prior judgments against assignors, that case involved an assignment for collection purposes only, which is not the case here. Id., 229. Moreover, even if Schoonmaker's logic was applicable to this case, New Haven did not foreclose on the Liens prior to its assignment to Strategic of that property, suggesting that Strategic would not be bound by the judgment in the Alston Foreclosure. Indeed, the court questions whether New Haven even had standing to foreclose on liens in which it no longer enjoyed an interest, let alone bind Strategic to a judgment in that a case.
Nevertheless, because the court in Strategic BCICFC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Grant, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4015561 (April 6, 2006, Doherty, J.) (holding privity to exist in identical situation to facts alleged in this case) has relied on Schoonmaker in a case on all fours with the present case I pause to further consider Schoonmaker's relevance here. In the passage cited by Judge Doherty, the Schoonmaker Court was discussing the privity relationship created when an assignment is for collection only, and the assignor, therefore, retains an equitable interest in the assigned property. In that context, the Schoonmaker Court explained, "the assignor and assignee are in privity with each other . . . Accordingly, the [assignee] cannot litigate the same claim against the same defendant employer if an [assignor] already has recovered a final judgment on that particular claim, and vice versa." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 230-31. Of course, these shared rights make sense in the context of an assignment for collection only because "[s]uch an assignment transfers legal title to the claim, so the assignee can sue in his or her own name . . . [T]his leaves equitable ownership with the creditor/assignor . . . The resultant split in ownership gives rise to a fiduciary relationship between the assignor and assignee . . . and the relationship generally is one of principal-agent . . . Subject to exceptions not pertinent here, the principal can revoke the agent's authority at any time." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 228-29.
These shared rights do not exist, however, in a case, such as this, where the assignment is complete. See Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli Inc., supra, 265 Conn. 228 ("[s]uccession by an assignee to exclusive ownership of all or part of the assignor's rights respecting the subject matter of the assignment, and a corresponding extinguishment of those rights in the assignor, is precisely the effect of a valid assignment") (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Schoonmaker Court stands for the proposition that privity between an assignor and assignee exists only where the assignor still has an equitable interest in the subject property, and does not lend any support for the proposition that an assignee is bound by a subsequent judgment obtained by an assignor that no longer has any interest whatsoever in the subject property. In this case, the parties do not dispute that the assignments were complete and not for collection purposes only. Accordingly, the City of New Haven did not have a continued equitable interest in the Liens, Schoonmaker is not applicable, and there was not, therefore, privity between the parties such that Strategic was bound by the judgment in the Alston Foreclosure.
Although the plaintiff's memorandum of law states that the right to collect was assigned to it by the City of New Haven, this was not the only right in the liens that was assigned. Indeed, while the right to collect the money owed on the Liens was included in the assignments, that was not the only right assigned. That the assignments specifically state that all rights and interests in the Liens were assigned by the City of New Haven helps to confirm the complete nature of this assignment. In any event, the plaintiff does not claim that the right to collect was the only right in the lien that was assigned, and the parties do not dispute the scope of the rights assigned.
In view of the foregoing, the court concludes that Strategic and the City of New Haven are not in privity. Not only do Strategic and New Haven hold adverse interests with respect to the disposition of the Liens, but the case law cited by the defendant to support its claim of privity is inapposite to the facts of this case. Schoonmaker involved an assignment for collection only, while the assignment in this case was complete and extinguished New Haven's interest in the Liens. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment must be denied because the parties are not in privity, and res judicata does not, therefore, bar this action.
Nevertheless, even if the parties were in privity with one another, the motion for summary judgment would still be denied because there are material facts in dispute. Although the complaint in the 2004 foreclosure action specifically sought to foreclose out the Liens and the Committee's Deed in that action stated that the sale foreclosed out tax Liens from 1993 through 2002, the affidavit of debt prepared by the servicer for the collection of real estate taxes for the City of New Haven in connection with the prior foreclosure sale states that the principal balance outstanding on the property did not include the Liens and the current tax bill for the premises obtained from the City of New Haven shows a current outstanding balance. Thus, the court is unable to discern from the record before it whether these Liens were foreclosed out in that litigation or whether there was an opportunity for the Liens to be foreclosed. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material facts that bars summary judgment at this time.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set for above, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.