" Id. (quoting Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-527, 2014 WL 4637093, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014)). In Michele A., the Court noted that in addition to there being no requirement that an ALJ discuss third-party statements, the plaintiff did "not explain in any detail how their statements undermine the ALJ's decision" and the "third-party statements in her RFC discussion, any such error was harmless because the written statements echo Plaintiff's own subjective complaints, which the ALJ supportably discounted."
Dkt. No. 14 at 8-9; Dkt. No. 16 at 13. It is well-settled, “‘an ALJ does not have to state on the record every reason justifying a decision' or ‘discuss every piece of evidence submitted.'” Gauda v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-594, 2024 WL 886595, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (summary order) (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012)); see also Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:13-cv-527, 2014 WL 4637093, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (“the mere fact that a specific portion of evidence is not discussed in a decision does not mean that it was not considered.”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)
cal sources,” according to the applicable regulations, include licensed physicians and “[l]icensed or certified psychologists.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a). At the time that Plaintiff filed her claim, nurse practitioners were not considered to be acceptable medical sources, but were considered “non-acceptable medical sources" or “other sources.” Id. § 416.913(d)(1). “[O]nly ‘acceptable medical sources' can be considered treating sources ... whose medical opinions may be entitled to controlling weight.'”Genier v. Astrue, 298 Fed.Appx. 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. 416.913(a) and SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2009)). “[C]herry-picking evidence occurs when administrative law judges credit information consistent with their findings while ignoring or discrediting inconsistent information from the same sources without providing plausible reasons.” Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-527, 2014 WL 4637093, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept 16, 2014). The ALJ found NPP Pfalzer's opinion that Plaintiff suffered no more than moderate limitations in any of the four areas “generally consistent with the medical evidence,” but that NPP Pfalzer provided “no significant explanation for” the opinion that Plaintiffs condition would cause “three absences per month.” Tr
“Just as importantly, the mere fact that a specific portion of evidence is not discussed in a decision does not mean that it was not considered.” Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:13-cv-527, 2014 WL 4637093, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (emphasis in original) (citing Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998)). Additionally, as set forth below, the treatment notes of PA Weaver and others in her practice group do not support Plaintiff's claims.
. “[C]herry-picking evidence occurs when administrative law judges credit information consistent with their findings while ignoring or discrediting inconsistent information from the same sources without providing plausible reasons.” Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-527, 2014 WL 4637093, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014). Here, the ALJ's decision provided plausible reasons for discrediting the inconsistent testimony provided by Dr. Dhiman.
Therefore, so that the ALJ may examine the full record and explain how Plaintiff is capable of performing at her RFC-level despite the side effects of her chemotherapy, Plaintiff requests remand. Cf. Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 4637093, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (“‘Cherry picked' decisions do not satisfy substantial evidence standards because reviewing courts cannot conclude . that adverse findings were based on evidence reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”).
(“[T]he record demonstrates that the ALJ improperly disregarded or mischaracterized evidence of Ericksson's continuing disability.”); Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-527, 2014 WL 4637093, at * 9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (“Cherry picked decisions do not satisfy substantial evidence standards because reviewing courts cannot conclude, under such circumstances, that adverse findings were based on evidence reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (quotations omitted)).
"Just as importantly, the mere fact that a specific portion of evidence is not discussed in a decision does not mean that it was not considered." Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-cv-527, 2014 WL 4637093, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (emphasis in original) (citing Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998)).
The ALJ's decision is particularly concerning as he appears to have used portions of treatment notes and opinions which supported his conclusions-that plaintiff has severe migraines and fibromyalgia and only mild depression and anxiety-while ignoring the remainder of those same notes and opinions indicating that plaintiffs anxiety causes or exacerbates his headaches and myalgia and that there is seemingly no physical cause for his myalgia. See Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, No. 6:13-CV-527 (GLS/ESH), 2014 WL 4637093, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (“A classic case of cherry-picking evidence occurs when administrative law judges credit information consistent with their findings while ignoring or discrediting inconsistent information from the same sources without providing plausible reasons.”)
(“Federal courts reviewing administrative social security decisions decry ‘cherry picking' of . . . evidence, which may be defined as inappropriately crediting evidence that supports administrative conclusions while disregarding differing evidence from the same source.”); see also Strange v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:13-cv-527 (GLS)(ESH), 2014 WL 4637093, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (“‘Cherry picked' decisions do not satisfy substantial evidence standards because reviewing courts cannot conclude, under such circumstances, that adverse findings were based on evidence reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”). The ALJ's reference to a note that Ortiz did not appear to be depressive is particularly revealing: the doctor who made it did not deny that Ortiz struggled with mental health, but rather wrote that “anxiety and personality [disorder]” were more likely.