Opinion
Case No. 8:04CV409.
January 3, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cabela's Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (Filing No. 15). The Plaintiff David Stotler opposes the motion, and both Cabela's and Stotler have submitted briefs in support of their respective positions. For the reasons stated below, Cabela's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
FACTS
The facts alleged in Stotler's Complaint (Filing No. 1) are accepted as true for purposes of the Court's analysis of Cabela's Motion to Dismiss.
In 2003, Stotler was employed by the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). ( Id. ¶ 10). Stotler contends that Defendant John Potter, Postmaster General, subjected Stotler to unlawful retaliatory employment discrimination from February 2003 through the date of the filing of the Complaint. ( Id. ¶ 10). Accordingly, Stotler brought this action against Potter, asserting claims against him under a variety of federal laws including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. ( Id. ¶¶ 10-67). Stotler also seeks judicial review of an administrative action of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. ( Id. ¶¶ 68-72).
Stotler's employment with USPS included work at a detached mail unit located inside Cabela's warehouse in Sidney, Nebraska. ( Id. ¶ 7). On February 24, 2003, Cabela's requested that USPS no longer allow Stotler to be assigned work on Cabela's premises. ( Id. ¶¶ 18-20). Stotler invoked the Court's supplemental jurisdiction to pursue his Fifth and Sixth Claims for Relief under state common law, alleging that Cabela's tortiously interfered with his employer-employee relationship and negligently caused him emotional distress. ( Id. ¶¶ 73-95).
Although Stotler's Complaint improperly cites 28 U.S.C. 1346 as the Court's basis for jurisdiction over his state law claims against Cabela's, the Court will construe the Complaint liberally, as if Stotler had properly referred to 28 U.S.C. 1367 to invoke the Court's supplemental jurisdiction over the claims. Stotler's brief in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss notes that this was his intent. (Filing No. 21, pp. 4-5).
Cabela's moved to dismiss the claims against it, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997). Thus, this Court will, as it must, accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Howard. v. Coventry Healthcare, 293 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2002).
ANALYSIS
There are no federal law claims against Cabela's, nor is there diversity jurisdiction in this case. If this Court has jurisdiction over Stotler's claims against Cabela's, the jurisdiction must lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a):
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court first should determine whether Stotler's federal claims and his claims against Cabela's "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," such that Stotler "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in a single judicial proceeding." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). While the sets of facts in Stotler's federal claims may intersect with the sets of facts related to his claims against Cabela's ( e.g., Stotler's alleged damages due to loss of employment), they share no common nucleus. As Cabela's rightly asserts, the elements of Stotler's federal causes of action and the facts that he would need to prove in order to prevail on those causes of action are separate and distinct from the elements of his state law causes of action and the facts that he would need to prove in order to prevail on those claims against Cabela's.
To support his claim against USPS based on retaliation, Stotler must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) USPS subsequently took adverse employment action against him; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected activity. Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1071 (8th Cir. 1998); Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). To support his claim against USPS based on discrimination, Stotler must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he held, (3) adverse employment action was taken against him, and (4) the evidence allows an inference of improper motive on the part of USPS. Landon v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). With respect to Stotler's claim against Cabela's for tortious interference with an employment relationship, Stotler must prove (1) the employment relationship existed; (2) Cabela's knew the relationship existed; (3) Cabela's intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with the relationship as claimed; (4) the interference caused Stotler damage; and (5) the nature and extent of the damage. Huff v. Swartz, 606 N.W.2d 461, 466 (Neb. 2000). To recover on his claim against Cabela's for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Stotler must prove (1) an act of negligence on the part of Cabela's, (2) that was the proximate cause emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it, (3) resulting in medically-diagnosable and medically-significant injury to Stotler. Schleich v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital, 491 N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (Neb. 1992).
Other federal courts have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in situations similar to the one now before this Court. Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 90 F.3d 451, 456 (11th Cir. 1996) (no supplemental jurisdiction over state contract claims in action brought for pension benefits under ERISA); Soliday v. Miami County, Ohio, 55 F.3d 1158, 1165 (6th Cir. 1995) (no supplemental jurisdiction over state claims related to cremation of body in federal civil rights action brought by inmate's relatives alleging deliberate indifference to inmate's medical needs); Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 763 (3rd Cir. 1995) (no supplemental jurisdiction over state tort and contract claims in action brought for overtime wages under Fair Labor Standards Act); Ryther v. KARE II, 976 F.Supp. 853, 856 (D. Minn. 1997) (no supplemental jurisdiction over state law claim for lien on judgment in action brought under federal age discrimination law); Obendorfer v. Gitano Group, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 950, 956-57 (D.N.J. 1993) (no supplemental jurisdiction over state law claim for slander asserted by employee's spouse in Title VII action alleging sexual harassment and sex discrimination).
If this Court could assert supplemental jurisdiction over Stotler's claims against Cabela's under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), there is ample reason for the Court to decline to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). When factors of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants are weighed, as the Supreme Court suggested in United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726, the reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction over Stotler's state claims are compelling. This Court perceives no judicial economy in allowing Stotler's federal claims and state law claims to proceed in a single lawsuit. While Stotler might enjoy some slight measure of convenience and economy in trying his federal claims against Potter and his state law claims against Cabela's in the same proceeding, he will suffer no unfair prejudice if he is required to pursue those claims in separate actions. Any convenience to Stotler is far outweighed by the expense, inconvenience and fairness to the Defendants of allowing Stotler to proceed against them in a single federal-court action.
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Cabela's Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 15) is granted;
2. All claims against Cabela's are dismissed, without prejudice;
3. This action will proceed against the sole remaining Defendant, John Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service; and
4. The caption shall be revised accordingly.