Opinion
E062240
09-27-2017
LYLE STOTLEMYER, as Administrator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. SHARON FOREMAN, Objector and Appellant; STANLEY FOREMAN et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
Horspool & Horspool, Karin E. Horspool, for Objector and Appellant Sharon Foreman. M. Daniel Saylor for Petitioner and Respondent Lyle Stotlemyer. Carmen Qualls & Associates and Carmen J. Qualls, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Regina Foreman (Holt). No appearance for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Stanley Foreman. No appearance for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Ross Foreman.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. PROPS1100186) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cynthia Ann Ludvigsen, Judge. Affirmed. Horspool & Horspool, Karin E. Horspool, for Objector and Appellant Sharon Foreman. M. Daniel Saylor for Petitioner and Respondent Lyle Stotlemyer. Carmen Qualls & Associates and Carmen J. Qualls, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Regina Foreman (Holt). No appearance for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Stanley Foreman. No appearance for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Ross Foreman.
This probate matter centers on two pieces of real property and two bank accounts of Mattie Weaver, the decedent and the mother of four children, objector and appellant Sharon Foreman, and real parties in interest and respondents Stanley Foreman, Ross Foreman, and Regina Holt. Petitioner and respondent Lyle Stotlemyer, in his capacity as the administrator of Weaver's estate, brought a petition pursuant to Probate Code section 850, seeking to have the proceeds from the sale of the two properties and the funds from the bank accounts returned to the estate. Sharon objected to the petition. After a trial, the trial court found that two quitclaim deeds, transferring the properties at issue from Weaver to Sharon, were invalid. It further found clear and convincing evidence that Weaver had intended the funds in one of the two bank accounts at issue to be distributed upon her death equally among the four children, rather than to Sharon alone. On that basis, it ordered Sharon to return to the estate the proceeds from the sale of the two properties, and to distribute a proportionate share of the funds from the bank account to Stanley, Ross, and Regina.
Several of the people involved in this case share or used to share the same last name. For clarity, we will generally refer to the children of the decedent by their first names only. No disrespect is intended.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
On appeal, Sharon contends that the trial court erred in finding the two quitclaim deeds to be invalid, and rejecting her claim to one of the bank accounts. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKROUND
Weaver died in January 2009. In October 2012, Stotlemyer, in his capacity as administrator of Weaver's estate, filed the petition pursuant to section 850, that initiated these proceedings.
The petition alleges that Weaver had two bank accounts that were registered as joint accounts with Sharon. Sharon withdrew all the funds from one of the accounts (account number ending 8858-8), a sum of $105,945.94, and the bulk of the funds from the other (account number ending 1715-5), a sum of $74,768, on September 22, 2008. The petition seeks return of those funds to the estate, arguing that the accounts were held jointly "for convenience and without intent of survivorship."
It is account 8858-8 that is at issue in the present appeal. The account was opened in March 2002 by Weaver individually. In December 2006, Sharon was added as a joint account holder. The 2002 version of the account agreement is not in our record. The December 2006 "Payable-On-Death ('POD')/ Custodial Master Account Agreement" (agreement) describes the account as follows: "Joint P.O.D. (A joint voluntary and revocable P.O.D. account or similar trust account with right of survivorship)." (Some capitalization omitted.) The agreement elaborates that "[u]pon the death of one of us, the funds become the property of the survivor; upon the death of both of us, the funds are payable to the payee(s) listed." (Some capitalization omitted.) The payee is identified on the first page of the agreement as "Stanley Foreman 1 of 4"; a second page, a "Multiple Beneficiary or Payee Addendum to Master Account Agreement," lists Stanley again, along with Regina and Ross.
At trial, Sharon testified that she had not deposited any of her own money into the account, and that the funds had been used exclusively for Weaver's expenses. She further testified that she closed the account in 2008 and moved the money into an account with the same bank, but in her name only, to safeguard the funds. According to Sharon, the bank had recommended she take that course of action because Regina had attempted to access the account by pretending to be Sharon.
The trial court found "sufficient evidence to overcome any presumption of joint ownership or right of Sharon Foreman to lay claim to all of the funds" in the account. On that basis, it ordered that Sharon must "turn the proportionate share of these funds over to her sister and brothers," entering judgment in the amount of $26,486.48 each, plus interest, in favor of Stanley, Ross, and Regina.
The petition also seeks the return of proceeds from the sale of two parcels of real property that had been owned by Weaver. They were purportedly transferred to Sharon by quitclaim deeds dated July 15, 2003, but not recorded until November 26, 2008, by Stanley, nine days before his appointment as conservator for Weaver. Sharon sold the properties in 2010. The petition contends that the quitclaim deeds transferring the property from Weaver to Sharon were not valid.
At trial, Stanley testified that in July 2007, his mother gave him an envelope, with instructions to open it if she became seriously ill or died. He did not know what was in the envelope until he opened it in November 2008, after Weaver had become seriously ill, and Weaver never gave him any instructions on what to do with its contents. When he opened the envelope, he discovered, among other things, the two quitclaim deeds. He gave the deeds to Sharon, and he subsequently took the deeds to be recorded. The Recorder's Office required him to complete an affidavit pursuant to Government Code section 27361.7 because the notary seals on the two deeds were not completely legible. The deeds were recorded on November 26, 2008.
A licensed notary public testified that the signatures and notary stamps on the deeds were hers. She had no specific recollection of notarizing the documents, and she did not have her notary book, because it had been stolen from her car. She testified, however, that she never notarized any document without the person being present with a California picture identification and, if real property was involved, a thumb print.
A forensic document examiner testified that she had examined the signatures on the two quitclaim deeds, comparing them to 24 exemplars of Weaver's signature, provided to her by Regina, dating from the 1970s through 2007. The examiner concluded that Weaver "did not sign the two documents in question," describing her confidence in that conclusion as "the highest level opinion that a document examiner would render," an "absolute opinion." On cross examination, when challenged about her investigation into the origins of the exemplar signatures, she noted that, in addition to the word of her client, her process included comparison "between known samples to determine internal inconsistencies." She expressed confidence that if there had been a problem with the exemplars, "then out of 24 documents . . . there would have been something off." She also conceded that she did not review the original deeds, but used copies as the basis for her comparison, because copies were available, but originals were not. She opined, however, that in most cases working from a copy was no more difficult than working with original documents.
Ross testified that in early November 2008, he met with Sharon and Stanley at Stanley's house to discuss what to do with Weaver's real properties, and how to divide the proceeds if the properties were to be sold. At the meeting, Stanley suggested that the properties should be placed into Sharon's name "to get around probate." At the time of the meeting, according to Ross, "there were no deeds"; he knew because he had "had a whole bunch of conversations" with Weaver, and she told him that there were "no deeds." Later in the month, he saw the deeds, which had been signed by Sharon as grantee. He asked Stanley how Weaver's signatures got on the deeds; Stanley told him that his secretary had signed Weaver's name, and that the next day he had the deeds notarized.
The trial court was persuaded that the deeds "do not bear a valid signature" of Weaver. It further found that, even if the signatures were Weaver's, the deeds "fail to meet the legal requirements for validity," because there was "no evidence of a present intent to convey the property." It noted that Weaver had "maintained control and dominion" over the properties after the purported execution of the deeds in 2003, until her death. Furthermore, Weaver had made no irrevocable delivery of the deeds, either to Sharon or Stanley. The trial court concluded on these bases that the deeds were invalid. Sharon had sold the properties to bona fide purchasers, so the trial court ordered Sharon to turn over to Lyle Stotlemyer, in his capacity as administrator of Weaver's estate, the proceeds of those sales—a total of $187,000—plus interest.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Conclusion That Weaver Intended the Bank Account to Benefit All Four of Her Children, Not Just Sharon.
With respect to account 8858-8, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Weaver intended the funds therein to be shared equally among her four children upon her death, even though Sharon was nominally a joint account holder. Because this finding is supported by substantial evidence, we will not disturb it.
The Probate Code provides that, with respect to a P.O.D. account such as the one at issue, "the P.O.D. payee has no rights to the sums on deposit during the lifetime of any party, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent." (Former § 5301, subd. (b).) We review the trial court's factual finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of such a different intent for substantial evidence: "'The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.'" (Nat. Auto. & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 25.) "Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings of the trier of fact . . . an opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also lead to a contrary finding does not warrant reversal." (In re Leland D. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 251, 258.)
Section 5301 was amended, effective January 1, 2013. (Stats. 2012, ch. 235, § 1 (Assembly Bill No. 1624).) The parties agree that, because the events at issue occurred prior to that date, it is the former version of the statute that applies. Our analysis would be the same, however, under the current version of the statute; the statutory language quoted here appears in both versions. (Compare former § 5301, subd. (b) with § 5301, subd. (d).)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion regarding Weaver's intent with respect to the funds in account 8858-8. Sharon testified that she deposited none of her own money into the account, and that the funds were always used for Weaver's benefit, even after Sharon was added as a joint account holder. The trial court reasonably inferred from the language and structure of the account agreement—identifying the payee as "Stanley Foreman 1 of 4" on the first page, with an addendum for three additional payees, each of whom are one of her children—that Weaver had intended, when she opened the account, that the funds to be split equally among her four children upon her death. The agreement, as revised in 2007, contained language typical of a P.O.D. account, indicating that the funds would become the property of Sharon as joint account holder upon Weaver's death, with the funds payable to the payees only upon the death of both Sharon and Weaver. But it also continued to identify the payee as "Stanley Foreman 1 of 4." No other evidence, other than the ambiguous language of the revised account agreement, supported the notion that Weaver's intent with respect to the distribution of the funds had changed since the account was opened. Although the evidence in support of the trial court's conclusions regarding Weaver's intent was necessarily circumstantial, it was nevertheless substantial.
Lee v. Yang (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 481, the primary case authority on which Sharon relies, is inapposite. In Lee, the court of appeal found substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that the parties—a previously engaged couple, who had cancelled their wedding and broken up—had no legally enforceable oral agreement restricting the right of one of them to withdraw funds from a joint account, and that the other party had no right to "reimbursement on an ownership theory premised on his proportionate net contribution to the sums on deposit . . . ." (Id. at pp. 485, 490.) Lee has no bearing on the question presented in the present appeal, namely, whether the trial court's finding of fact with respect to Weaver's intent was supported by substantial evidence.
To be sure, as Sharon argues, the evidence presented at trial could have supported different inferences regarding Weaver's intent than the one reached by the trial court. But that is not a sufficient basis for us to disturb the judgment. (See Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822 (Sabbah) ["Our sole inquiry is 'whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' supporting the court's finding."].)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Conclusion That the Deeds Were Invalid.
The trial court concluded that the deeds at issue were invalid for two reasons, namely, that they did not bear valid signatures by Weaver as grantor, and they were never legally delivered to the grantee, Sharon. Again, we will not disturb the trial court's conclusions because they are supported by substantial evidence.
"'A deed does not transfer title to the grantee until it has been legally delivered.' [Citations.] 'Delivery is a question of intent.' [Citation.] 'A valid delivery of a deed depends upon whether the grantor intended that it should be presently operative, and a manual transfer is not conclusive evidence of such intention.' [Citation.] Although physical delivery of a deed raises an inference that the grantor intended to immediately transfer title, that inference may be overcome by evidence showing a contrary intent. [Citation.] The trier of fact must determine intent by reviewing all of the surrounding circumstances of the transaction. [Citation.] 'Where there is substantial evidence, or where an inference or presumption may be drawn from the evidence to sustain the court's finding of delivery or nondelivery, the finding will not be disturbed on appeal.'" (Luna v. Brownell (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 668, 673.) The substantial evidence standard also applies to our review of the trial court's factual finding that the deeds were forged. (Wright v. Rogers (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 349, 361-362.)
Sharon's argument that the de novo standard of review applies to the question of Weaver's intent is rejected. --------
There is substantial evidence in support of the trial court's conclusion that the deeds "do not bear a valid signature of the grantor." The forensic document examiner testified that, in her expert opinion, the signatures were not Weaver's, and explained her reasoning at some length. It is irrelevant that there is other evidence in the record—particularly Stanley's testimony, and that of the notary who purportedly witnessed Weaver's signature—that could have supported a different conclusion. (See Sabbah, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 822.)
The trial court's conclusion that the deeds were not signed by Weaver is an independently sufficient basis for its judgment with respect to the two properties. We note, however, that there is also substantial evidence in support of the trial court's finding that there had been no effective delivery of the deeds, even assuming the validity of the signatures on them and accepting Stanley's testimony regarding how they came to be in his possession. Stanley testified that when Weaver gave him the envelope, she only instructed him to open it when she was seriously ill or dead; she never told him what was in the envelope, or instructed him what to do with the contents once it was opened. Weaver retained control of the properties throughout her life. And there is nothing in evidence that suggests she could not have, at any time, had Stanley return the envelope unopened, and thereafter disposed of the properties in some other manner than quitclaiming them to Sharon. It was reasonable for the trial court to infer, as it did, that when Weaver provided the deeds to Stanley, she had no intent to immediately transfer title to the properties to Sharon.
The authority cited by Sharon does not require a contrary result. She cites Williams v. Kidd (1915) 170 Cal. 631 (Williams) for the proposition it is "well settled that a person may make a conveyance of property and place it in the hands of a third party to be delivered to the grantee named in it on the death of the grantor, and that such a delivery will be effectual to pass a present title to the property to the grantee, if the intention of the grantor is to make such delivery absolute and place it beyond [her] power thereafter to revoke or control the deed." (Id. at p. 637.) She ignores, however, the subsequent paragraph in Williams, which begins: "On the other hand, it is equally well settled that where a deed is deposited with a third party to be handed to the grantee on the death of the grantor, unless this is accompanied by an intention on the part of the grantor that title to the property shall thereby immediately pass to the grantee, there is no delivery of the deed and consequently no title is transferred." (Id. at p. 642.)
Here, as discussed above, the trial court reasonably inferred Weaver's lack of intent that title pass immediately to Sharon from the facts and circumstances in evidence. "This court cannot set aside the finding of the trial court unless it appears that there is no evidence to support it, or the evidence is so clearly preponderating against the finding as made that it can be said that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it. We are satisfied from a full consideration of the evidence that this cannot be said." (Williams, supra, 170 Cal. at p. 642.)
Sharon's reliance on Merkle v. Merkle (1927) 85 Cal.App. 87, is also misplaced. In that case, the deed at issue was "given by the grantor into the possession of a third party with unconditional instructions to deliver it to the grantee at some future time." (Id. at p. 108.) Under those circumstances, there was "'nothing to indicate an intention on the part of the grantor to recall [the deed] . . . ." (Ibid.) In the present case, Stanley's testimony was that he received no unconditional instructions, or indeed any instructions at all, with respect to delivery of the deeds, and that he did not even know there were deeds inside the envelope given to him by Weaver until the envelope was opened months later. The trial court reasonably reached a different conclusion than the Court of Appeal in Merkle, based on a different set of underlying facts.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Lyle Stotlemyer and Regina Holt shall recover their costs on appeal. Respondents Ross Foreman and Stanley Foreman, who did not make any appearance in this appeal, shall bear their own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. FIELDS
J.