Opinion
3D23-1101
03-13-2024
Anamarie Stoppa, Appellant, v. Infinity The Oaks LLC, Appellee.
Anamarie Kelly Stoppa, in proper person.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Stephanie Silver, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 23-3440 CC
Anamarie Kelly Stoppa, in proper person.
No appearance, for appellee.
Before SCALES, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
SCALES, J.
In this residential eviction action, we affirm the trial court's challenged June 8, 2023 order that struck self-represented appellant Anamarie Stoppa's (Tenant) answer and entered a final default judgment for possession for Infinity the Oaks, LLC (Landlord) ("judgment"). We write only to clarify that section 83.232(5) of the Florida Statutes, governing nonresidential tenancy eviction proceedings, is inapplicable to residential tenancy eviction proceedings. The trial court's error in citing to section 83.232(5) in the judgment, however, is harmless.
I. Relevant Background
On April 20, 2023, Landlord filed the instant residential eviction action against Tenant alleging that Tenant failed to pay her April rent. Pursuant to the lease agreement attached to Landlord's complaint, and the complaint's allegations, Tenant's monthly rent was $2,150. On April 24th, Tenant filed both an answer and, in lieu of payment into the court registry, a motion to determine rent, pursuant to section 83.60(2) of the Florida Statutes ("rent motion"). Tenant's rent motion maintained that she had paid past rent consistent with the terms of her lease, and that the trial court should reduce her rent to reflect the diminution of the value of her unit due to Landlord's alleged failure to maintain the premises. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Tenant's rent motion over the course of three days. We have been provided no transcript of any part of this hearing.
This section reads, in relevant part, as follows:
In an action by the landlord for possession of a dwelling unit, if the tenant interposes any defense other than payment, . . . the tenant shall pay into the registry of the court the accrued rent as alleged in the complaint or as determined by the court and the rent that accrues during the pendency of the proceeding, when due. . . . Failure of the tenant to pay the rent into the registry of the court or to file a motion to determine the amount of rent to be paid into the registry . . . constitutes an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses other than payment, and the landlord is entitled to an immediate default judgment for removal of the tenant with a writ of possession to issue without further notice or hearing thereon. If a motion to determine rent is filed, documentation in support of the allegation that the rent as alleged in the complaint is in error is required.§ 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. (2023).
On June 5, 2023, the trial court entered its order on Tenant's rent motion ("June 5th order"). For Tenant to avoid the entry of an immediate default, the June 5th order unambiguously required Tenant to pay into the registry of the court the $2,150 monthly rent (plus late fees) for each of the months of April, May and June, no later than 10:00 a.m. on June 6, 2023. The record reflects that Tenant deposited the funds into the court registry at 12:38 p.m. on June 6, 2023, approximately two and a half hours after the deadline imposed in the June 5th order. Later, on June 6th, arguing that the trial court lacked the discretion to modify the deadline set out in the June 5th order, Landlord filed a motion seeking the entry of a default judgment and immediate possession of the property ("default motion").
On June 8, 2023, the trial court granted Landlord's default motion and entered the challenged judgment. The judgment contains the following explanation regarding the proceedings on Tenant's rent motion that resulted in the June 5th order:
The Court gave specific detailed reasons for its decision in open court. At the conclusion of the hearing at approximately 9:20 a.m., on June 5, 2023, this Court granted over 24 hours for the Defendant to deposit three months rent in the Court Registry. This Court ordered that the Defendant deposit rent via cash, cashier's check, money order, or wire transfer no later than 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, June 6, 2023. The Court indicated in its order that failure to deposit these funds would result in a Default Final Judgment.
The judgment goes on to explain that, on June 6th, at 10:10 a.m. -while Tenant was represented by counsel - Tenant began calling chambers of the trial court (and other judges) "asking for additional time to deposit funds in the Registry." The judgment further explains that Tenant's counsel, at 12:34 p.m. on June 6th, moved to withdraw from representation of Tenant and that the trial court granted the withdrawal motion on June 7th.
While not reflected in the record, Tenant asserts in her initial brief that a weather delay caused her to miss her June 6th, 10:00 a.m. deadline to deposit her rent payment.
Importantly, the judgment goes on to say that, at no time prior to the entry of the judgment, did Tenant, either through counsel or otherwise, file a motion in the trial court seeking an enlargement of time in which to deposit rent into the court registry.
Citing section 83.232(5) of the Florida Statutes, governing nonresidential tenancy eviction proceedings and cases construing this provision, the judgment contains the following explanation of the trial court's perceived discretion when it considered Landlord's default motion:
Section 83.232(1) sets forth the requirements for a nonresidential tenant, subject to a landlord's eviction proceeding, to pay rent due into the court registry, "or if such amount is contested, such amount as is determined by the court . . ." § 83.232(1), Fla. Stat. (2023). Section 83.232(5) then provides: "Failure of the tenant to pay rent into the court registry pursuant to court order shall be deemed an absolute waiver of the tenant's defenses. In such case, the landlord is entitled to an immediate default for possession without further notice or hearing thereon." § 83.232(5), Fla. Stat. (2023).
The Plaintiff now moves for Default Final Judgment based on the late deposit. Irrespective of whether the result appears harsh or whether the Court is sympathetic, trial courts are without discretion when Court Registry deposits are late.
The judgment then granted Landlord's default motion and evicted Tenant.
II. Analysis
As is obvious from the judgment, the trial court concluded that, because Tenant missed the rent deposit deadline set in the trial court's June 5th order, it lacked the discretion to adjudicate Landlord's default motion in any manner other than to grant it. Indeed, pursuant to section 83.232(5), regarding nonresidential tenancies, once the trial court adjudicates a tenant's motion to determine rent, the trial court lacks the discretion to alter or vary the deadlines contained in the trial court's order; it must enter a default judgment of possession if the tenant fails to deposit the rent as required by the order. See § 83.232(5), Fla. Stat. (2023); see also Simpson v. 2699 Indus., LLC, 319 So.3d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021); Park Residential Facility, Inc. v. Dan Designs, Inc., 36 So.3d 811, 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).
The Legislature, however, did not import section 83.232(5)'s mandatory default language into section 83.60 governing residential tenancy eviction proceedings. Section 83.60 contains no counterpart to 83.232(5).
The judgment cited well-established law applicable to nonresidential tenancy eviction proceedings, evidencing that the trial court was of the mistaken belief that she could exercise no judicial discretion in adjudicating Landlord's default motion. Absent a statute, rule, or other authority to the contrary, however, a trial court generally does have the authority to exercise its discretion, upon a showing of cause, to modify its own deadlines. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b)(1) reads as follows:
(b) Enlargement.
(1) In General. When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time by order of court, by these rules, or by notice given thereunder, for cause shown the court at any time in its discretion:
(A) with or without notice, may order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; or
(B) upon motion made and notice after the expiration of the specified period, may permit the act to be done when failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
The trial court's erroneous citation to section 83.232(5), though, is harmless in this case, because nothing in the record reflects that the discretion afforded the trial court under rule 1.090(b)(1) was implicated in this case. Rule 1.090(b)(1)(A) was not implicated because no "request" seeking an enlargement of time was made prior to the deadline imposed by the June 5th order, and rule 1.090(b)(1)(B) was not implicated because Tenant never filed a motion seeking an enlargement of time.
Even if Tenant's phone calls to various judges had occurred prior to 10:00 a.m. on June 6, Tenant provides no authority that a party - represented by counsel - calling various judges' chambers constitutes a valid "request" for an enlargement of time under rule 1.090(b)(1)(A), such that a trial court reversibly errs by not "adjudicating" such an ex parte request.
We can hardly say the trial court reversibly erred by its failure to extend, essentially sua sponte, the deadline imposed by its June 5th order. And, while the trial court erred by citing an inapplicable provision in the judgment, under the circumstances presented in this case, any such error was harmless.
Affirmed.