Opinion
No. 07-19-00205-CV
08-24-2020
JARRETT STONE, APPELLANT v. MISSION ROCK RESIDENTIAL TEXAS, LLC, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 126th District Court Travis County, Texas
Trial Court No. D-1-GN-18-001146; Honorable Karin Crump, Presiding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Jarrett Stone, appeals the trial court's order granting the No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Appellee, Mission Rock Residential Texas, LLC ("Mission Rock"), in his suit for damages arising out of the retention of a residential security deposit. Through four issues, Stone contends the trial court erred because: (1) the Texas Property Code shifts the burden of proving that any retention was reasonable; (2) Mission Rock did not request the relief granted; (3) genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to Stone's breach of contract claim; and (4) genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to Stone's statutory claims. We will affirm.
Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, sitting in Austin, this appeal was transferred to this court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013). Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this court on any relevant issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
BACKGROUND
The dispute at issue in this proceeding arose after Stone moved out of the Bradford Pointe Apartments in Austin, Texas. Stone rented and lived in an apartment at the Bradford Pointe Apartments from May 13, 2016 until July 2, 2017. During this period, the apartments were managed by Mission Rock. According to Stone, Mission Rock is a large property management company that manages several apartment complexes in Texas, including the Bradford Pointe Apartments.
Before Stone moved into the apartment, he read the Apartment Lease Contract and paid a $150.00 security deposit. Stone and Mission Rock signed the lease contract and accompanying addendums on April 4, 2016. The day he moved out, he received an email from Mission Rock's assistant manager telling him he owed $132.87 for July prorated rent ($72.06 for rent for the first two days of July and $60.81 for utilities). Stone paid the full amount that day.
On July 13, 2017, Mission Rock applied certain charges against Stone's $150.00 security deposit (the amount of the charges exceeded the amount of the security deposit) and advised him of the sum still owing. Among other charges were two Stone contends should not have been charged against his security deposit: (1) a "Cleaning-Apt" fee of $120.00 and (2) a "Cleaning-Carpet" fee of $75.78. On July 17, 2017, Mission Rock sent Stone a written Move-Out Statement containing the charges, along with a demand letter seeking payment for the balance due after the application of his security deposit. In that letter, Mission Rock informed Stone it would be required to send the amount due to a collection agency if Stone did not pay the requested amount within fifteen days from the date of the letter. Stone received the letter a few days later and contacted Mission Rock, noting the statement included the two charges that he believed were not owed. At that time, Stone paid the full amount requested, $293.65, to avoid having the debt sent to a collection agency.
Mission Rock says that a full accounting showed charges under the Lease Contract amounted to $576.52 when Stone moved out. Mission Rock gave Stone a credit for the July 2, 2017 payment of $132.87 and his security deposit of $150.00, leaving a balance of $293.65.
Three days later, Mission Rock received an invoice from a cleaning company that charged $75.78 for cleaning the apartment Stone vacated. This amount matched the amount Mission Rock charged Stone for carpet cleaning in the apartment (but not the amount charged for cleaning the entire apartment). Stone argues this makes the charges Mission Rock listed seem manufactured and disingenuous.
On March 6, 2018, Stone filed suit against Mission Rock, individually and on behalf of a putative class of similarly treated Mission Rock tenants. Stone sought the recovery of statutory damages pursuant to the Texas Property Code, as well as damages for breach of contract, and breach of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Stone alleged he and the members of the putative class had suffered an injury in fact caused by the false, fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading practices through which Mission Rock wrongfully withheld security deposits. The claims focused on Mission Rock's alleged unlawful and systematic charging of cleaning fees to clean for normal wear and usage. In addition to filing a general denial, Mission Rock filed a verified denial denying liability in the capacity sued and alleging there to be a defect in the parties. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 93.
While Stone did attempt to certify the putative class, the district court denied his certification motion. Stone does not appeal that ruling.
See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN §§ 92.101-.109 (West 2014). A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of these statutory provisions is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, plus three times the portion of the security deposit wrongfully withheld, plus reasonable attorney's fees. Id. at § 92.109(a).
See TEX. BUS. AND COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.80 (West Supp. 2019).
On November 27, 2018, Mission Rock filed a Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment concerning Stone's statutory claims under the Texas Property Code as well as his claims for breach of contract and violations of the DTPA. Stone filed his opposition to the motion and Mission Rock subsequently filed its reply in which it set forth a new argument that Mission Rock, as an entity, did not exist at the time the Lease Contract was consummated.
On February 13, 2019, the trial court signed its Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Defendant's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. In that order, the trial court sustained Stone's objection to the new argument set forth in Mission Rock's reply. It also denied Mission Rock's Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment as to Stone's breach of contract claims and claims under the Texas Property Code; however, it granted the traditional motion as to Stone's DTPA claims. Furthermore, it granted Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment concerning Stone's breach of contract claims and his statutory claims under the Texas Property Code. Based on these rulings, the trial court entered a final judgment that Stone take nothing by any of the claims asserted against Mission Rock. Although it did not formally grant or deny Mission Rock's prayer for attorney's fees, it did implicitly deny the recovery of attorney's fees by either party when it stated that its order finally disposed of all claims and was appealable.
Stone does not appeal the granting of Mission Rock's traditional motion for summary judgment as to his DTPA claims or otherwise mention it in his brief. Rule 38.1(h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the body of Appellant's brief contain a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the arguments made in support of any relief requested. Failure to advance an argument, cite authority, make record references or otherwise brief an issue effects a waiver of that issue on appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Bever Props., L.L.C. v. Jerry Huffman Custom Builder, L.L.C., 355 S.W.3d 878, 885-86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citations omitted). Therefore, we will affirm the trial court's summary judgment regarding Stone's claims under the DTPA.
ANALYSIS
In reviewing a summary judgment, we apply well-established standards. We review the granting of a motion for summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Tex. 2013) (citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)). Further, "[i]n reviewing a summary judgment, we consider all grounds presented to the trial court and preserved on appeal in the interest of judicial economy." Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005). When the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling, a summary judgment will be affirmed if any of the grounds presented in the motion are meritorious. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013).
A party moving for a traditional summary judgment bears the burden of proving its entitlement thereto as a matter of law. Roskey v. Texas Health Facilities Com., 639 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex. 1982). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and judgment should be granted in favor of the movant as a matter of law. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc., 185 S.W.3d at 846. A fact issue exists if it is supported by more than a scintilla of probative evidence. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), (i). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence "rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119, 118 S. Ct. 1799, 140 L. Ed. 2d 939 (1998). In conducting our review, we are required to review the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, while resolving all doubts against the movant. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 823).
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is in essence a motion for a pretrial directed verdict; therefore, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. 2003). In a defensive no-evidence summary judgment motion, the movant contends there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the claims for which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). Once a sufficient no-evidence motion is filed, the burden shifts to the non-movant to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the elements of its cause of action upon which the movant contends there is no evidence. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). The trial court must deny the motion if the non-movant produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements. Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426. To satisfy its burden, the non-moving party is not required to marshal its proof because its response need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i), Notes and Comments (1997); Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426.
We also review a no-evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. A no-evidence challenge will be sustained when, as to an essential element of the nonmovant's claim challenged by the movant (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751.
By his Notice of Appeal and appellate briefing, Stone has indicated his desire to appeal only the order granting Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, we will affirm that portion of the trial court's order granting Mission Rock's traditional motion for summary judgment as to Stone's DTPA claims and we will only address the trial court's rulings on the no-evidence motion pertaining to his Texas Property Code claims and breach of contract claim.
ISSUES ONE, TWO, AND FOUR—CLAIMS UNDER TEXAS PROPERTY CODE
Through Stone's first, second, and fourth issues, for various reasons, he contends the trial court erred in granting Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment concerning his claims under the Texas Property Code. First, he argues his claim could not be dismissed because the burden of proof rested on Mission Rock. Second, he asserts his claim could not be dismissed because Mission Rock "failed to request such a dismissal in its [motion]." Lastly, Stone argues genuine issues of material fact and questions of law exist precluding summary judgment.
Neither the arguments presented nor the record support the second issue as stated. Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment clearly and specifically requests the trial court to enter a take-nothing judgment as to all of Stone's claims and the arguments presented contend Mission Rock only identified one essential element upon which there was no evidence, when the record shows otherwise.
Chapter 92, subchapter C, of the Texas Property Code governs the rights of residential landlords and tenants with respect to security deposits. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.101-.150. Chapter 92 requires a landlord to refund a tenant's security deposit "on or before the 30th day after the date the tenant surrenders the property." Id. at § 92.103(a). Further, before returning the deposit, a landlord may deduct from the deposit "damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease." Id. at § 92.104(a). If the landlord retains any portion of the security deposit, the landlord must timely give the tenant "a written description and itemized list of all deductions" together with a refund of any balance from the security deposit. Id. at § 92.104(c). However, a landlord is not required to give the tenant a description and itemized list of deductions if (1) the tenant owes rent when he surrenders possession of the premises and (2) there is no controversy concerning the amount of the rent owed. Id. Important to this dispute, a landlord may not retain any portion of the deposit to cover normal wear and tear. Id. at § 92.104(b).
Under section 92.109, there are two potential causes of action resulting from a landlord's improper retention of a security deposit. Frazin v. Sauty, No. 05-15-00879-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12007, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). First, under section 92.109, subsection (a), a landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of subchapter C is liable to a tenant for "an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit." Id. at § 92.109(a). Second, under subsection (b), if a landlord, in bad faith, fails to provide an accounting for any deduction, the landlord forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the security deposit or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises and is liable for the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees in a suit to recover the deposit. Id. at § 92.109(b). Furthermore, bad faith is presumed if the landlord either fails to return a security deposit or provide a written description and itemization of deductions within thirty days of the tenant's surrender of possession. Id. at § 92.109(d).
As to the matter presently before this court, the real question in controversy is whether Mission Rock is a "landlord," as defined by the Texas Property Code. Under section 92.001(2), a landlord is defined as "the owner, lessor, or sublessor of a dwelling." The statutory definition specifically excludes a "manager or agent of the landlord unless the manager or agent purports to be the owner, lessor, or sublessor in an oral or written lease." Id. at § 92.001(2) (emphasis added). Mission Rock contends that it is not a "landlord" because it merely manages the property for the true owner, Bradford Pointe Asset Management, LLC. Stone disagrees, contending Mission Rock is a landlord, by definition, because a representative of Mission Rock originally signed the lease and Mission Rock "purported to be the 'lessor'" in two of the addendums to the Lease Contract.
In response, Mission Rock points out that the only parties named in the lease are Jarett Stone, as resident, and Bradford Pointe Asset Management, LLC, as owner; and, there are only two electronic signatures to the agreement: Jarett Stone, as tenant or lessee, and Bobbie Petrosky Marquardt, over the line "Owner/Manager." Not only does the body of the Lease Contract not mention Mission Rock, it contains specific language stating, "[t]he terms 'we,' 'us,' and 'our' refer to the owner listed above [Bradford Pointe Asset Management, LLC] and not to property managers or anyone else." Additionally, Mission Rock notes that it is not the record title holder of the apartments. Finally, while Mission Rock does acknowledge references to "Mission Rock Residential" and "Mission Rock Residential, LLC" in the lease addendums relating to insurance and community rules, it further points out that these addendums are (1) irrelevant to Stone's claims and (2) they reference an entity separate and distinct from Mission Rock Residential Texas, LLC, Appellee in this matter.
While Stone asserts the trial court sustained his objection to this argument when it ordered that "the new argument set forth in [Mission Rock's] Reply in Support of Summary Judgment be sustained," the two arguments are distinguishable. Whether Mission Rock existed as an entity at the time the lease was signed is not the same argument as whether "Mission Rock Residential, LLC" is the same or a different entity from "Mission Rock Residential Texas, LLC." As noted previously, Mission Rock did file a verified denial alleging it was not liable in the capacity sued and stating that there was a defect in parties.
To counter Mission Rock's arguments, Stone points out that the Insurance Addendum and the Community Policies, Rules, and Release addendum both specifically list Mission Rock Residential, LLC as the "Lessor." Furthermore, both addendums were incorporated into the lease and expressly made a part of that agreement. In addition, the insurance addendum contains an express provision at the outset of the document stating, "[t]his Insurance Addendum, dated 03/29/2016 ('Addendum'), is attached to and becomes a part of the Residential Lease Agreement referenced in the table above, which shall be referred to as the 'Lease Agreement.' This Addendum is a legally binding part of the Lease Agreement."
The addendums were part of the lease agreement. See In re Bank One, N.A., 216 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (finding that documents incorporated by reference are part of the contract).
While these particular addendums are not the subject of Stone's suit against Mission Rock, we cannot say they are irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether Mission Rock "purported to be the lessor," making it a landlord under the statutory definition found in the Texas Property Code. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN § 92.001(2). Furthermore, even if Mission Rock Residential Texas, LLC is an entity separate and apart from Mission Rock Residential, LLC, such a misidentification would be of little significance when applying the statutory definition of a landlord. Accordingly, reviewing the Lease Contract as a whole, while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, for purposes of chapter 92, subchapter C, of the Texas Property Code, we will assume Mission Rock to be a landlord.
With that question settled, we turn now to Stone's specific contentions that the trial court erred by granting Mission Rock's no-evidence motion for summary judgment because (1) section 92.109(c) of the Texas Property Code prohibits his claims from being "dismissed" since Mission Rock had the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security deposit was reasonable; (2) Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of his claims because Mission Rock did not state the elements upon which it contends there was no evidence; and (3) genuine issues of material fact exist regarding both his statutory claims under the Texas Property Code and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
As we stated in footnote 7 supra, the arguments in support of Stone's second issue do not comport with the issue as stated. We have reframed the issue here to follow the arguments actually presented.
As stated before, for a tenant to prevail on a cause of action based on a landlord's bad faith retention of a security deposit pursuant to a violation of section 92.109(a), the tenant must prove: (1) a "landlord," (2) acted in bad faith, and (3) retained the security deposit in violation of chapter 92, subchapter C of the Texas Property Code. Frazin, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12007, at *13 (citing Pulley v. Milberger, 198 S.W.3d 418, 428 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)). Similarly, in order for a tenant to prevail on a cause of action based on a landlord's bad faith failure to account for a security deposit pursuant to a violation of section 92.109(b), the tenant must prove (1) a "landlord," (2) acted in bad faith, and (3) failed to provide the tenant with: (a) a written description of the damages, and (b) an itemized list of the deductions. Id.
As Stone has correctly argued, in an action brought by a tenant under subchapter C of chapter 92 of the Texas Property Code, the landlord has the burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security deposit was reasonable. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.109(c). Based on this burden-shifting statute, Stone contends his statutory claims under section 92.109 are immune from a no-evidence motion for summary judgment since that type of summary judgment is limited to situations where there is no evidence relating to "one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (emphasis added). Because the burden was on Mission Rock to show that its retention of Stone's security deposit was reasonable, Stone contends a no-evidence motion for summary judgment would improperly invert that burden back on him. Where this argument fails is in the assumption that the reasonableness of the retention was ever an essential element attacked by Mission Rock. Mission Rock's no-evidence motion for summary judgment specifically identifies three elements upon which it contended there was no evidence: (1) that Mission Rock was an "owner, lessor, or sublessor" of the apartment; (2) that Mission Rock "purport[ed] to be the owner, lessor, or sublessor [of the apartment] in an oral or written lease," and (3) that Mission Rock acted in bad faith. Since we have already determined that there was sufficient evidence to defeat Mission Rock's no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the basis of the first two of these claims, we will only address its last no-evidence claim.
Stone contends there is sufficient evidence to raise a fact question as to whether Mission Rock acted in bad faith because a "landlord who fails either to return a security deposit or to provide a written description and itemization of deductions on or before the 30th day after the date the tenant surrenders possession is presumed to have acted in bad faith." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.109(d); Hardy v. 11702 Mem'l, Ltd., 176 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citation omitted) (finding a prima facie case of bad faith is established by showing that the landlord failed to refund the deposit or provide an itemized list of deductions within thirty days). The record in this case shows, and Stone admits, he received a Move-Out Statement within thirty days of vacating the apartment and that the statement included the following table:
| Date | Description | Charge | Payment | Balance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Balance as of 7/01/2017 | 0.00 | |||
| 07/01/2017 | Administrative Fee-Ins (07/2017) | 3.00 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| 07/01/2017 | Liability Only Insur (07/2017) | 7.00 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| 07/01/2017 | Rent (07/2017) | 864.00 | 0.00 | 874.00 |
| 07/01/2017 | Reimbursed Pest Control (07/2017) | 2.00 | 0.00 | 876.00 |
| 07/01/2017 | Reimbursed Trash (07/2017) | 8.00 | 0.00 | 884.00 |
| 07/01/2017 | Gas - 04/25/17-05/25/17 | 13.69 | 0.00 | 897.69 |
| 07/01/2017 | Sewer - 04/25/17-05/25/17 | 27.24 | 0.00 | 924.93 |
| 07/01/2017 | Water - 04/25/17-05/25/17 | 16.68 | 0.00 | 941.61 |
| 07/01/2017 | Trash Admin Fee - 07/01/17-07/31/17 | 3.20 | 0.00 | 944.81 |
| 07/02/2017 | chk# PSID119010065 Web PSID 119010065 - ACH | 0.00 | 132.87 | 811.94 |
| 07/04/2017 | Late Fees | 75.00 | 0.00 | 886.94 |
| 07/13/2017 | Reverse charge. System error. | -75.00 | 0.00 | 811.94 |
| 07/13/2017 | :Security Deposit credit | -150.00 | 0.00 | 661.94 |
| 07/13/2017 | Rent (07/2017) Credit 29 days | -808.26 | 0,00 | (146.32) |
| 07/13/2017 | Reimbursed Pest Control (07/2017) Credit 29 days | -1.87 | 0.00 | (148.19) |
| 07/13/2017 | Reimbursed Trash (07/2017) Credit 29 days | -7.48 | 0.00 | (155.67) |
| 07/13/2017 | Administrative Fee-Ins (07/2017) Credit 29 days | -2.81 | 0.00 | (158.48) |
| 07/13/2017 | Liability Only Insur (07/2017) Credit 29 days | -6.55 | 0.00 | (165.03) |
| 07/13/2017 | Cleaning-Apt | 120.00 | 0.00 | (45.03) |
| 07/13/2017 | Cleaning-Carpet | 75.78 | 0.00 | 30.75 |
| 07/13/2017 | DamagesReplacement-1 drip pan,1 light bulb | 8.00 | 0.00 | 38.75 |
| 07/13/2017 | Damages-prep walls (stains/marks) | 50.00 | 0.00 | 88.75 |
| 07/13/2017 | Final Water 5/26/17-7/2/17 | 20.50 | 0.00 | 109.25 |
| 07/13/2017 | Final Sewer 5/26/17-7/2/17 | 42.36 | 0.00 | 151.61 |
| 07/13/2017 | Final Gas 5/26/17-7/2/17 | 9.17 | 0.00 | 160.78 |
| 07/13/2017 | Rent-MtM rate difference | 132.87 | 0.00 | 293.65 |
As can be seen from this table, the statement includes both a chronological itemization of the amounts allegedly owed by Stone and a brief description for each item. Stone contends this statement does not comply with the requirements of section 92.109(d) because it includes items which are not properly chargeable to him under the terms of the lease. Specifically, Stone contends Mission Rock improperly included charges for "Cleaning-Apt." ($120.00) and "Cleaning-Carpet" ($75.78) because those expenses were for normal wear and tear, items which were not properly chargeable to him under the terms of the lease. In response, Mission Rock contends that even if the contested charges were not properly chargeable to Stone, he was still liable for various other charges, not contested by Stone, that exceeded the $150.00 security deposit. Therefore, because the record shows that a written description and itemization of deductions was provided to Stone on or before the 30th day after the date he surrendered possession of the premises and the uncontested amount of those deductions exceeded the amount of the security deposit, no presumption of bad faith ever arose. Accordingly, because Stone did not bring forth any other evidence showing Mission Rock acted in bad faith, the trial court did not err in granting Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Stone's claims under the Texas Property Code.
Finally, we note also that Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment does include a prayer that asks the court to grant it summary judgment on all of Stone's claims against it, render judgment that Stone take nothing, enter a final and appealable order, and requests such other and further relief to which Mission Rock was entitled. As such, we cannot agree with Stone's assertion that Mission Rock did not request the relief the trial court granted, i.e., the granting of its no-evidence motion regarding Stone's claims under the Texas Property Code. Accordingly, we overrule Stone's first, second, and fourth issues.
ISSUE THREE—BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
Via Stone's third issue, he complains the trial court erred in granting Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment concerning his breach of contract claim because genuine issues of material fact and questions of law exist precluding summary judgment. Mission Rock argues Stone's breach of contract claim fails, as a matter of law, because Mission Rock is not the owner of the apartment and was not a party to the agreement and thus, there is no privity between Mission Rock and Stone.
To prevail on his breach of contract claim, Stone was required to show that (1) a valid contract existed between the parties; (2) Stone tendered performance or was excused from doing so; (3) Mission Rock breached a duty under the contract; and (4) Stone sustained damages as a result. Winchek v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 232 S.W.3d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citation omitted).
While we have already determined that Mission Rock purported to be the "lessor" and thus was a "landlord" of the property for purposes of subchapter C of chapter 92 of the Texas Property Code, that finding is of little consequence when it comes to Stone's non-statutory breach of contract claim. A statutory definition does not make Mission Rock a party to the lease contract. At best, while it may be some evidence of an agency relationship, Stone has failed to allege any theory that would impose contractual liability on Mission Rock. As such, there is no evidence that a valid contract existed between the parties.
Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that Mission Rock breached the Lease Contract "by charging cleaning bills [for] normal wear and tear" or that Stone was damaged "in the amount of the security deposit withheld" as Stone contends. As set forth in our analysis of Stone's first, second, and fourth issues, the record shows Stone's security deposit was completely depleted by charges he did not contest and the record does not contain any other evidence showing how he was damaged by the withholding of his deposit. Consequently, there is no evidence Mission Rock breached a contractual duty by retaining the $150.00 deposit or that Stone suffered any damages as a result of an alleged breach. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting Mission Rock's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment as to Stone's breach of contract claim. Accordingly, we resolve Stone's third issue against him.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Stone's issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice