Opinion
IP 00-1228-C-T/G
July 26, 2001
Entry Reviewing the Commissioner's Decision
Though this Entry is a matter of public record and is being made available to the public on the court's web site, it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. The reason for this caveat is to avoid adding to the research burden faced by litigants and courts. Under the law of the case doctrine, the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court. See, e.g., Tr. of Pension, Welfare, Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 468 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). However, a district judge's decision has no precedential authority and, therefore, is not binding on other courts, on other judges in this district, or even on other cases before the same judge. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998) ("a district court's decision does not have precedential authority"); Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) ("district court opinions are of little or no authoritative value"); United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A single district court decision . . . has little precedential effect. It is not binding on the circuit, or even on other district judges in the same district."). Consequently, though this Entry correctly disposes of the legal issues addressed, this court does not consider the discussion to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication of the Entry or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
Plaintiff, Holly A. Stone, seeks review of the Commissioner's decision denying her application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by (1) finding that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment, (2) finding that Plaintiff's asthma and obesity did not meet the Listing of Impairments ("the Listing") requirements, (3) finding that Plaintiff could sustain work, (4) improperly evaluating medical evidence and (5) improperly evaluating Plaintiff's credibility. Having reviewed the ALJ's decision, the record and the parties' briefs, the court decides as follows.
I. Background
On November 13, 1996, Plaintiff applied for a period of disability and DIB, alleging that she had been disabled since April 6, 1995. (R. at 118.) On January 10, 1997, her claim was denied by the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). (R. at 90.) On February 14, 1997, Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration. (R. at 94.) On April 1, 1997, her claim was again denied by the SSA. (R. at 96.) On May 9, 1997, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ (R. at 100), which was held on January 13, 1998 (R. at 56-87). On October 27, 1998, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 53K.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment, that Plaintiff's asthma and obesity were severe but did not meet the Listing requirements and that Plaintiff could sustain work. (R. at 53J-53K.) On December 30, 1998, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council ("AC"). (R. at 11.) On June 29, 2000, the AC denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision that of the Commissioner. (R. at 8.)
Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled in part due to her asthma, which results in shortness of breath, coughing, fatigue, hoarseness, ear infections, sinus problems and dizziness. (R. at 125, 133, 228.) Plaintiff claims that her asthma prevents her from being able to sustain a job due to environmental limitations (R. at 229) and problems with absenteeism (R. at 133, 229). She maintains that she cannot be around others due to possibility of infection (R. at 125, 133, 229), that her medications cause her to be drowsy (R. at 133, 229) and that she cannot perform heavy lifting (R. at 133). Plaintiff further alleges that she suffers from obesity (R. at 125, 134, 228), abdominal problems (R. at 897), depression (R. at 229) and a learning disability (R. at 125, 133, 229).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's asthma and obesity qualified as severe impairments, but that neither Plaintiff's asthma nor her obesity met the Listing requirements for a conclusively disabling impairment. (R. at 53F-53H.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff was restricted to work which does not involve exposure to respiratory irritants or heavy lifting due to her asthma and obesity. (R. at 53J.) Due to these restrictions, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be unable to perform her past relevant work. (R. at 53J.) However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not precluded from all work. (R. at 53K.) Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment, and that Plaintiff was not entirely credible as to her physical and mental problems. (R. at 53J.)
In making these findings, the ALJ relied on evidence from various examiners and experts. In determining that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment, the ALJ considered evidence from Dr. Modlik, a psychologist who examined Plaintiff on April 16, 1998. (R. at 53F.) Dr. Modlik found that Plaintiff intentionally misrepresented herself as having severe psychiatric problems in order to avoid work. (R. at 1058, 1060, 1061.)
In finding that Plaintiff's asthma did not meet the Listing requirements, the ALJ relied on medical evidence of Plaintiff's various test results. (R. at 53G-53H.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff's pulmonary function test results fell far below the level required by the Listing. (R. at 53H.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was frequently found to be in stable condition by medical examiners (R. at 53H), that she rarely exhibited rales, rhonchi or wheezing (R. at 53G, 53H) and that her chest x-rays were generally clear (R. at 53G, 53H). In addition, the ALJ relied on the medical record to determine that although Plaintiff meets the weight requirements for obesity, she does not satisfy any of the additional physical conditions required by the Listing, including a history of pain or limitation in the joints or back, hypertension, congestive heart failure, chronic venous insufficiency or respiratory disease. (R. at 53F.)
In determining that Plaintiff could sustain a job, the ALJ relied on the findings of medical examiners (R. at 53H) and the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") (R. at 531-53J). Dr. Dale, Plaintiff's regular pulmonary specialist, and Dr. Henson, Plaintiff's regular otolaryngologist, each concluded that Plaintiff would not be prevented from sustaining work provided her asthma was controlled and she was not exposed to respiratory irritants. (R. at 832-33, 834.) The VE testified that someone with Plaintiff's work experience who is restricted to work which does not involve heavy lifting or exposure to respiratory irritants could work as a cashier or waitress, of which there are approximately 42,000 and 56,000 positions in Illinois, respectively. (R. at 78-79.)
The VE testified that these Illinois statistics are comparable to Indiana statistics, at least proportionate to population. (R. at 78-79.)
Finally, in evaluating Plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ again relied on the findings of Dr. Modlik, who diagnosed Plaintiff with malingering, defined as "feigning illness or disability to escape work, excite sympathy, or gain compensation." (R. at 53F.) Moreover, the ALJ noted that Dr. Modlik's diagnosis of malingering is supported by the findings of other doctors. (R. at 53G, 53H, 53I.)
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1057 (26th ed. 1995).
II. Legal Standards
A claimant must have a disability in order to qualify for a period of disability or DIB. A disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Furthermore, "[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Secretary of Health and Human Services created a five-step test to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). The first and fourth steps — whether the claimant is employed and whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work-are not disputed by the parties. However, the parties are in dispute regarding the second, third and fifth steps-whether the claimant's impairments are severe, whether the claimant's impairments meet the Listing requirements for conclusively disabling impairments and whether the claimant's impairments restrict her residual functioning capacity such that she can no longer perform any work. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff throughout the first four steps of the test, and shifts to the defendant at the fifth step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n. 5.
An ALJ's decision will be affirmed provided it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court has a limited role in reviewing the ALJ's decision because a court "cannot substitute [its] own judgment for that of the SSA by reevaluating the facts, or reweighing the evidence to decide whether a claimant is in fact disabled." Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Thus, the court must only determine whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, not whether Plaintiff is disabled. See id. at 306. Furthermore, credibility judgments made by the ALJ will not be disturbed unless patently wrong. See id. at 308 (citation omitted).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff has five bases for disagreeing with the ALJ's opinion. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment. In particular, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly ignored evidence of Plaintiff's somatization disorder. Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff's obesity and asthma did not meet the Listing requirements for disability status. Third, Plaintiff argues that even if her disabilities do not meet the Listing requirements, the ALJ erred in finding that she was able to sustain work. To be precise, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider all of Plaintiff's impairments when determining Plaintiff's residual functioning capacity. Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated evidence provided by physicians. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored a statement supporting Plaintiff's claim of problems with absenteeism. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misjudged Plaintiff's credibility. None of these arguments is persuasive.
A. ALJ's Finding Regarding Alleged Mental Impairment
Plaintiff argues that she has a severe mental impairment and is therefore disabled. Plaintiff maintains that although Dr. Modlik offered diagnoses of both malingering and somatization, the ALJ improperly ignored the somatization diagnosis.
A severe impairment is defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]" 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). In his examination of Plaintiff on April 16, 1998, Dr. Modlik noted that "[Plaintiff's] performance in this current examination can only be consistent with malingering" and that Plaintiff's somatization was still developing. (R. at 1061.) The diagnosis of malingering was based on the exam that Dr. Modlik administered to Plaintiff, whereas the somatization diagnosis appears to have been based on Dr. Modlik's reading of Plaintiff's medical history. (R. at 1061.) The ALJ may have reasonably placed more weight on the diagnosis based on Dr. Modlik's own examination than on the diagnosis based on the secondhand medical history evidence. Indeed, the ALJ indicated that he found Dr. Modlik's diagnosis of malingering persuasive and thus put much weight on this finding. (R. at 53F, 53I.) The court is not in the position of reweighing the evidence. See Diaz, 55 F.3d at 305 (citations omitted). Furthermore, although an ALJ is required to articulate reasons for accepting or rejecting entire lines of evidence, Dr. Modlik's entire line of evidence was not rejected. See Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). In addition, the ALJ noted that the findings of other doctors support the conclusion that Plaintiff was exaggerating, if not faking, her symptoms. (R. at 53G, 53H, 53I.) Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment.
B. ALJ's Evaluation of Plaintiff's Asthma and Obesity
Next, Plaintiff argues that she meets the Listing requirements for asthma and obesity, and that she is therefore disabled. Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff has asthma attacks of the requisite frequency, Plaintiff does not satisfy the additional requirement of test results between attacks documenting baseline airflow obstruction. Defendant further argues that although Plaintiff meets the weight requirement for obesity, Plaintiff does not satisfy any of the other additional physical conditions required by the Listing, including a history of pain or limitation in the joints or back, hypertension, congestive heart failure, chronic venous insufficiency or respiratory disease.
To qualify as having disabling asthma, a claimant must have "[a]ttacks . . . in spite of prescribed treatment and requiring physician intervention, occurring at least once every 2 months or at least six times a year. Each in-patient hospitalization for longer than 24 hours for control of asthma counts as two attacks, and an evaluation period of at least 12 consecutive months must be used to determine the frequency of attacks." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 3.03(B). Even if Plaintiff satisfies these frequency requirements, she must also fulfill certain testing requirements to be found disabled. "For asthma, the medical evidence should include spirometric results obtained between attacks that document the presence of baseline airflow obstruction." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 3.00(C). Spirometric tests measure pulmonary function in terms of forced expiratory volume ("FEV"). All of Plaintiff's FEV test results were normal. (R. at 427, 485, 816, 818, 858.) Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's asthma did not meet the Listing requirements.
Plaintiff had FEV test results of 2.73 liters in March 1995 (R. at 485), 2.88 liters in April 1995 (R. at 427), 2.94 liters in November 1995 (R. at 816, 818) and 2.60 liters in March 1996 (R. at 858), which are all considered normal. In addition, the ALJ noted a result of 2.95 liters in February 1995, which is also normal. (R. at 53H.)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet the Listing requirements for obesity under section 9.09, which was the applicable standard at the time of his decision. That section, however, was subsequently deleted by the SSA effective October 25, 1999. The parties in this case, by not addressing the fact that section 9.09 has been deleted, implicitly argue that this old standard should still apply. However, as discussed below, courts that have addressed this issue head on have generally found that the new standard should apply to claims pending on October 25, 1999. In any event, the court need not make a decision as to that issue because Plaintiff fails to meet either standard.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff meets the weight requirements for obesity under the old version of the Listing. However, the Listing also previously required one or more of the following for obesity to be considered disabling: a history of pain or limitation in the joints or back, hypertension, congestive heart failure, chronic venous insufficiency or respiratory disease. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 9.09(A)-(E) (1999). Plaintiff has not alleged a history of pain or limitation in her joints or back, hypertension, congestive heart failure or chronic venous insufficiency. Plaintiff's alleged symptoms come closest to meeting the respiratory disease condition. To meet this condition, Plaintiff needs to show "[r]espiratory disease with total forced vital capacity equal to or less than 2.0 [liters] [.]" 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 9.09(E) (1999). Again, however, as noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff's pulmonary function tests do not meet the required level because Plaintiff's FEV results were always greater than 2.0 liters. (R. at 427, 485, 816, 818, 858.) Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's obesity did not meet the old Listing requirements.
Under the revised rules, the outcome is the same. In a May 15, 2000, Social Security Ruling issued to provide guidance on how to evaluate obesity-related disability claims, the SSA stated:
The final rules that deleted the listing became effective on October 25, 1999. The final rules deleting listing 9.09 apply to claims that were filed before October 25, 1999, and that were awaiting an initial determination or that were pending appeal at any level of the administrative review process or that had been appealed to court. The change affected the entire claim, including the period before October 25, 1999. This is our usual policy with respect to any change in our listings.
Social Security Ruling 00-3p, 65 Fed. Reg. 31039, 31042, 2000 WL 574779 (May 15, 2000). Many courts addressing this issue have held that the new rule applies to cases pending on October 25, 1999. See Castrejon v. Apfel, 131 F. Supp.2d 1053, 1056-57 (E.D.Wis. 2001) (holding that the revised rules should apply to a case that was pending review by the AC on October 25, 1999); Fulbright v. Apfel, 114 F. Supp.2d 465, 476 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (holding that the revised rules applied to a case that was pending review by the AC on October 25, 1999); Wooten v. Apfel, 108 F. Supp.2d 921, 924 (E.D.Tenn. 2000) ("The new rules have prospective effect and, therefore, apply to cases pending at the time the rules took effect in October, 1999[.]" (citation omitted)); Rodriguez v. Massanari, No. Civ.A. 500CV274C, 2001 WL 406226, at *3 (N.D.Tex. Apr. 17, 2001) (holding that the revised rules applied to a case that was pending review by the AC on October 25, 1999); Allen v. Apfel, No. Civ.A. 00-0705, 2001 WL 253120, at *2 (E.D.La. Mar. 14, 2001) (holding that the use of the revised rules was proper in a case on appeal to the AC on October 25, 1999). Furthermore, although some courts have held that section 9.09 should still apply to cases pending on October 25, 1999, this conclusion has been challenged as flawed. See Havens v. Massanari, No. 99-1008-MLB, 2001 WL 721661, at *1 n. 3 (D.Kan. May 9, 2001) (noting that some cases holding that section 9.09 still applies did not consider Social Security Ruling 00-3p, which states that the revised rule should apply) (citing Nash v. Apfel, No. 99-7109, 2000 WL 710491, at *2 (10th Cir. June 1, 2000); Rudolph v. Apfel, No. 00-4093-DES, 2000 WL 1916317, at *6-7 (D.Kan. Dec. 29, 2000)).
The Tenth Circuit in Nash and the District of Kansas in Rudolph both relied on their respective interpretations of the Social Security rule issued on August 24, 1999, in determining that section 9.09 applied to cases pending on October 25, 1999. However, that rule was clarified by Social Security Ruling 00-3p issued on May 15, 2000. In the May 15 ruling, the SSA indicated that the revised listings should apply to cases pending appeal to a federal court on October 25, 1999.
As stated above, however, regardless of which standard applies, Plaintiff's obesity fails to qualify as disabling. Plaintiff does not fulfill the requirements for a disability under the revised rules, largely due to the fact that the revised rules are more difficult to satisfy. In explaining why it deleted section 9.09, the SSA stated:
[W]e deleted listing 9.09 because our experience adjudicating cases under this listing indicated that the criteria in the listing were not appropriate indicators of listing-level severity. In our experience, the criteria in listing 9.09 did not represent a degree of functional limitation that would prevent an individual from engaging in any gainful activity. However, even though we deleted listing 9.09, we made some changes to the listings to ensure that obesity is still addressed in our listings. In the final rule, we added paragraphs to the prefaces of the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular body system listings that provide guidance about the potential effects obesity has in causing or contributing to impairments in those body systems. See listings sections 1.00F, 3.00I, and 4.00F.
65 Fed. Reg. at 31039. In other words, according to the SSA, section 9.09 was too broad and resulted in determinations of disability in claimants who were not truly disabled due to obesity. However, Plaintiff failed to show disabling obesity even under the overly broad earlier standard. Therefore, Plaintiff would be unlikely to meet the new tougher standard for obesity and thus, there is no need for a remand on this issue.
More specifically, revised Listing section 3.00(I), which incorporates obesity into respiratory impairments, states:
Obesity is a medically determinable impairment that is often associated with disturbance of the respiratory system, and disturbance of this system can be a major cause of disability in individuals with obesity. The combined effects of obesity with respiratory impairments can be greater than the effects of each of the impairments considered separately. Therefore, when determining whether an individual with obesity has a listing-level impairment or combination of impairments, and when assessing a claim at other steps of the sequential evaluation process, including when assessing an individual's residual functional capacity, adjudicators must consider any additional and cumulative effects of obesity.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 3.00(I); see also 65 Fed. Reg. at 31041 ("obesity may increase the severity of coexisting or related impairments to the extent that the combination of impairments meets the requirements of a listing. This is especially true of . . . respiratory . . . impairments."). Plaintiff has not established that her obesity exacerbates her asthma and thus, Plaintiff does not qualify as disabled under the revised rule. Again, Plaintiff's FEV test results were all considered normal. (R. at 427, 485, 816, 818, 858.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's obesity had little or no effect on her asthma. Therefore, regardless of which version of the Listing requirements is applied, Plaintiff's obesity does not meet the Listing requirements.
C. ALJ's Finding that Plaintiff Could Sustain Work
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that she could sustain work. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider all of Plaintiff's alleged impairments. However, the ALJ took Plaintiff's asthma and obesity into account when limiting her to work which does not involve heavy lifting or exposure to respiratory irritants. (R. at 53I.) The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff's other alleged impairments, including a learning disability, depression and abdominal pain. (R. at 53E-53F.) After considering the medical record, the ALJ reasonably concluded that these claims had little support.
The ALJ also relied on testimony from the VE in concluding that Plaintiff could sustain a job. The VE testified that someone with Plaintiff's work experience and the limitations found by the ALJ would be able to perform a cashier or waitress job. (R. at 78-79.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored evidence alleging that Plaintiff was unable to work around people due to her susceptibility to infection. However, neither Dr. Dale nor Dr. Henson found such a limitation when noting Plaintiff's work limitations. (R. at 832-33, 834.) Even if Plaintiff were found to require such a restriction, the VE testified that someone with Plaintiff's work experience, the restrictions found by the ALJ and this additional restriction would still be able to work as an assembler or non-public cashier, of which there are approximately 10,000 and 20,000 positions, respectively. (R. at 79-83.) Therefore, there is substantial evidence that Plaintiff could sustain work.
These statistics are also apparently from Illinois. However, the VE testified that these statistics are comparable to Indiana statistics, at least proportionate to population. (R. at 78-79.)
D. ALJ's Evaluation of Physicians' Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the treating physicians' opinions by ignoring evidence that did not support the ALJ's conclusion. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly ignored a statement by Dr. Dale that Plaintiff's attendance may be spotty if her asthma was active when determining that Plaintiff could sustain work. However, Dr. Dale did not note how often attendance problems would occur and how, if at all, this would affect Plaintiff's ability to sustain work. (R. at 832-33.) Dr. Dale also found that Plaintiff would have no problem working on an ongoing basis provided her asthma was controlled. (R. at 832.) Moreover, although an ALJ may not reject an entire line of evidence, the ALJ here did not reject Dr. Dale's entire line of evidence.
Although the ALJ did not specifically address Dr. Dale's finding that Plaintiff's attendance might be spotty if her asthma was active, the ALJ did not reject other statements of Dr. Dale, including his findings that Plaintiff could sit, stand, walk, lift and carry without difficulty, that Plaintiff would have trouble with exposure to respiratory irritants and that Plaintiff's medications did not produce any side effects that would prevent Plaintiff from working. (R. at 53H, 53I.)
Furthermore, the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff could sustain work is supported by the findings of Dr. Henson. Dr. Henson concluded that Plaintiff's workday length would not be affected by her asthma and voiced no opinion as to whether Plaintiff would have a problem with absenteeism. (R. at 834.) Therefore, the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence was not clearly improper.
E. ALJ's Evaluation of Plaintiff's Credibility
Last, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her credibility. An ALJ's credibility determination will not be disturbed unless patently wrong. See Diaz, 55 F.3d at 308 (citation omitted). The ALJ noted that Dr. Modlik found Plaintiff to be fabricating and misrepresenting her symptoms. (R. at 53F, 53I.) Dr. Modlik noted that doctors could not find evidence of many of Plaintiff's complaints. (R. at 1059-60.) Indeed, he diagnosed malingering, the principal feature of which is lying. (R. at 1058, 1061-62.) Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff was not entirely credible with regard to her physical and mental problems.
IV. Conclusion
There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff is not severely mentally impaired. Plaintiff fails to meet the black-letter requirements for asthma and obesity under either the new or old version of the Listing. There is substantial evidence to support that Plaintiff is able to sustain work. The ALJ's evaluation of medical evidence was not improper and there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was not entirely credible.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.