Opinion
CV186013757S
10-30-2018
Scott STOLL et al. v. Edmund ARIORI
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Harmon, Judge
FACTS
On June 12, 2018, the plaintiffs, Scott Stoll and Linda Streett, filed a six-count complaint against the defendant, Edmond Ariori, for negligence, statutory recklessness, and common-law recklessness. Stoll and Streett seek damages including, but not limited to, double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, as well as common-law punitive damages. Counts one through three of the complaint all allege the following facts. On June 14, 2016, Stoll was operating a vehicle that was travelling in a northerly direction on the Wilbur Cross Parkway, approximately one-tenth of a mile prior to exit 59, in New Haven, Connecticut. Ariori drove his vehicle directly behind Stoll. Ariori suddenly, and without warning, violently collided with the rear-end of Stoll’s vehicle, directly and proximately causing Stoll’s injuries and losses. Counts four through six of the complaint all allege that Streett was a passenger in Stoll’s car at the time of the accident, and Ariori’s actions directly and proximately caused Streett’s injuries and losses.
Stoll brings claims for negligence, statutory recklessness, and common-law recklessness in counts one, two, and three, respectively, and Streett brings claims for negligence, statutory recklessness, and common-law recklessness in counts four, five, and six respectively.
In counts one and four of the complaint, Stoll and Streett, respectively, allege that Ariori was negligent and careless for reasons that include, but are not limited to, his violations of General Statutes § § 14-218a, 14-222, and/or 14-240. In counts two and five of the complaint, Stoll and Street, respectively, allege that Ariori deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the safety of others, violated § 14-295 by violating § § 14-218a and/or 14-222. They further allege that the violations of § § 14-218a and 14-222 were substantial factors in causing their respective injuries and losses, and that their injuries and damages were proximately caused by Ariori’s statutory recklessness.
Finally, in counts three and six of the complaint, Stoll and Streett, respectively, allege that Ariori "knew that he was driving in an area frequently traveled" and, regardless, "continued to operate his vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable having due regard to the width, traffic and use of the public highway under the circumstances then and there existing, when under the circumstances it was obvious that such action posed a great risk of harm to other persons using the highway in front of his vehicle," and/or "operated his vehicle recklessly, when under the circumstances it was obvious that such action posed a great risk of harm to other persons using the highway in front of his vehicle." They further allege that Ariori’s "wanton and reckless indifference to the rights and safety of others was a substantial factor in causing" each of their injuries and losses, which were proximately caused by Ariori’s common-law recklessness. Stoll and Street seek, inter alia, double or treble damages pursuant to § 14-295 and common-law punitive damages.
On June 21, 2018, Ariori filed a motion to strike, and a memorandum of law in support of this motion, alleging that counts two, three, five, and six of the plaintiff’s complaint, and paragraphs two and three of the prayer for relief, on the ground that these counts and portions of the prayer for relief have been insufficiently pleaded. On July 6, 2018, Stoll and Streett filed an objection to the motion to strike and a memorandum in opposition of said motion. The matter was taken on the papers on July 23, 2018.
Ariori does not specifically challenge the sufficiency of the portions of the prayer for relief in the motion to strike itself, instead raising the issue in the memorandum of law in support, but said failure may be waived by the party opposing the motion. "Practice Book § [10-39(b) ], requires that a motion to strike raising a claim of insufficiency ‘shall separately set forth each such claim of insufficiency and shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency.’ Motions to strike that do not specify the grounds of insufficiency are fatally defective and, absent a waiver by the party opposing the motion, should not be granted ... Practice Book § [10-39(c) ], which requires a motion to strike to be accompanied by an appropriate memorandum of law citing the legal authorities upon which the motion relies, does not dispense with the requirement of [Practice Book § 10-39(b) ] that the reasons for the claimed pleading deficiency be specified in the motion itself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 102 Conn.App. 857, 861, 927 A.2d 343 (2007). If a party does not object, the motion to strike will be considered regardless of the form. Id. ; see also Himmelstein v. Windsor, 116 Conn.App. 28, 35, 974 A.2d 820 (2009), aff’d, 304 Conn . 298, 39 A.3d 1065 (2012) ("[m]otions to strike that do not specify the grounds of insufficiency are fatally defective and, absent a waiver by the party opposing the motion, should not be granted" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The court will consider the motion to strike as to the prayer for relief.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "The modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ... Although essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication ... the complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceed ... As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, [the court] will not conclude that the complaint is insufficient ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.D.C. Enterprises, Inc. v. Sarjac Partners, LLC, 164 Conn.App. 508, 512-13, 137 A.3d 894, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 913, 136 A.3d 1274 (2016). "[The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016).
Ariori argues that counts two, three, five and six of the complaint, and paragraphs two and three of the prayer for relief, should be stricken on the ground that Stoll’s and Streett’s allegations insufficiently plead causes of action for statutory and common-law recklessness because these counts do not allege facts that differ from those contained in counts one and four, sounding in negligence. In response, Stoll and Streett argue that counts two and five are legally sufficient as pleaded because the majority view of the Connecticut Superior Court does not require the addition of separate factual allegations to plead statutory recklessness. Stoll and Streett also argue that counts three and six are legally sufficient as pleaded because a count sounding in common-law recklessness can include the factual allegations of a count sounding in negligence. Stoll and Streett further contend that each of these counts actually allege facts that support more than negligence because they each allege, in detail, conduct that could be considered reckless, as well as the reasons the conduct being alleged is in reckless disregard for the safety of others.
A. COMMON-LAW RECKLESSNESS
"Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater ... than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 832, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). "The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 542, A.2d 711 (1988). The defendant must have allegedly acted "knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor’s conduct not only create[d] an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involve[d] a high degree of probability that substantial harm [would] result to him." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 84, 14 A.2d 713 (1940).
"Although there is a difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted." Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 343, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). Where a plaintiff alleges negligence and recklessness in a single complaint, the "plaintiff cannot transform a negligence count into a count for wilful and wanton misconduct merely by appending a string of adjectives to allegations that clearly sound in negligence." Brown v. Branford, 12 Conn.App. 106, 110, 529 A.2d 743 (1987). Furthermore, "[s]imply using the word ‘reckless’ or ‘recklessness’ is not enough. A specific allegation setting out the conduct that is claimed to be reckless or wanton must be made." Dumond v: Denehy, 145 Conn. 88, 91, 139 A.2d 58 (1958). Thus, the plaintiff "must allege facts demonstrating both egregious conduct and the requisite state of mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Walters v. Tanner, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 549835 (November 15, 1999, Martin, J.) In Walters, the court granted a motion to strike where the plaintiff alleged injuries due to negligence in one count and alleged common-law recklessness in a separate count. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated § 14-240, § 14-218a, and § 14-222. Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to raise a legally sufficient claim for common-law recklessness where the "only substantive difference" between the counts was the "additional alleged violation of § 14-222" in the recklessness count; there were "no additional facts alleged" in the recklessness count "purporting to show exactly how the defendant was reckless"; and the facts as alleged did not "meet the level of egregiousness or wantonness necessary to support a recklessness claim." Id. ; but see Syzmanski v. Eveillard, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-15-6025348-S (April 20, 2016, Bates, J.) (denying motion to strike because plaintiffs can rely on elements supporting negligence counts in recklessness counts, so long as elements "would independently support a finding of recklessness"); see also Harmon v. Burchard, Superior Court, district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-13-6019699-S (March 11, 2014, Adams, J.T.R.) ("In Connecticut, [a] plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action for negligence, statutory recklessness and common-law recklessness simultaneously" [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
In the present case, Stoll and Streett allege in counts three and six that Ariori "knew" he was driving in an area "frequently traveled by other vehicles" but, in "spite of that knowledge," either continued to operate his motor vehicle at unreasonable speeds "having due regard to the width, traffic and use of the public highway under the circumstances then and there existing, when under the circumstances it was obvious that such action posed a great risk of harm to other persons using the highway in front of his vehicle" and/or "operated his vehicle recklessly, when under the circumstances it was obvious that such action posed a great risk of harm to other persons using the highway in front of his vehicle." Moreover, they allege that his "wanton and reckless indifference to the rights and safety of others was a substantial factor in causing [their] injuries." Thus, they allege that Ariori drove at an excessive speed in a high-traffic area with conscious disregard of substantial risks, and other trial courts have previously found that such allegations are sufficient to plead common-law recklessness. See Smith v. Verma, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-13-6015809-S (December 6, 2013, Cole-Chu, J.) (denying motion to strike common-law recklessness count because complaint alleged that defendant "deliberately, or with conscious disregard for the safety of the plaintiff, drove his vehicle at a high rate of speed on a heavily traveled highway with conscious disregard for the safety of the plaintiff and other motorists" and that defendant "drove into the plaintiff’s vehicle with conscious disregard for the safety of the plaintiff," which was held to be legally sufficient); Alterio v. Diaz, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-00-0375823-S (July 13, 2001, Skolnick, J.) (denying motion to strike common-law recklessness count because complaint alleged that defendant "was traveling at an excessive rate of speed, despite his knowledge of heavy traffic on the road, that it was during the morning commute, the speed of other vehicles and the presence of a school bus, which would make frequent stops," which was held to be legally sufficient).
Ariori’s reliance on Leaksealers, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-92-0517952-S (June 20, 1995, Hennessey, J.) is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff’s negligence and recklessness counts contained the same factual allegations about a bank’s unauthorized cashing of checks and differed only to the extent that the recklessness counts described the conduct as reckless. Id. Here, however, Stoll’s and Streett’s common-law recklessness and negligence claims are factually distinct. The common-law recklessness claims contain separate factual allegations that refer to Ariori’s state of mind, and in particular his knowledge about the traffic patterns in the geographic area described. Ariori, therefore, incorrectly asserts that Stoll and Streett have not specified new, distinct facts that would show a reckless disregard of circumstances. Consequently, unlike the factual allegations in Walters, the factual allegations here do support egregious or wanton conduct because, as in Smith and Alterio, these allegations involve a defendant speeding through a high-traffic area in spite of an awareness of driving conditions at the time and place. Accordingly, the motion to strike as to counts three and six of the complaint and the associated prayer for relief are denied.
B. STATUTORY RECKLESSNESS
Section 14-295 provides in relevant part: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a or 14-227m, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 14-227n or section 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." The Supreme Court and the Appellate Court have not yet identified what a legally sufficient complaint arising under § 14-295 must contain. See Oliva v. Giannattasio, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-18-6035753-S (June 11, 2018, Adams, J.T.R.). "There is a split of authority within the Superior Court on the specificity needed to properly allege a claim of statutory recklessness under [§ 14-295] ..." Hopwood v. Sciarretta, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV-01-0075934-S (July 11, 2002, Lager, J.) (32 Conn.L.Rptr. 474, 475). The majority view finds that a claim for statutory recklessness is legally sufficient if the plaintiff alleges both that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the specific statutes enumerated by § 14-295, and also that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. See Shaw v. Yahn, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-14-6011321-S (March 9, 2015, Danaher, J.); see also Hand v. Moore, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-05-2BJ-4003873-S (September 26, 2005, Jennings, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 83, 84) (holding, in relevant part, that "the specific pleading requirements for pleading common-law recklessness do not apply to pleading a case of statutory recklessness under § 14-295").
The minority view, on the other hand, "requires the plaintiff to plead specific factual allegations above and beyond the facts that were pleaded in the negligence count." Shaw v. Yahn, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-6011321-S. Pursuant to this approach, some courts have emphasized that "[t]he reiteration of acts previously asserted to support a cause of action in negligence, without more, cannot be transformed into a claim of reckless misconduct by mere nomenclature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markham v. Fleury, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 526775 (April 29, 1994, Leuba, J.).
In the present case, Stoll and Streett allege in counts two and five that Ariori "deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the safety of others" violated § 14-218a by operating his motor vehicle at a speed greater than was "reasonable having regard to the width, traffic, and use of the highway and the weather conditions" and violated § 14-222 by operating his vehicle "recklessly"; that these statutory violations were "substantial factors" in causing their injuries and losses; and that Ariori’s conduct proximately caused their injuries. Their allegations are similar to those alleged in Cuadra v. Hallock, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV-18-6011762-S (July 11, 2018, Harmon, J.). In Cuadra, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant "traveled at an unreasonable speed, given the width, traffic conditions, use of the highway, and weather conditions" in violation of § 14-218a; the defendant operated his vehicle recklessly in violation of § 14-222 by driving directly into a stopped motor vehicle; and that the defendant’s "recklessness or deliberate disregard ... was a substantial factor in causing the injuries." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court in Cuadra denied the motion to strike, finding that the allegations satisfied the pleading requirements under both the majority and minority approaches. Id.
Ariori incorrectly relies on cases whereby the negligence and recklessness claims differed only to the extent that the plaintiffs in those matters had added language amounting to a conclusion that the defendant was reckless in the recklessness counts. See Torres v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-00-0802360-S (September 6, 2001, Peck, J.) (granting motion to strike where recklessness and negligence counts contained same factual allegations but recklessness counts included additional phrases "wanton and reckless conduct" and "knowingly or with reckless disregard"); Reed v. Sesta, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-98-0577273-S (June 29, 1998, Aurigemma, J.) (granting motion to strike because "[t]he allegation in the [recklessness count] offer[ed] no factual basis for showing that [the defendant’s] conduct was of an evil nature or performed with reckless indifference to the interest of the plaintiff"). As previously stated, Stoll and Streett allege more than mere negligence and legal conclusions.
In the present action, because of the explicit references to statutes enumerated by § 14-295, as well as the additional allegations that the statutory violations were "substantial factors" in causing their injuries and losses, and the allegations in the statutory recklessness counts are, like the ones in Cuadra, legally sufficient. Like Cuadra, Stoll and Streett do not simply add conclusory language to convert their negligence counts into statutory recklessness counts, but instead add factual allegations about Ariori’s alleged actions. Here, as in Cuadra, the statutory recklessness counts are distinct enough from the negligence claims to satisfy the pleading requirements under both the majority and minority approaches. Accordingly, the motion to strike as to counts two and five are denied, and the motions to strike the associated prayer for relief is also denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, counts two, three, five, and six of the complaint, as well as the associated portions of the prayer for relief, are sufficiently pleaded, and the motion to strike is therefore denied.