Opinion
Civil Action No. JFM 99-1740
July 12, 2000
Memorandum
Plaintiff Michael Stinson has sued his former employer, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC), alleging that his employment was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102 et seq., and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. Discovery has been completed, and defendants have moved for summary judgment. The motion will be granted.
I.
The HABC police department hired Stinson in February 1992. When he was hired, plaintiff was given a hearing test that indicated he had a hearing loss. However, the loss was not considered severe enough to interfere with his job duties. Plaintiff's first assignment was to start in the patrol division. On May 4, 1994, he was transferred to the tactical unit, which is responsible for serving warrants and assisting in drug arrests. The work of the tactical unit is substantially more demanding than that of other units in the police department.
Plaintiff received satisfactory performance evaluations while in the unit, but developed a personality conflict between plaintiff and his supervisor, Sgt. Fitch, developed. Fitch allegedly sought Stinson's removal for general performance problems and for difficulty writing reports. Fitch also reported to his supervisors that Stinson had difficulty hearing, and specifically that plaintiff had failed to hear and respond to a call for police assistance. Based on Sgt. Fitch's report about the incident, police management sent Stinson for a fitness for duty evaluation and transferred him December 9, 1994, from the tactical unit to the administrative, non-patrol quartermaster unit. During the next year while he was in the quartermaster unit, Stinson's hearing tests showed that his hearing had deteriorated so that he could no longer meet the minimum hearing requirements for an HABC police officer. Stinson continued to receive good evaluations after his transfer.
In November 1995, plaintiff retained Roger Malik as his attorney to advise him regarding his situation with the police department. Malik was known by defendants to be representing another officer, Mjr. Paul Benson, in that officer's suit against HABC for alleged employment discrimination. Meanwhile, after subsequent hearing tests, HABC removed Stinson's police powers on July 1, 1996. On July 15, 1996, Stinson filed a grievance contesting the removal of his police powers. On July 22, 1996, Stinson completed an affidavit providing evidence in support of Benson's charges of discrimination against the department.
On November 11, 1996, Stinson met with HABC officials to discuss available alternate jobs. Three jobs were reviewed in particular: maintenance clerk, part-time bus/van driver, and building monitor. Stinson declined those positions allegedly for fear that he would be mistaken for a "police spy" and that therefore his personal safety would be endangered. Stinson's employment with HABC was terminated on December 9, 1996. He was subsequently offered another position as a police dispatcher, which he also did not accept.
II.
Plaintiff argues that his termination violated the ADA because it was based on his inability to meet the hearing screening guidelines necessary for his position on the police force. Stinson does not argue that he should be allowed to continue his duties as a regular police officer despite the conclusions of his hearing tests. Indeed, it is undisputed that the extreme loss of high frequency hearing rendered plaintiff unfit for duty as a police officer. Rather, plaintiff argues that because he adequately performed his administrative functions in the quartermaster unit and there was never any allegation that he could not perform those functions because of his hearing, HABC had no medical reasons for terminating him from that position.
First, plaintiff's hearing loss arguably does not qualify as a disability under the Act because the impairment does not significantly limit any major life activity. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working for purposes of ADA, an employee must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that when the major life activity under consideration in ADA action is that of working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits" requires, at minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in broad class of jobs). While Stinson was unfit to perform the duties required of a member of the police force, there were other positions available that he could perform. Stinson merely declined to accept them.
Furthermore, plaintiff's argument ignores the fact that there was no permanent quartermaster position available when plaintiff was employed and that he was assigned to the quartermaster functions only until the resolution of his medical status. At the time, the positions were filled only by officers who had been injured in the line of duty or who were on administrative leave pending a disciplinary action. All police officers placed there temporarily were expected to return to their previous full-time positions after removal of their infirmity or after completion of the disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff was offered other, permanent positions, but declined to accept them. Accordingly, even were his hearing impairment considered to be covered by the Act, a reasonable fact finder cannot conclude that Stinson was fired because of his disability.
III.
Plaintiff also argues that he was terminated in violation of Title VII in retaliation for filing an affidavit on July 22, 1996, in Benson's employment discrimination case. Stinson alleges that defendants discovered that plaintiff had hired the same attorney as Benson, anticipated plaintiff's eventual support for Benson, preemptively removed his police powers, and then terminated Stinson soon after discovering that he had filed an affidavit supporting Benson. HABC disputes this charge and argues that it has demonstrated that beginning as early as November 1994 and up to July 1, 1996, Stinson's record was filled with medical findings about a concern of safety due to hearing loss.
The first instance of any protected activity by Stinson was on July 22, 1996, almost three weeks after his permanent removal of his classification as a police officer, and almost one and one-half years after the process of investigating whether Stinson could meet the medical screening guidelines had begun. Furthermore, police department supervisors were not even aware until at least October 1996 that Stinson had filed the affidavit or that he would serve as a witness in the Benson case, three months after plaintiff's reclassification, and before plaintiff was offered other positions in HABC. Plaintiff has therefore not presented sufficient evidence to support a causal connection between his participation in the Benson case, his previous permanent change of status, and his removal as an officer five months later.
In sum, HABC had legitimate medical reasons for terminating Stinson as a police officer, and these reasons were not a pretext for a retaliatory discharge. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. A separate order to that effect is being entered herewith.
Order
For the reasons stated in the memorandum entered herewith, it is, this 12th day of July 2000 ORDERED1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and
* Judgment is entered in favor of defendants against plaintiff.