Opinion
No. CV 07-4030612
January 15, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
The Plaintiff Eric J. Stiggle, Sr., brings this action against the defendants Connecticut State Troopers Michele Freeman, Robert Deny, Matthew Spina and Kevin Slonski challenging their conduct during an incident which occurred on July 3, 2004. The plaintiff was driving southbound on interstate 95 when he was stopped by trooper Derry. The plaintiff alleges that trooper Derry ordered the plaintiff to stop smoking and pointed a gun at the plaintiff. The plaintiff then fled trooper Derry in his vehicle and the State Police gave chase. The plaintiff's vehicle ran across stop sticks (stop sticks are hollow spikes attached to a rollout strip that police officers can throw across the highway to stop fleeing vehicles. State v. Brown, 84 Conn.App. 351, 356 n. 4). He lost control of the vehicle striking a telephone pole and careening into a swampy area. A female friend of the plaintiff's was in the vehicle with him during this chase incident. The plaintiff was allegedly ordered to exit the vehicle but the plaintiff said he could not do so because of injuries. The plaintiff was forcefully removed from the vehicle and handcuffed. He alleges that while handcuffed he was punched and kicked by troopers Derry and Spina. Plaintiff alleges that while he was in handcuffs he was shot by a taser gun by unnamed members of the Guilford police department who were not defendants in this matter. The plaintiff was then taken to Troop F State Police barracks in Westbrook, Connecticut. The plaintiff claims that he was not allowed to call his lawyer and was told that his passenger had died which was not correct. He subsequently was taken to Yale-New Haven hospital for treatment of his injuries. He claims that he suffers from nightmares and anxiety as a result of the incident. The plaintiff further claims that he has pain in his back and neck and suffered a stroke as a result of the taser application.
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss seeking to dismiss the complaint in its entirety because: a) sovereign and statutory immunity; as to the state statutory and common-law claims; b) eleventh amendment immunity as to the federal law claims; c) the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient evidence to support his eighth amendment violation claim; d) the plaintiff's allegations of negligence are barred by General Statutes § 4-165; e) the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; f) the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient evidence to support a claim of supervisory liability as against defendant Freeman and g) the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the Miranda violations.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gerlt v. South Windsor, 284 Conn. 178, 188 (2007); Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11 (2006). "A motion to dismiss is not designed to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint in terms of whether is states a cause of action." Pratt v. Old Saybrook, 225 Conn. 177, 185 (1993). "The doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Vejseli v. Pasha, 282 Conn. 561, 572 (2007). "The defense of sovereign immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss an action against the state." Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 227 (1983).
The pro se plaintiff's complaint sets forth five causes of action. Two relate to eighth amendment claims and two relate to the alleged failure to allow him to contact his attorney and not informing him of his Miranda rights.
"The eighth amendment of the United States constitution provides: excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 970 (1994). State v. Reynolds, 264, Conn. 1, 65 n. 51 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 (2004).
The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; the standard applies to convicted prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Also see Newlan v. State, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Middletown, docket No. X04 CV 02-0103313 (January 16, 2007, Beach, J.). "The eighth amendment only applies to convicted persons." Logan v. Connecticut Lottery Corp., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at New Britain, docket No. X03 CV 00-0503174 (August 31, 2001, Aurigemma, J.), citing Soltis v. Kotenski, 63 F.Sup.2d 187, 189 (D.Conn. 1999); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977).
"Eighth amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the state has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal protections . . . The State does not acquire the power to punish with which the eighth amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law . . . Because there is no formal adjudication of guilt against (the detainee at the time of the alleged cruel and unusual punishment), the eighth amendment has no application." Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983).
In that the plaintiff was not convicted at the time of the alleged abuse by the defendants his eighth amendment claims fail and motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the eighth amendment claims. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants failing to allow him to call his attorney constituted cruel and unusual punishment. "In the seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that when the subject is subjected to custodial interrogation, he must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of any attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired." Miranda rights are most often invoked by defendants in an effort to exclude evidence that has been obtained by prosecutorial forces via means allegedly forbidden by the Miranda protections. In the current matter, the defendant is attempting to use an alleged Miranda violation in order to obtain a monetary award. Such a use of Miranda is impermissible according to a majority of courts.
"Several circuits have held that no cause of action for money damage exists under § 1983 where police officers allegedly violate Miranda principles by either failing to give Miranda warnings or by continuing to question a defendant in custody after the request for an attorney. The Third Circuit held that the right protected under the fifth amendment is the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself in a criminal prosecution, whereas the right to counsel during custodial interrogation recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, is merely a procedural safeguard and not a substantive right." Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994). The Tenth Circuit agrees and recognizes that the remedy is to exclude the ill-gotten confession from evidence and not subject the police to civil liability for the failing to give Miranda warnings or for continuing to question a defendant in custody after he requests an attorney. Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976)."
Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to the four counts of the plaintiff's cause of action which relate to eighth amendment claims and Miranda rights violation claims.