Opinion
No. CV00 07 07 51
January 3, 2001
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION (Motion to Strike #103) CT Page 313
On or about January 26, 2000, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant. The plaintiff filed a Two Count Complaint directed to the defendant. The First Count alleged the defendant's negligence and the Second Count alleges statutory recklessness by the defendant pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. The plaintiff also claimed double or treble damages pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295 in his prayer for relief.
Sec. 14-295. Double or treble damages for persons injured as a result of certain traffic violations.
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.
The defendant has filed a motion to strike the Second Count contending that the Second Count should be stricken as it contains insufficient allegations to support a cause of action sounding in recklessness. The defendant claims that Count One sounds in negligence and that Count Two sounding in recklessness is entirely based on the same factual allegations supporting the plaintiff's claim for recklessness. Among several allegations of negligence in Count One, the plaintiff claims that the defendant "operated his motor vehicle at an unreasonable, improper and excessive rate of speed in violation of Connecticut General Statutes§ 14-218a. In the Second Count sounding in recklessness, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant "deliberately and/or with reckless disregard operated said vehicle at an unreasonable, improper and excessive rate of speed having regard to the curves, width, traffic and use of said highway and the intersection of said streets and the weather conditions then and there existing in violation of § 14-218a of the Connecticut General Statutes, which was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.
Sec. 14-218a. Traveling unreasonably fast. Establishment of speed limits.
(a) No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or road of any specially chartered municipal association or any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or on any parking area as defined in section 14-212, or upon a private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with this subsection, or upon any school property, at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions. The State Traffic Commission may determine speed limits which are reasonable and safe on any state highway, bridge or parkway built or maintained by the state, and differing limits may be established for different types of vehicles, and may erect or cause to be erected signs indicating such speed limits. The traffic authority of any town, city or borough may establish speed limits on streets, highways and bridges or in any parking area for ten cars or more or on any private road wholly within the municipality under its jurisdiction; provided such limit on streets, highways, bridges and parking areas for ten cars or more shall become effective only after application for approval thereof has been submitted in writing to the State Traffic Commission and a certificate of such approval has been forwarded by the commission to the traffic authority; and provided such signs giving notice of such speed limits shall have been erected as the State Traffic Commission directs, provided the erection of such signs on any private road shall be at the expense of the owner of such road. The presence of such signs adjacent to or on the highway or parking area for ten cars or more shall be prima facie evidence that they have teen so placed under the direction of and with the approval of the State Traffic Commission. Approval of such speed limits may be revoked by said commission at any time if it deems such revocation to be in the interest of public safety and welfare, and thereupon such speed limits shall cease to be effective and any signs that have been erected shall be removed. Any speed in excess of such limits, other than speeding as provided for in section 14-219, shall be prima facie evidence that such speed is not reasonable, but the fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than such limits shall not relieve the operator from the duty to decrease speed when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). A motion to strike shall be granted if "the plaintiff's complaint [does not] sufficiently [state] a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law." Mora v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn. App. 208, 211, 535 (1988).
A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings" (Emphasis omitted.) Id. "A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiff's complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts."Id.
"In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, CT Page 314 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). A motion to strike "is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "plaintiff's complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). "The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail." Mingachos v CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108-09, 491 A.2d 368 (1985).
"There is a wide difference between negligence and reckless disregard of the rights and safety of others, and a complaint should employ language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is relied on." Dumond v. Denehy, 148 Conn. 88, 91 (1958). The instant case, however, involves a statutory claim grounded in recklessness under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295 and merely requires that a plaintiff plead that another party violated certain statutes with reckless disregard in order for the trier of fact to consider awarding multiple damages. Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295 does not require the same specificity of pleading which is required to support a cause of action predicated on recklessness. Spencer v. King, 10 Conn.L.Rptr., No. 2, 48 (October 21, 1993, Higgins, J.); Warkentin v. Burns, 223 Conn. 14, 22 (1992); Ogletree v. Brown, 9 CSCR 908 (August 29, 1994, Lewis, J.); Switek v. Fournier, 1 Conn. Ops. 838, (July 31, 1995, Pickett, J.); Lombardi v. Santoro, Inc., CV94 0314825s, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, (December 22, 1994, Hauser, J.)
The court agrees with the plaintiff's position that all that is required under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295 is that if the plaintiff pleads that another party has operated a motor vehicle deliberately or with reckless disregard in violation of certain statutory sections, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages. The statute does not require the same specifications of pleading as under common law which is required to support a cause of action predicated on recklessness.
Accordingly, the motion to strike Count Two of the plaintiff's complaint is hereby denied.
THE COURT
by ARNOLD, J.