Opinion
C. A. 5:23-2951 -JDA-KDW
10-03-2024
Thomas Stewart, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Jeremy Stewart, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Jeremy Stewart. ECF No. 43. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. On July 25, 2024, at the request of Plaintiff, the court held an evidentiary hearing to receive information helpful in determining the amount of damages Plaintiff is entitled to seek against Defendant Stewart for the allegations detailed in Plaintiff's Complaint. Notice of the hearing was provided to Defendant Stewart at his last known address. Having considered the information provided in the record before the court, along with the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the court award Plaintiff $15,000.00 in compensatory damages and $10,000.00 in punitive damages against Defendant Stewart for the reasons outlined below.
I. Procedural History
This matter was originally filed on May 9, 2023 in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas against Defendants Jeremy Stewart, Karen Tuttle, Stephen Duncan, and Bryan Stirling and was removed to federal court on June 23, 2023. ECF Nos. 1; 1-1. On June 24, 2023, Defendants Stephen Duncan, Karen Tuttle, and Bryan Stirling filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 5. By order of the court dated May 13, 2024, the moving Defendants' Motion was granted, and those Defendants were dismissed from this case. ECF No. 35. The only remaining Defendant in this case is Jeremy Stewart.
On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service with this court, along with an Affidavit of Service. ECF Nos. 15; 15-1. The Affidavit of Service indicated that attorney J. Todd Rutherford, Esquireagreed to accept service on behalf of Defendant Stewart. After Defendant Stewart did not file an Answer or otherwise plead, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default as to Defendant Jeremy Stewart, and the Clerk entered an Entry of Default on November 16, 2023. ECF Nos. 23; 24. On January 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Damages Hearing. ECF No. 29. Plaintiff requested a hearing so that the court could assess an appropriate measure of damages against Defendant Stewart. On the date this Motion was filed, the order dismissing the other three Defendants had not yet been issued; thus, Defendants Tuttle, Duncan and Stirling opposed the Motion, arguing that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Plaintiff had not made a proper showing that default judgment may be entered against Defendant Stewart when Plaintiff's claims against the other Defendants remained pending. See ECF No. 30 at 2-3.
Mr. Rutherford has not made an entry of appearance in this case or otherwise indicated to the court that he represents Defendant Jeremy Stewart in the matter pending before this court.
After reviewing the pleadings in this case, this court issued an Order, dated May 17, 2024. This order pointed out the two-step process for obtaining a default judgment, noting that Plaintiff had not yet filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). ECF No. 38 at 3. Moreover, the court reviewed the copy of a deposition transcript, provided by Plaintiff, supporting his request for a damages hearing. ECF No. 29-1. This deposition was taken in a related state court case, Thomas D. Stewart, Jr. v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Richland County Court of Common Pleas, 2021-CP-40-01532 on June 19, 2023. See ECF No. 291. On the date of the deposition in this related state court case, Plaintiff's counsel had already filed the state court case (which was later removed to this court). After reviewing the deposition transcript, the court sua sponte raised some concerns about the validity of service effected upon Defendant Stewart. For this reason, the court requested further explanation from Plaintiff regarding the efforts to serve Defendant Stewart.
In response, Plaintiff provided further explanation, as well as supporting documents, reflecting the fact that they served Mr. Rutherford, who agreed to accept service on behalf of Defendant Stewart. ECF No. 40 at 3. Plaintiff also served both Defendant Stewart and Mr. Rutherford with copies of Plaintiff's Motion for Damages Hearing. ECF No. 40 at 3. The court then issued an order, directing Plaintiff to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), which Plaintiff filed on June 4, 2024. ECF No. 43. On June 20, 2024, this court issued a Notice of Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, advising the parties that a hearing would be conducted to consider evidence in making a determination of damages in this case. ECF No. 45. The court ordered Plaintiff to serve Mr. Rutherford and Defendant Stewart at his last known address with a copy of the Notice and the Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 45. The hearing was later rescheduled, and Plaintiff filed Certificates of Service indicating Plaintiff provided both Mr. Rutherford and Mr. Stewart with the notice of the rescheduled hearing. ECF Nos. 53; 54.
II. Factual Allegations
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that during the time he was incarcerated at Goodman Correctional Institution, a correctional officer, Defendant Jeremy Stewart, demanded that Plaintiff engage in a sexual act with him. ECF No. 1-1 at 5-6. Plaintiff was housed in protective custody after other inmates made multiple threats against his life and well-being. Id. On May 28, 2020, Defendant Stewart came to Plaintiff's cell several times and ultimately demanded Plaintiff perform oral sex on him. Id. at 6. By virtue of Defendant's default, he has been deemed to have admitted the truth of all well-pled factual allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint unrelated to the amount of damages. See Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(6).
III. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes the entry of default judgment when a defendant does not plead or otherwise defend in accordance with the Rules. United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982). The undersigned has reviewed the docket and finds that Defendant Stewart failed to plead or otherwise file a responsive pleading or appear in this case. To obtain a default judgment, a party must first seek entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a). Bruce v. T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00895-BHH-MGB, 2021 WL 5823002, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2021); see also Progressive Northern Ins. Co. v. Jackson, No. 5:19-cv-02002-JMC, 2020 WL 4904824, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2020). Once the clerk enters the entry of default, if the claim is not for a sum certain, the party may then seek a default judgment under Rule 55(b). Jackson, 2020 WL 4904824, at *3. The court may conduct a hearing to determine the amount of damages in such a case. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(2)(B). Here Plaintiff did not seek a sum certain in his Complaint. On July 25, 2024, the court conducted a hearing to determine the appropriate measure of damages.
Upon entry of default, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted all well-plead allegations of fact contained within the Complaint. Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780 (quoting Nishimatsu Const. Co. Ltd. v. Houston Nat.'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). However, the defaulting party is not deemed to have admitted conclusions of law, nor is the entry of default treated as a confession by a defendant that he is liable, and the plaintiff has a right to recover. Id. It is the court's task to determine whether the well-plead allegations within a complaint support the relief sought. Id. Plaintiff must prove damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Spangler v. Colonial Ophthalmology, 235 F.Supp.2d 507, 510 (E.D. Va. 2002).
IV. Analysis
a. Liability
Plaintiff sets forth the following facts to support his claim that Defendant Stewart engaged in serious sexual misconduct, thereby forming a sufficient basis to establish his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The following well-plead allegations are contained within the Complaint and deemed admitted by Defendant Jeremy Stewart, the defaulting party:
1. Jeremy Stewart was a Goodman Correctional Institution (“Goodman”) correctional officer. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 10.
2. In May 2020, Plaintiff was an inmate placed in protective custody at Goodman due to multiple threats made against Plaintiff's life and well-being. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 19.
3. On the evening of May 28, 2020, Defendant Stewart came to Plaintiff's cell for count. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 20.
4. That same evening, Defendant Stewart stared at Plaintiff in a way that made him uncomfortable, and Defendant Stewart came back a short time later to inquire about Plaintiff's plans for the evening. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 21; 22. Defendant Stewart also stated to Plaintiff, “I hope you're not planning on sleeping in all that.” ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 22.
5. Defendant Stewart returned later to Plaintiff's cell and asked him if he smoked cigarettes. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 23. Upon learning Plaintiff was a smoker, Defendant Stewart
left and returned with a pack of cigarettes he then gave to Plaintiff. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 23.
6. At approximately 1:50 a.m. on May 29, 2020, Defendant Stewart came into Plaintiff's cell while Plaintiff was asleep and demanded that Plaintiff perform oral sex on him. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 24.
7. Worried for his safety and the repercussions of refusing, Plaintiff performed said act. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 24. Plaintiff thereafter reported the incident and provided a towel that contained physical evidence related to the incident. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 25.
8. Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendant Stewart's deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's health and safety, Plaintiff suffered both mental and psychological injuries. ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 30.
Within his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged this event occurred on May 29, 2021; however, the undersigned believes this to be a clerical error because every other date alleged in the Complaint was on 2020, Plaintiff's testimony at the damages hearing was that this incident occurred on the same evening. See ECF No. 57, Transcript of Motion for Default Judgment, dated July 25, 2024, 4:19-25; 5:1-20.
Plaintiff provided the court DNA evidence that confirms sexual contact occurred between Defendant Stewart and Plaintiff. See Exhibit C, ECF No. 29-3, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division CODIS Hit Notification. Additionally, Plaintiff has provided evidence in the form of Defendant Stewart's testimony acknowledging that sexual contact between a guard and an inmate is against South Carolina Department of Corrections Policy, regardless of whether any such contact is consensual. See Exhibit A, ECF No. 29-1, Deposition of Jeremy Stewart, 49:23-25; 50:10-20; 51:9-19.
Plaintiff asserts one cause of action, albeit pursuant to the “South Carolina Constitution, the United States Constitution and § 1983.” In his Motion for Damages Hearing, Plaintiff posits that Defendant Stewart acted deliberately indifferent toward Plaintiff's rights while Defendant Stewart was employed and working as a corrections officer at Goodman. In Plaintiff's Application for Default Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to damages stemming from a violation of his bodily integrity, which if accepted as true, sets forth an Eighth Amendment violation.
Plaintiff also contends his allegations show a violation of the right to be free from excessive force. ECF No. 43 at 2. In reviewing the Complaint, aside from one reference in the Complaint alleging Plaintiff had the right to be free from excessive force, the undersigned finds Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead an alleged excessive force claim, nor does he cite to case law analyzing cases where damages were awarded in excessive force claims.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011). The substantive due process rights afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment ensure that a person is not “subjected by anyone acting under color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm.” Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997). An inmate has a “constitutional right to be secure in [his] bodily integrity and free from attack by prison guards.” Carr v. Hazelwood, No. 7:07-cv-00001, 2007 WL 4410694, at *2 (W.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2007) (quoting Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993)). For an Eighth Amendment violation to exist, the alleged sexual conduct must be incompatible with “contemporary standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)).
A prison guard may violate the Eighth Amendment by sexually assaulting an inmate, because sexual assault is “not a legitimate part of a prisoner's punishment, and the substantial physical and emotional harm suffered by a victim of such abuse are compensable injuries.” Carr, 2007 WL 4410694 at *2 (citing Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Jackson v. Holley, 666 Fed.Appx. 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating, “there can be little doubt that sexual abuse is repugnant to contemporary standards of decency, and that allegations of sexual abuse can amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.”). A sexual assault against an inmate by a prison guard without a lasting physical injury may be actionable as an act which is “offensive to human dignity.” Carr, 2007 WL 4410694 at *3 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 119697 (9th Cir. 2000)). At least one other court has found that the act of forcing an inmate to perform oral sex on an officer is properly considered a physical injury. Etters v. Shanahan, No. 5:09-CT-3187-D, 2013 WL 787344, at *4-5 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 6, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 792834 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 4, 2013) (where the court was analyzing whether the plaintiff satisfied the physical injury requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
Much like any other Eighth Amendment claim, an Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim has both an (1) objective and (2) subjective component. Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2019); see Copeland v. Lanham, 17 F.3d 1433 (Table) (4th Cir. 1994) (applying the objective and subjective components to an Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim); see Carr, 2007 WL 4410694, at *3. To establish this claim, a prisoner must prove: (1) the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights was sufficiently serious; and (2) whether the officer had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind. Carr, 2007 WL 4410694 at *3. Courts have explained that an “inmate must allege facts on which he could prove that the unwanted touching had some sexual aspect to it.” Ellis v. Elder, No. 7:08-cv-00642, 2009 WL 275316, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4, 2009) (citing Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1998)). Here, Plaintiff has established that the unwanted touching was sexual in nature, and allegations of forced sexual activity, particularly when it involves a corrections officer responsible for an inmate clearly establishes a sufficiently serious deprivation of Plaintiff's rights.
The inmate must also allege facts showing that the guard acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” Carr, 2007 WL 4410694, at *3 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). When a case involves a rape or sexual abuse, the conduct itself is sufficient evidence that force was used maliciously and sadistically for the “very purpose of causing harm.” Carr, 2007 WL 4410694, at *3 (quoting Giron v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999)). Nor is there any evidence that the contact by the officer was in any way “a legitimate part of the prisoner's punishment.” See Ellis, 2009 WL 275316, at *3 (quoting Berryhill, 137 F.3d at 1076)). Here, Plaintiff alleges he was sexually assaulted in that he was made to perform oral sex on Defendant. Defendant agreed in his deposition that such activity is against the detention center policy, whether consensual or not. Moreover, Plaintiff contends he suffered harm as a result of the incident, and he feared retribution if he did not comply with Defendant Stewart's demands. Such conduct is neither a legitimate part of punishment or incarceration, nor it is compatible with contemporary standards of decency. The undersigned therefore finds that the facts, as alleged and admitted to by Defendant by virtue of default, establish that Defendant Stewart violated Plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his right to bodily integrity. The question then becomes with respect to the relief sought by Plaintiff, what is an appropriate measure of his damages.
b. Damages Hearing
The hearing to establish an appropriate measure of damages was held on July 25, 2024, with both Plaintiff and his counsel present. Prior to the beginning of the hearing, the court requested the court security officer to please check the court hallways to determine whether Defendant Jeremy Stewart or anyone appearing his behalf was present at the courthouse. See ECF No. 57, Transcript of Motion for Default Judgment, dated July 25, 2024, 3:15-24. Neither Defendant Stewart nor any representative of Defendant Stewart appeared at the hearing.
At the hearing, Plaintiff requested actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees. Tr. 4:3-5. In his Complaint, he did not specify what measure of damages he was seeking in the form of a sum certain. The court first requested that Plaintiff submit a petition for fees to the court, which the court has not yet received. Following the entry of the order ruling on this Motion, Plaintiff will be afforded fourteen days to provide the court a Petition for fees. At the hearing, the only testimony presented was from Plaintiff. He testified that on the evening in question, he was “awoken by Jeremy Stewart” and was asked to provide his SCDC number. Plaintiff explained he had been moved from population to protective custody where he would be alone. Tr. 6:1-4. Plaintiff testified Defendant Stewart stated, “I hope that you're not planning to sleep in all them clothes.” Tr. 6:4-6. Plaintiff further remembered Defendant Stewart inquiring whether he smoked cigarettes, and Plaintiff acknowledged that he did. Tr. 6:8-10. Plaintiff testified that around 11:00 p.m.-12:00 a.m., Defendant Stewart returned to Plaintiff's cell, placed cigarettes outside the door, and not long afterward, exposed his genitals to Plaintiff. Tr. 6:14-20. Plaintiff testified he felt coerced into performing oral sex on Defendant Stewart. Tr. 7:3-5. Plaintiff testified that engaging in this activity made him feel violated, ashamed, and degraded. Tr. 7:22-25; 8:1-4. Plaintiff recalls that the incident lasted for an “appreciable” period of time. Tr. 8:5-7. Plaintiff further explained that he lost “status with [his] peers” in the facility, that he was made fun of and mistreated by the other inmates as a result of the incident, and that he continues to feel shame through the present. Tr. 8:12-25. Plaintiff testified that the incident caused him anxiety, depression, and shame. Tr. 9:13. Plaintiff also testified that there was no one readily available, by way of phone or otherwise, in the area during the time the incident took place. Tr. 9:22-25; 10:1-11.
Once Plaintiff completed his testimony, his attorney made a request for damages in the amount of $5,000,000 in actual damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. Tr. 11:15-18. These dollar amounts were seemingly based on what Plaintiff (and his counsel) believed a jury would return were this to go to trial, as well as the fact that the nature of the act is such that Plaintiff continued to endure effects through present day. Tr. 11:10-22. Plaintiff's counsel further indicated that Plaintiff was trying to get therapy while in jail, and he planned to seek therapy upon his release from incarceration. Tr. 11:19-22.
The court conducted research into other cases that had similar facts and reached the trial phase. For example, in Lewis v. Fischer, the plaintiff received a $365,000 jury verdict, including punitives, but ultimately settled the case for $300,000 with respect to all defendants while the jury was still considering the liability of another defendant. 2010 WL 4079800 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010). In McLaughlin v. Allegheny County & LawShawn Walker, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the individual defendant for $100,000, where the plaintiff claimed she had sex with, and he demanded she show him her breasts, and he put his hands down her pants. 2006 WL 4459369 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2006). In Robinson v. Dart, the parties settled for $100,000 in a case wherein an officer touched an inmate's private parts, and then he and other officers punched, kicked and pepper sprayed the plaintiff. 2017 WL 6604436 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2017). In Walton v. Jail Administrator Moore, a case involving an inmate-on-inmate assault, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $60,000 in damages and $74,000 in attorney's fees. 2014 WL 8588743 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2014). In J.M. v. County of Los Angeles, the parties agreed to settle a lawsuit involving female inmates of a detention center who were allegedly sexually assaulted by a deputy for $2.25 million; however, there were multiple causes of actions, including municipal liability and negligent supervision. 2018 WL 8017138 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 1, 2018).
The court then asked Plaintiff's counsel several questions. First, the court was apprised that
Plaintiff is scheduled to be released in April 2027. Tr. 12:4-7. The court then inquired whether all treatment Plaintiff has received to date has been through the prison system, to which Plaintiff's counsel confirmed was true. Tr. 12:21-25. Plaintiff's counsel further explained that, to his knowledge, Plaintiff's treatment was limited to psychological counseling, that when Plaintiff sought such counseling through the South Carolina Department of Corrections, he was directed to the chaplain. Tr. 13:2-4. The court asked whether there were records available to show the amount of treatment received to date. Plaintiff's counsel indicated that he did not believe there were any records available due to this being a psychological injury. Tr. 13:8-13. The court inquired whether Plaintiff intended to submit anything in regard to any past or future treatment, and Plaintiff's counsel indicated Plaintiff would stand on his testimony. Tr. 14:6-11.
Plaintiff's hearing testimony regarding the factual allegations surrounding the incident mirrors what was alleged in his Complaint. The undersigned previously found that the allegations, admitted by virtue of Defendant's default, establish that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were violated. The question becomes what amount of damages would fairly compensate Plaintiff for his injuries, and if appropriate, would penalize Defendant Stewart and deter other prison officials from engaging in similar conduct. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978) (explaining that § 1983 created a species of tort liability meant to compensate individuals for actual injuries, including emotional distress, caused by another's unconstitutional conduct); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 206 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Punitive damages are available under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”).
Plaintiff's testimony, as well as the allegations within the Complaint, entitle Plaintiff to some measures of damages. Clearly, Plaintiff has the right to be free from unwanted sexual advances or contact by an officer while he is incarcerated. Moreover, Plaintiff testified about the harm he suffered as a result of this violation. Other courts have found that the intentional, unwanted sexual touching is sufficient to show “physical injury” to authorize an award of compensatory damages for an inmate's mental and emotional distress. Morton v. Johnson, No. 7:13-cv-496, 2015 WL 4470104, at *7 (W.D. Va. July 21, 2015) (collecting cases). Likewise, punitive damages are available under § 1983 when “the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
While the undersigned agrees that Plaintiff is entitled to some measure of compensatory damages, these damages must be supported by “competent, sufficient evidence” in the record. Carey, 435 U.S. at 263-64. Testimony alone can support an award of compensatory damages. Bryant v. Aiken Regional Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1251 (4th Cir. 1996)). Here, Plaintiff's testimony included his feelings of shame and humiliation, and the fact that other inmates made fun of him as a result of the interaction with Defendant Stewart in May 2020. Plaintiff also testified that the incident caused him to suffer from anxiety and depression. The undersigned found his testimony to be competent and credible. There is also evidence within the record that Plaintiff produced a towel evidencing that the act in question occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated in protective custody. At the same time, Plaintiff did not provide any additional detail regarding the duration of the disparagement by fellow inmates, nor did he provide additional detail regarding the ways in which his mental health has been impacted in the long term. While he did testify that he suffers emotional harm through present day, he did not detail any manifestation of this harm, nor did he testify as to the frequency or duration of any mental health treatment or therapy. Plaintiff simply testified that he sought some form of treatment while he has still been incarcerated. See, e.g., Painter v. Blue Ridge Reg'l Jail Auth., No. 6:17-cv-00034, 2018 WL 3631895 (W.D. Va. July 31, 2018) (explaining that at the damages hearing after plaintiff's sexual assault, she testified about her ongoing mental health issues, her monthly mental health treatment, and her indefinite need for weekly therapy sessions to treat her PTSD, as well as the cost associated with this treatment). Further, even with inquiry by the court, Plaintiff did not provide this court with any information regarding the nature of treatment during his incarceration, or any detail regarding his plans to continue treatment upon his release in 2027. Indeed, the court was not provided any medical evidence to support Plaintiff's need for extended treatment or any longstanding impacts on Plaintiff's health, nor did Plaintiff provide any estimate as to the cost of treatment upon release from incarceration. While the undersigned agrees Plaintiff's testimony was credible, the undersigned does not agree that his testimony alone provides a sufficient basis to award him $5 million dollars in compensatory damages. Clearly, sexual assault is a serious violation, particularly when it occurs in the confines of a correctional facility. Thus, crediting Plaintiff's testimony regarding the mental and emotional impacts stemming from this incident and considering the fact that Plaintiff suffered an unwanted sexual touching during this one incident, the undersigned recommends an award of $15,000.00 in compensatory damages.
In determining an appropriate measure of damages, the undersigned considered what other courts considering prison-based sexual assault cases awarded. See Anselme v. Griffin, No. 3:20-cv-00005, 2023 WL 1930005 (W.D. Va. February 10, 2023) (awarding $12,790 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages); Carrington v. Easley, No. 5:08-CT-3175-FL, 2011 WL 2132850 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 8, 2011) (awarding $1 in nominal damages and $5,000 in punitive damages for an “unwanted touching” where there was no evidence that the plaintiff sought clinical, psychological, or any other type of treatment); Oxendine-Bey v. Harihan, No. 5:12-CT-3084-FL, 2015 WL 5330571, at *9 (E.D. N.C. September 14, 2015) (awarding $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages); Carrington v. Dorsey, No. ELH-19-3587, 2023 WL 5831088 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2023) (awarding $5,000 in compensatory damages to an inmate who alleges unwanted sexual activity forced upon him by a female correctional officer several years prior). In Etters v. Shanahan, the magistrate judge considering a plaintiff's allegations of multiincident sexual assault and rape of inmates by prison guards and noted that other courts have awarded compensatory damages ranging from $100,000 to $500,000. Etters, 2013 WL 787344, at *5 (emphasis added). In Etters, the court recommended a default judgment award of $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages to a plaintiff who was sexually assaulted and raped on at least four different occasions involving multiple sexual violations. Id. at *6. In Etters, the plaintiff was the only witness at the hearing; however, she produced six exhibits, including two handwritten statements from herself, as well as a department of corrections memorandum. Id. at *2. The plaintiff also testified that as a result of the incident she lost her job and schooling while incarcerated and she sought mental health treatment and still sees a mental health counselor once a month. Id. at *3-4.
Additionally, the undersigned recommends awarding some measure of punitive damages. While evidence within the record indicates that Defendant Stewart was not ultimately convicted of sexual misconduct, Defendant Stewart's conduct clearly involved “reckless indifference” or callousness to Plaintiff's right not to be subjected to unwanted sexual touching while incarcerated, and the record establishes that Defendant Stewart visited Plaintiff's cell several times prior to demanding Plaintiff perform oral sex on him. Additionally, the record establishes that Plaintiff felt coerced into complying with Defendant Stewart's demand, as Defendant Stewart was an officer where Plaintiff was incarcerated. Plaintiff's testimony regarding the comments made by Defendant prior to the incident suggest Defendant Stewart had formulated the idea to demand Plaintiff perform this act several hours prior to the incident. However, the undersigned does not find that the record supports a punitive damages award of $5 million dollars. Instead, the undersigned recommends an award of $10,000.00 in punitive damages to punish Defendant Stewart for his conduct and to deter other correctional officers from committing similar offenses, which is comparable to punitive damages awarded in like circumstances.
Defendant testified in his state court deposition that his criminal charges were dismissed. See Stewart Dep. 6:15-17. Likewise, Plaintiff's counsel asked Defendant Stewart in his deposition if he knew why his charges got dismissed, thereby implying Plaintiff's counsel was also aware that the charges were ultimately dismissed. Tr. 60:21-23.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 43, against Defendant Stewart, and award Plaintiff $15,000.00 in compensatory damages and $10,000.00 in punitive damages against Defendant Stewart in his personal capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The undersigned also instructs Plaintiff to file any petition for fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), within fourteen days after entry of default judgment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.