It is well settled that the State is entitled to amend an information at any time prior to the case being submitted to the jury so long as the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the offense charged or create unfair surprise. Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 243 S.W.3d 866 (2006); DeAsis v. State, 360 Ark. 286, 200 S.W.3d 911 (2005); Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999). In Kelch v. Erwin, 333 Ark. 567, 970 S.W.2d 255 (1998), this court analyzed the issue of whether a trial court properly allowed the State to amend an information to conform to the proof in the case.

[9-11] We have held that the presence of an accused in the proximity of a crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation is a relevant factor in determining an accomplice's connection to a crime. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999). Relevant factors include: (1) the presence of the accused in the proximity of a crime, (2) the opportunity to commit the crime, and (3) an association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation.

10. CRIMINAL LAW — INFORMATION — WHEN STATE MAY AMEND. — The State is entitled to amend an information at any time prior to the case being submitted to the jury so long as the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the offense charged or create unfair surprise. 11. CRIMINAL LAW — INFORMATION — CASE RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT ACTUALLY SUPPORTED STATE'S ARGUMENT. — Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999), the only case cited by the appellant in support of his argument that the circuit court erred in allowing the prosecution to amend the original information thirty-four days before trial to include an arson charge, actually supported the State's argument; in that case, the State was allowed to amend an information and add a charge one day before trial where the defense counsel was not surprised by the amendment; likewise, appellant could not have been "surprised" by the amendment of the information, because of numerous prior references to the fire; first, the affidavit for probable cause for his arrest alleged that there had been a fire at his home, that he had been drinking and wanted to kill himself, that his wife had reported that he "had previously set fire to his belongings when he was upset," and that the autopsy revealed that the child had been killed before the fire started; furthermore, six months before trial, a witness testified that his investigation of the cause of the fir

We do not agree. In Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999), this Court discussed the general principles surrounding the admission of photographs at trial: Ark.R.Evid. 403 (1999) permits the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.

The jury may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence and may choose to believe the State's account of the facts rather than the defendant's. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999). [4] Premeditation is not required to exist for a particular length of time. It may be formed in an instant and is rarely capable of proof by direct evidence but must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime.

The State is entitled to amend an information at any time prior to the case being submitted to the jury so long as the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the offense charged or create unfair surprise. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 612, 999 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1999). The mere fact that an amendment authorizes a more severe penalty does not change the nature or degree of the crime.

We have long held that the trier of fact is free to believe all or part of a witness's testimony. Stewart v. State, 999 S.W.2d 684 ([Ark.] 1999). The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not for this court.

The mere fact that an amendment authorizes a more severe penalty does not change the nature or degree of the crime. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 612, 999 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1999). The record shows that the prosecutor originally charged Stover with possession of a controlled substance and possession of a weapon.

Furthermore, a defendant's improbable explanation of suspicious circumstances may be considered as proof of guilt. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999). A presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts, and the fact-finder may draw upon common knowledge and experience to infer the defendant's intent from the circumstances.

Nelson's credibility was weakened by the fact that he had more at stake than the officer and the fact that he gave an improbable explanation of his circumstances. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999). The decision of the trial court was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and we affirm.