Stewart v. State

Full title: UNDRE DEMON STEWART, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District, Houston

Date published: May 5, 2009

No. 14-08-00625-CR (Tex. App. May. 5, 2009)

Opinion

No. 14-08-00625-CR

Opinion filed May 5, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 241st District Court Smith County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 241-0099-08.

Panel consists of Justices HEDGES, ANDERSON, and SEYMORE.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN S. ANDERSON, Justice.

A jury convicted appellant, Undre Demon Stewart, of aggravated sexual assault of a child and assessed his punishment at seventy-five years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Corrections and a $10,000 fine. On appeal, appellant contends (1) the court's charge erroneously permitted the jury to convict him without requiring a unanimous verdict, and such error requires reversal; (2) the trial court erred in failing to require the State to make an election thereby depriving him of his right to a unanimous verdict; (3) the State engaged in impermissible bolstering; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing an unqualified witness to testify as an expert. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.J. and her mother lived with A.J.'s maternal grandparents, Deloris and John Robinson, during the time period relevant to this appeal. In June 2007, Mr. Robinson found A.J., with her pants pulled down, lying on top of her older cousin, Kendrick, on the couch in their home. When Mrs. Robinson and A.J.'s aunt sat down with A.J. and asked her whether anyone had "messed with" or had sex with her, she told them that "Fat Daddy" had. Appellant, who is also known as Fat Daddy, is A.J.'s uncle. At trial, A.J. testified that appellant touched his private parts to her private parts on three occasions in January 2005. When the prosecutor asked her to indicate on a diagram what she meant by private parts, A.J. circled the female and male genitalia. A.J. testified that the first incident occurred one evening while appellant was babysitting her, her brother, and her cousins at appellant's mother's house. She testified that appellant made her get on top of him and he had sex with her. Afterwards, appellant told A.J. that he would "whoop" her if she told anyone. A.J. testified that she was afraid of appellant and feared telling anyone what had happened. Another evening, while appellant was babysitting A.J., her brother, and her cousins at A.J.'s grandmother's house, appellant again touched his private parts to her private parts. A.J. testified that after her grandfather caught her and Kendrick on the sofa in June, she told her grandmother what appellant had done to her. As a result of her outcry, A.J.'s mother and aunt took her to the hospital where a sexual assault examination was performed and she was interviewed by a police detective. Mrs. Robinson testified that, in June 2007, A.J.'s grandfather found A.J. lying on top of her cousin on the sofa in their home. Mrs. Robinson further testified that when they were caught, A.J.'s pants were down but Kendrick was fully dressed. When Mrs. Robinson and A.J.'s aunt confronted A.J. and asked her whether anyone had "messed with her," A.J. told them that appellant had done so. A.J. told her grandmother that appellant had warned her not to tell anyone and that she was scared. A.J. also told her that the first two incidents occurred at appellant's mother's house and the third incident occurred at her grandmother's home. According to Mrs. Robinson, A.J. told her the third incident occurred when appellant woke her up and bent her over the couch while standing behind her. A.J., however, did not describe to her grandmother in detail what occurred on those three occasions. Mrs. Robinson testified that while A.J. was confiding in her, her head was bent down, and that she appeared scared and embarrassed. On June 26, 2007, Susan Henson, a sexual assault nurse examiner, performed a SANE exam on A.J. A "SANE" exam consists of a detailed patient history, a head to toe assessment, a specific genitalia exam, and the collection of DNA evidence. A.J. told Henson that, on more than one occasion, appellant told her to take her clothes off and lay down, and then he "did it to [her]." A.J. also told Henson that appellant told her not to tell anyone or he would whip her. Henson noted that, during their conversation, A.J. averted her eyes, only answered when questioned and was hesitant in her responses, wrapped a t-shirt around her arms, and was solemn and quiet. Henson testified that, based on her training and experience, A.J.'s demeanor was consistent with someone who had been sexually assaulted. During the head-to-toe examination, Henson noted no trauma. Henson testified that the genitalia exam revealed a cleft on A.J.'s hymen. She further testified that the vaginal trauma was consistent with A.J.'s history and her mother's statement that A.J. had acted out sexually with her cousin. Based on her observations and the results of the SANE exam, Henson believed A.J. was a victim of sexual assault. Henson stated that she could not say whether A.J.'s vaginal trauma was caused by appellant or A.J.'s cousin. However, she testified that vaginal trauma is caused by penetration, as opposed to mere contact, and that A.J.'s vaginal trauma was more consistent with penetration by an adult rather than a child. When Henson asked A.J. whether there had been any anal contact, A.J. responded "yes to penis, no to finger." The examination revealed no trauma to A.J.'s anal area. Following A.J.'s outcry, Detective Paul Robeson of the Tyler Police Department conducted an investigation of the case. In the course of his investigation, he interviewed A.J., her mother, and her grandmother, and reviewed Henson's SANE report. Robeson testified that A.J. exhibited more knowledge regarding sexual matters than most ten year olds, and that such knowledge is learned rather than innate. Specifically, she spoke to him about vaginal and anal sex. Robeson testified that A.J. was extremely reserved and very quiet. Following the conclusion of the investigation, appellant was arrested in Arizona and transported back to Texas. After the State rested, defense counsel called appellant as a witness. Appellant testified that he began babysitting A.J., her brother, and her cousins in 1997 when he was in the seventh grade. According to appellant, he stopped babysitting A.J. in 2001 because he was no longer available due to his football practice schedule. He testified that he never babysat A.J. in 2005 when the incidents allegedly occurred. He denied having sex or otherwise acting inappropriately with A.J. The State called A.J.'s aunts, Gwendolyn and Jocelyn Black, as rebuttal witnesses. Gwendolyn testified that she spoke to A.J. in June 2007 following the incident involving her son, Kendrick, and that A.J. told what appellant had done to her. Gwendolyn and Jocelyn testified that appellant babysat A.J. and her cousins in 2004 and 2005. The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and assessed his punishment at 75 years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. Appellant timely filed this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jury Unanimity

In his first issue, appellant contends the jury charge erroneously permitted the jury to convict him with less than a unanimous verdict. He argues that such error was harmful and requires reversal of his conviction. The Texas Constitution requires a unanimous verdict in felony criminal cases. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 36.29(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). A unanimous verdict is more than a mere agreement on a violation of a statute — it ensures that the jury agrees on the factual elements underlying an offense. Francis v. State, 36 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Jury unanimity is not violated when the jury is disjunctively instructed on alternate means or theories of committing the same offense. Martinez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). However, when a defendant is charged with multiple offenses, the jury charge may submit the offenses in the disjunctive, but the trial court must instruct the jury that it must be unanimous in deciding which offense the defendant committed, and the record must demonstrate that the verdict is unanimous. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 747 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Appellate review of error in a jury charge involves a two-step process. Id. at 743. First, we must determine whether error occurred. Id. If error exists, we must then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal of the conviction. Id. 1. Error Analysis The court charged the jury, in relevant part, as follows:

[I]f you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 2nd day of January, 2005, in Smith County, Texas, the defendant, UNDRE STEWART, did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the contact or penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of [A.J.], a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of age and not the spouse of the defendant, by the defendant's sexual organ; then you will find the defendant, UNDRE STEWART, guilty of Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child, as charged in the indictment. (Emphasis added).

Appellant contends the disjunctive instruction in the charge allowed the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict. He argues that because the acts of penetration and contact are separate and distinct offenses, it is possible that some of the jurors believed that he was guilty of penetration while others believed that he was guilty of contact. Therefore, appellant reasons, the jury could have found him guilty of aggravated sexual assault without agreeing on the specific act that he committed. We begin our analysis by considering the applicable statutory provisions. Section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code provides, in relevant part:

(a) A person commits an offense:

(1) if the person:

. . .

(B) intentionally or knowingly:

(i) causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means;

(ii) causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by the sexual organ of the actor;

(iii) causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; [or]

(iv) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; [and]

. . .

(2) if:

. . .

(B) the victim is younger than 14 years of age.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). In Vick v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that

Article 22.021 is a conduct-oriented offense in which the legislature criminalized very specific conduct of several different types. Also, the statute expressly and impliedly separates the sections by "or," which is some indication that any one of the proscribed conduct provisions constitutes an offense. A more compelling demonstration of legislative intent is reflected in the specific conduct prohibited in the four sections applicable to this case. Section (i) prohibits penetration of a male or female child's anus or the sexual organ of a female child. The focus is on penetration of the child's genital area. Somewhat related is section (ii), which prohibits penetration of the child's mouth by the defendant's sexual organ. Both section (i) and section (ii) concern penetration of the child, one focusing on the genital area and the other on the mouth. In contrast, sections (iii) and (iv) address penetration and contact of another in a sexual fashion, by the sexual organ or anus of the child. The statute criminalizes many types of sexually assaultive conduct with a child. Yet, each section usually entails different and separate acts to commit the various, prohibited conduct. This specificity reflects the legislature's intent to separately and distinctly criminalize any act which constitutes the proscribed conduct. An offense is complete when a person commits any one of the proscribed acts. In sum, Art. 22.021 is a conduct-oriented statute; it uses the conjunctive "or" to distinguish and separate different conduct; and its various sections specifically define sexual conduct in ways that usually require different and distinct acts to commit. These considerations lead us to conclude that the Legislature intended that each separately described conduct constitutes a separate statutory offense.

991 S.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). Relying on Vick, and based on the record before us, we conclude the jury charge in this case submitted three distinct criminal offenses: (1) penetration of A.J.'s anus or sexual organ [subsection (i)]; (2) sexual contact with A.J.'s sexual organ [subsection (ii)]; and (3) sexual contact with A.J.'s anus [subsection (iv)]. The State, however, argues that the general rule enunciated in Vick — that each allegation under section 22.021 constitutes a separate offense — is inapplicable here because the act of penetration necessarily subsumes contact. See Hendrix v. State, 150 S.W.3d 839, 848 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) (finding no error implicating appellant's right to unanimous verdict where penetration alleged also necessarily included contact and, therefore, jury, at minimum, unanimously found appellant guilty of contact); see also Gonzalez Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 339 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2008, pet. denied) (recognizing exception to general rule that each allegation under section 22.021 constitutes a separate offense where one act alleged is necessarily subsumed by another alleged act, such as contact and penetration); Santee v. State, 247 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (concluding jury's finding of penetration necessarily included contact and, thus, appellant was not deprived of unanimous verdict); Valdez v. State, 211 S.W.3d 395, 400 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, no pet.) (finding no risk of non-unanimous verdict because contact alleged was necessarily subsumed within allegation of penetration); Tyson v. State, 172 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd) (noting that different types of conduct described in section 22.021 constitute separate offenses even if different types of conduct occur in same transaction except where one act would necessarily be subsumed by another, such as contact being subsumed by penetration). Here, however, A.J. testified that appellant touched his private parts to her private parts on three different occasions, and that at least one of those incidents involved penetration. Because the evidence shows that appellant contacted or penetrated A.J., or did both, on multiple occasions, the exception is inapplicable here. See Gonzalez Soto, 267 S.W.3d at 339 (concluding that because more than one incident of penetration (and contact) occurred, the exception to the general rule that the offense of contact is necessarily subsumed in the offense of penetration does not apply); Martinez v. State, 212 S.W.3d 411, 418-20 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. ref'd) (rejecting State's argument that offense of contact was subsumed in offense of penetration where victim testified to more than one act involving contact and those acts did not always involve penetration). By presenting the offenses disjunctively, the charge instructed the jury that it could convict appellant of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child if it found that appellant (1) penetrated A.J.'s anus or sexual organ, (2) had sexual contact with A.J.'s sexual organ, or (3) had sexual contact with A.J.'s anus. Where a disjunctive application paragraph contains distinct criminal acts, as here, then a jury must be instructed that it cannot return a guilty verdict unless it agrees unanimously that the defendant committed one of the acts. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 744; see also Francis, 36 S.W.3d at 125. In this case, however, the jury was not specifically instructed that it had to unanimously agree upon one of the offenses alleged.¹ Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred by submitting the separate offenses disjunctively without a specific unanimity instruction because it allowed for the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict.² See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 744 ("When the State charges different criminal acts, regardless of whether those acts constitute violations of the same or different statutory provisions, the jury must be instructed that it cannot return a guilty verdict unless it unanimously agrees upon the commission of any one of these criminal acts."); Francis v. State, 36 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (holding jury charge allowing for non-unanimous verdict concerning what specific criminal act defendant committed was error); De Los Santos v. State, 219 S.W.3d 71, 77 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (concluding charge that did not include specific unanimity instruction in aggravated sexual assault case allowed for possibility of non-unanimous verdict and, thus, was error); Martinez, 212 S.W.3d at 420 (holding charge instructing jury on aggravated sexual assault was erroneous where "reasonable possibility" existed that some jurors convicted appellant of offense of penetration on one occasion while other jurors convicted him of offense of sexual contact at other time); Martinez v. State, 190 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (finding disjunctive jury charge which permitted jury to convict appellant of offense of aggravated sexual assault of child if it found appellant had sexual contact either with sexual organ or anus of complainant without including specific unanimity instruction was error).³ 2. Harm Analysis Having found error in the court's charge, we must now determine whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743. The degree of harm from charge error requiring reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection. Id. Appellant concedes that he did not object to the charge based on the submission of the offenses of contact and penetration disjunctively.⁴ Because appellant failed to object, we may reverse only if the record shows "egregious harm" to the defendant. Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect "the very basis of the case," "deprive the defendant of a valuable right," or "vitally affect a defensive theory." Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750; Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). In making an egregious harm determination, reviewing courts assess the degree of harm in light of (1) the entire jury charge, (2) the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, (3) the arguments of counsel, and (4) and any other relevant information in the record. Ellison v. State, 86 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The Texas Constitution guarantees due course of law and provides that a defendant charged with a felony must be convicted by a unanimous jury. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19, art. V, § 13; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29; see also Kirchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Hendrix, 150 S.W.3d at 845. The Texas Penal Code requires that "no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.01 (Vernon 2003). In Hendrix v. State, we reversed a conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child because the jury charge instructed the jury on separate offenses under section 22.021 in the disjunctive. 150 S.W.3d at 849 ("Because the erroneous charge made it possible for the jury to return a less than unanimous guilty verdict, we find the charge error was harmful.").⁵ Several of our sister courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., Carty v. State, 178 S.W.3d 297, 302-03 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd); Tyson v. State, 172 S.W.3d 172, 178-79 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd); Clear v. State, 76 S.W.3d 622, 623-24 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); but see De Los Santos, 219 S.W.3d at 77-80 (holding trial court erred in submitting separate offenses disjunctively but that such error did not cause defendant egregious harm); Martinez, 212 S.W.3d at 418-19 (same); Martinez, 190 S.W.3d at 258-63 (same). In Cook v. State, we noted

A[t]he reasoning behind these opinions is that when a charge includes separate offenses in the disjunctive, it is possible that six jurors could convict the defendant on the first charged offense (while believing he was innocent of the second offense), and the other six jurors could convict him of the second offense (while believing he was innocent of the first). . . . Such an outcome would run afoul of the unanimous verdict rule.

192 S.W.3d 115, 118 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).⁶ As in Hendrix, the error in the jury charge here enabled the jury to possibly return a non-unanimous guilty verdict. Hendrix, 150 S.W.3d at 849. Because the erroneous charge made it possible for the jury to return a less than unanimous guilty verdict, we find the charge error was harmful. See id.; Clear, 76 S.W.3d at 623-24 (concluding charge error was egregious because "it deprived [the defendant] of his right to a unanimous jury verdict in that we cannot determine that the jury was unanimous in finding [him] guilty of either penetration offense charged.").⁷ Accordingly, we sustain appellant's first issue.⁸

1 Instead, the charge included a general instruction that "[y]our verdict must be UNANIMOUS, and after you have arrived at your verdict, you may use one of the forms attached hereto by having your Presiding Juror sign the particular form that conforms to your verdict."

2 In its brief, the State acknowledges that "the jury's charge in this case contained potential error."

3 In accordance with Ngo, we note that it is not error to submit the separate offenses of contact and penetration disjunctively. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 749. Rather, the error lies in "failing to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous in deciding which one (or more) of the . . . disjunctively submitted offenses it found appellant committed." Id.

4 In its brief, the State contends that "[a]ppellant did object to the court's charge on the basis raised in this appeal." However, a review of the record reveals that although defense counsel objected to the charge's application paragraph at trial, it was not on the same grounds as raised in this appeal. The relevant portion of the record reads, as follows:

THE COURT: Mr. Roberson, have you reviewed the final charge of the Court?

MR. ROBERSON: I have, Judge. I do have an objection to Paragraph IV. I have an objection, Judge, because it states "penetration of the anus or female sexual organ." And I have an objection, because, Judge, you have to have a unanimous verdict under the Code of Criminal Procedure. And you can have a situation where you're talking about the anus or female sexual organ of a child here can be a splitting of votes. You can have six say, hey, look, the anus, and six say female sexual [sic] verdict, and you don't have a unanimous verdict. So, therefore, Judge, I'm going to object to them having in the charge in Paragraph IV "anus or female sexual organ."

Thus, although defense counsel objected to the charge, it was to the submission of the language "anus or female sexual organ" rather than the language "contact or penetration," which is the issue appellant raises on appeal.

5 In Hendrix, appellant was charged with aggravated sexual assault in five separate cause numbers involving two complainants. 150 S.W.3d at 841. A jury found appellant guilty as charged in all five cases. Id. As noted above, we reversed one of the convictions after finding harmful error. Id. However, as to the other four causes, we concluded there was no error implicating appellant's right to a unanimous verdict because the penetration alleged also necessarily included contact, and a non-unanimous verdict was not possible. Id. at 848. We affirmed the trial court's judgment in those four cause numbers. Id. at 849.

6 In contrast to Hendrix, the trial court's charge in Cook instructed the jury disjunctively on different manner or means of committing a single offense, not on separate offenses. See id. at 118-19. The Cook court concluded that the charge did not violate the unanimous verdict rule and upheld the defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. See id. at 119.

7 The instant case was transferred to this Court from the Twelfth Court of Appeals. On March 10, 2008, the Texas Supreme Court ordered a number of amendments to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, one of which was to Rule 41.3. See Order Amending Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mar. 10, 2008 (Tex. Misc. Docket No. 08-9017). The amended rule, effective September 1, 2008, provides, in relevant part:

In cases transferred by the Supreme Court from one court of appeals to another, the court of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if the transferee court's decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court. The court's opinion may state whether the outcome would have been different had the transferee court not been required to decide the case in accordance with the transferor court's precedent.

Id. We have been unable to locate any authority from the Twelfth Court, nor has either party directed us to any, addressing the issue presented here, namely, whether a charge that instructs a jury on separate section 22.021 offenses in the disjunctive and, thus, permits the jury to return a less than unanimous verdict, is harmful error. In the absence of any such precedent, we apply the legal reasoning employed by this court in Hendrix.

8 In light of our disposition of appellant's first issue, we need not address issues two through four. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.