Opinion
Civil Action No. AW-01-302
May 23, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court are Prince George's County, Maryland, et. al.'s ("Defendants") Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery. Oppositions have been filed by Elaine Stewart ("Plaintiff") and replies filed by Defendants. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendants Motion to Dismiss Prince George's County Police as a party and grant the Defendants Motion for Bifurcation and a Stay of Discovery.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff has filed suit against Prince George's County, Maryland, Prince George's County Police Department, Target Stores, Inc., Target Store's Security Staff and various named and unknown police officers of Prince George's County, Maryland. The allegations in the complaint stem from the events of May 19, 2000. Allegedly, decedent Clarence Edward Stewart was shopping in the Target Store located in the Kettering Plaza Mall. Upon exiting the Target Store, Mr. Stewart was approached by Defendants and ordered back into the Target Store. Although, the details of what occurred next are not clear, eventually, Mr. Stewart was assaulted by the Defendants using pepper spray and police batons. At the end of the events on May 19, 2000, Mr. Stewart was deceased. The Plaintiff has filed various counts against the Defendants, both individually, and as Prince George's County, Maryland. Defendants seek to have any pending trial bifurcated, whereby all of the Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendant officers, would be resolved in the first trial, and all of the claims against Defendant, Prince George's County, Maryland, including the claims against the officers in their official capacity, would be resolved in a second trial. Additionally, Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Prince George's County, Maryland Police Department because the Defendant is not sui juris.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendants' Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery
A. Standard
Bifurcation is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), which states in pertinent part, "Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conductive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim. . ." Defendants argue that a single trial of the claims against the individual Defendants and Defendant Prince George's County, Maryland would be unduly prejudicial. The prejudice would occur with the attempt to introduce evidence of prior acts and complaints against the individual Defendants, as well as, Prince George's County, Maryland. Furthermore, a stay of discover as to issues present for the second trial would conserve the resources of both parties and serve to provide judicial economy if there is no need for a second trial. Plaintiff counters the Defendants argument by stating that the Plaintiffs' case would be prejudiced due to the financial hardship in having to try two cases. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the facts connect the claims between the individual officers and the County. Finally, Plaintiff argues that a stay of discovery would hamper the Plaintiff's efforts to gather evidence from the Defendants for its trial preparations.
B. Discussion
This Court addressed the issue of bifurcation in the context of police assault cases in Dawson v. Prince George's County, et. al., 896 F. Supp. 537 (1995). In deciding the issue of bifurcation, the Court must analyze the claims brought forward by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has alleged various common law claims, state claims, and federal claims against the individual officers, the County, and Target Stores. Among the claims advanced by the Plaintiff are federal civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has brought § 1983 claims against individual officers for the purpose of imposing liability acting under the color of state law, and against Prince George's County, Maryland, to show a pattern and practice of police abuse as well as for vicarious liability. A court may not impose vicarious liability under a § 1983 action against the County without proving that "active" Defendants (individual officers involved in the assault and subsequent death) have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 540. See Marryshow v. Bladensburg, 139 F.R.D. 318 (D.Md. 1991). If Plaintiff is not able to show that individual officers violated his constitutional rights, than his claims against the county will fail. Even if the Plaintiff prevails against "active" defendants, the Plaintiff will still have to show that "the actions of the active Defendants subjecting him to Section 1983 liability were proximately caused by custom, practice or policy of an inactive Defendant." Id. (quoting Marryshow, 139 F.R.D. at 319) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691- 94(1978)).
In order for the Plaintiff to establish a pattern and practice case against the County, Plaintiff will have to submit evidence of prior incidents of police assaults, the details associated with such incidents, and how the policymakers in the County reacted to the incidents. While the evidence is indeed relevant to the Plaintiff's case, it is not the type of evidence the Court would allow to be introduced against the "active" Defendants in the case. The prejudicial effect of such evidence would clearly outweigh its probative value. F.R.Evid. 404(a). The Court believes that such evidence would unduly prejudice the "active" Defendants. In order to avoid this prejudice, the Court will grant the Defendants' Motion for Bifurcation pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 42(b). Plaintiff has not presented to this Court a viable reason as to why the evidence and claims against the County need to be included in a trial against the "active" Defendants. Additionally, in light of the Court's ruling, the Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery, with respect to issues relevant to the Plaintiff's case against the County, only, will be granted.
II. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Prince George's County, Maryland Police Department
A. Standard
It is well established that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In determining whether to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court must view the well-pleaded material allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true. See Flood v. New Hanover County, 125 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1997), citing Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1994); Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 1996); J.C. Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Court, however, is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981). Nor is the Court "bound to accept [Plaintiff's] conclusory allegations regarding the legal effect of the facts alleged." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1977). As the Fourth Circuit has explained, the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to provide a defendant with a mechanism for testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and not the facts that support it. See Neitzeke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989); Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994); United Mine Workers, 609 F.2d at 1085 (4th Cir. 1979) . Thus, a complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if it lacks a cognizable legal theory, or it alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 2A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 6 12.08 at 2271 (2d ed. 1982)).
B. Discussion
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Prince George's County Police Department as Defendant because the Defendant is not sui juris. There is no legal entity in existence designated as "Prince George's County Police Department." "Prince George's County, Maryland" is the only legal entity designated by the County Charter, Section 103, and authorized by Maryland Annotated Code, Art. 25A. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Prince George's County Police Department as a party to the above captioned case.
CONCLUSION
The Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Bifurcation and Stay of Discovery as to issues against the County, only. The Plaintiff must show liability of the "active" Defendants in order to establish a § 1983 claim against the County. Additionally, the evidence that the Plaintiff would have to present to show a pattern and practice under § 1983 would not be allowed against an individual officer. The prejudice to the officer would more than outweigh the relevancy to the case. Furthermore, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Prince George's County Police Department as a party because they are not a legal entity. An Order consistent with this opinion will follow.